You will recall that three weeks after Munich, on 21 October, the same day on which the administration of the Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian authorities, Hitler and Keitel had issued an order to the armed forces. This document is C-136, Exhibit U.S.A. No-104. by the armed forces for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. You will also recall that two months later, on 17 December, the Defendant Keitel issued an appendix to the original order directing the continuation of these preparations. This document is C-138, Exhibit U.S.A. No-105, and both these documents have already been introduce.
to be a war-like action. "To the outside world" it said--and I quote-
"it must appear that it is merely an action of pacification and not a war-like undertaking."
in fact, be met by the German Army. As in the case of Austria and liquidated Czechoslovakia.
With the German minority separated from Czechoslovakia, they could no longer use the cry, "Home to the Reich."
after the cession of the Sudetenland. Autonomy had been granted Nazi conspirators found fertile ground for their tactics.
The picture the Czechoslovakian official Government Report, Document No. 998-PS, groups in Germany.
Prior to 1938 Nazi aides were in close contact People's Party of Monsignor Andrew Hlinka.
In February and July, Father Hlinka's party and agreed to furnish one another with mutual assistance in pressing their respective claims to autonomy.
This in Prague to tell the Slovaks to start their demands for autonomy.
been introduced in evidence and read. figures in the Slovak Autonomist Movement and had paid agents among the higher staff of Father Hlinka's party. These agents undertook to render impossible any understanding between the Slovak Autonomists and the Slovak parties in the Government at Prague. Nazi leader in Slovakia and professed to be serving the cause of, Slovak autonomy while actually on the Nazi payroll. On 22 November, the Nazis indiscreetly wired Karmasin to collect his money at the German legation in Prague, and I offer in evidence Document 2859-PS as Exhibit USA 107, captured from the German Foreign Office files. I read this telegram which was sent from the German legation at Prague to Pressburg:
"Delegate Kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin he would appreciate it if he could personally draw the sum which is being kept for him at the treasury of the embassy. /signed/ Hencke."
Karmasin proved to be extremely useful for the Nazi cause. Although it is out of its chronological place in my discussion, I should like now to offer in evidence Document 2794-PS, a captured memorandum of the German Foreign Office which I offer as Exhibit USA 108, dated Berlin, 29 November, 1939. throws a revealing light both on Karmasin and on the German Foreign Office, and I now read from this memorandum:
"On the question of payments to Karmasin.
"Karmasin receives 30,000 Marks from the VDA (Peoples' League for Germans Abroad) until 1 April 1940; from then on 15,000 Marks monthly.
"Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial Germans (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle) has deposited 300,000 Marks for Karmasin with the German mission in Bratislava (Pressburg) on which he could fall back in an emergency.
"Furthermore, Karmasin has received money from Reich Minister SeyssInquart; for the present it has been impossible to determine what amounts had been involved, and whether the payment still continue.
"Therefore, it appears that Karmasin has been provided with sufficient money; thus one could await whether he would put up new demands himself.
"Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign Minister. /signed/ Woermann." subsidization of illegal organizations abroad. More important, it shows that the Germans still considered it necessary to supply their undercover representatives in Pressburg with substantial funds, even after the declaration of the so-called Independent State of Slovakia. with Durkansky and Mach, two leaders in the Slovak extremist group, who were accompanied by Karmarsin. The Slovaks told Goering of their desire for what they called independence, with strong political, economic and military ties to Germany. They promised that the Jewish problem would be solved as it had been solved in Germany; that the Communist Party would be prohibited. The notes of the meeting report that Goering considered that the Slovak efforts toward independence were to be supported, but as the document will show, his motives were scarcely altruistic. between Goering and Durkansky. This document was captured among the files of the German Foreign Office. style:
"To begin with Durkansy (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out declaration. Contents: 'Friendship for the Fuehrer; gratitude, that through the Fuehrer autonomy has become possible for the Slovaks'. The Slovaks never want to belong to Hungary. The Slovaks want full independence with strongest political, economic and military ties to Germany. Bratislava to be the capital. The execution of the plan only possible if the army and police are Slovak.
"An independent Slovakia to be proclaimed at the meeting of the first Slovak Diet.
In the case of a plebiscite the majority would favour a separation from Prague. Jews will vote for Hungary. The area of the plebiscite to be up to the March, where a large Slovak population lives.
"The Jewish problem will be solved similarly to that in Germany. The Communist Party to be prohibited.
"The Germans in Slovakia do not want to belong to Hungary but wish to stay in Slovakia.
"The German influence with the Slovak Government considerable; the appointment of a German Minister (member of the cabinet) has been promised.
"At present negotiations with Hungary are being conducted by the Slovaks. The Czechs are more yielding towards the Hungarians than the Slovaks.
"The Fieldmarshall--" That is Fieldmarshall Goering--"considers that the Slovak negotiations towards independence are to be supported in a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy.
"Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air Force for use against the East."
On 12 February a Slovak delegation journed to Berlin. It consisted of Tuka, one of the Slovaks with whom the Germans had been in contact, and Karmarsin, the paid representative of the Nazi conspirators in Slovakia. They conferred, with Hitler and the defendant Ribbentrop in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday, 12 February 1939. the captured German Foreign Office minutes of that meeting.
(reading)
"After a brief welcome Tuca thanks the Fuehrer for granting this meeting. He addresses the Fuehrer with 'My Fuehrer' and he voices the opinion that he, though only a modest man himself, might well claim to speak for the Slovak nation. The Czech courts and prison gave him the right to make such a statement. He states that the Fuehrer had not only opened the Slovak question but that he had been also the first one to acknowledge the dignity of the Slovak nation. The Slovakian people will gladly fight under the leadership of the Fuehrer for the maintenance of European civilization. Obviously future association with the Czechs had become an impossibility for the Slovaks from a moral as well as an economic point of view."
Then, skipping to the last sentence:
"I entrust the fate of my people to your care,'" addressing that to the Fuehrer. ful in planting the idea of insurrection with the Slovak Delegation. I refer to the final sentence of the document, which I have just read, the sentence spoken by Tuka: "I entrust the fate of my people to your care."
Nazis had a well disciplined group of Slovaks at their service, many of them drawn from the ranks of Father Hlinka's party. Flattered by the personal attention of such men as Hitler and the defendant Ribbentrop and subsidized by German representatives, these Slovaks proved willing tools in the hands of the Nazi conspirators. Germans still remaining within the mutilated Czechoslovak Republic. Kundt, Henlein's deputy who had been appointed leader of this German minority, created asmany artificial "focal points of German culture" as possible. Germans from the districts handed over to Germany were ordered from Berlin to continue their studies at the German University in Prague and to make it a center of aggressive Nazism. With the assistance of German civil servants, a deliberate campaign of Nazi infiltration into Czech public and private institutions was carried out, and the Henleinist movement gave full cooperation to Gestapo agents from the Reich who appeared on Czech soil. The Nazi political activity was designed to undermine and to weaken Czech resistance to the commands from Germany. and propaganda levels, the Czech Government was unable to take adequate measures against these trespassers upon its sovereignty. Government Report, Document No. 998-PS.
In early March, with the date for the final march into Czechoslovakia already close at hand, fifth column activity moved into its final phase.
In Bohemia and Moravia the FS, Henlein's equivalent of the SS, were in touch with the Nazi conspirators in the Reich and laid the groundwork of the events of 14 and 15 March.
I now offer in evidence document 2826 PS as Exhibit U.S.A.111. This is an article by SS Group Leader Karl Herman Frank, published in the publication Bohemia und Mahren, the official Periodical of the Reichs Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, edition May 1941, page 179. Czechoslovakia at the moment of Germany's greatest military successes. It is a boastful article and reveals with a frankness rarely found in the Nazi press both the functions which the FS and the SS served and the pride the Nazi conspirators took in the activities of these organisations. It is a long quotation.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going on with this tomorrow, Mr. Alderman?
MR. ALDERMAN : Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you take the whole day?
MR. ALDERMAN: No, not more than an hour and a half.
THE PRESIDENT: And after that the British Prosecutors will go on?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
(Whereupon at 1700 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 1000 hours on 4 December 1945).
Military Tribunal, in the matter of: The
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal: When the Tribunal rose yesterday afternoon, I had just offered in evidence Document 2826-PS, Exhibit USA 111. This was an article by SS Group Leader Karl Herman Frank, published in Bohmen and Mahren, or Bohemia and Moravia, the official periodical of the Reich's Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, the issue of March 1941, at page 79. It is an article which reveals with considerable frankness the functions which the FS and the SS had, and shows the pride which the Nazi conspirators took in the activities of these organizations. I read from that article, under the heading "The SS on March 15, 1939":
"A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable without political troops. To these are allotted the special task of being the advance guard of the political will and the guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German folk-groups, which have their home in some other people's state. Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly also organized its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes" -- or, in German -"Freiwilliger Selbstschutz, called FS for short. This troop was trained especially in accordance with the principles of the SS, so far as these could be used in this region at that time. The troop was likewise assigned here the special task of protecting the homeland actively, if necessary. It stood up well in its first test in this connection, wherever in the fall crisis of 1938 it had to assume the protection of the homeland, arms in hand.
"After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau, the tasks of the FS were transferred essentially to the German student organizations as compact troop formations in Prague and Brunn, aside from the isolated German communities which remained in the second republic. This was also natural because many active students from the Sudeten Gau were already members of the SS. The student organizations then had to endure this test, in common with other Germans, during the crisis of March 1939.
"In the early morning hours of March 15, after the announcement of the planned entry of German troops in various localities, German men had to act in some localities in order to assure a quiet course of events, either by assumption of the police authority, as for instance in Brunn, or by corresponding instruction of the police president, etc. In some Czech offices, men had likewise, in the early hours of the morning, begun to burn valauble archives and the material of political files. It was also necessary to take measures here in order to prevent foolish destruction. How significant the many-sides and comprehensive measures were considered by the competent German agencies, follows from the fact that many of the men either on March 15 itself or on the following days were admitted into the SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even through the Reich's leader of the SS himself or through SS Group Leader Heydrich. The activities and deeds of these men were thereby designated as accomplished in the interest of the SS.
"Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here placed themselves at once at their further disposition and became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators." Charter of three official documents. These are identified by us as Documents D-571, D-572, and 2943-PS. I offer than in evidence, respectively, D-571 as Exhibit USA 112; D-572, Exhibit USA 113 ; and 2943-PS, which is the French Official Yellow Book, at pages 66 and 67, as Exhibit US 114.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you cited 572?
MR. ALDERMAN: D-572 was Exhibit US 113. The first two documents are British diplomatic dispatches, properly certified to by the British Government, which give the background of intrigue in Slovakia--German intrigue in Slovakia. The third document, 2943-PS, or Exhibit USA 114, consists of excerpts from the French Yellow Book, principally excerpts from dispatches signed by M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin, to the French Foreign Office, between 13 and 18 March, 1939. I expect to draw on these three dispatches rather freely in the further course of my presentation, since the Tribunal will take judicial notice of each of these documents, I think; and, therefore, it may not be necessary to read them at length into the transcript. In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that day the Czechoslovakian Government dismissed those members of the Slovak cabinet who refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them Foreign Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within twenty-four hours the Nazis seized upon this act of the Czechoslovak Government as an excuse for intervention. The following day, March 11, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the Slovak Capital. I quote from Document D-571, which is US 112. That is the report of the British Minister in Prague to the British Government.
"Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart, and five German generals came at about 10 p.m. in the evening of Saturday, the 11th March, into a cabinet meeting in progress in Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia. When M. Sidor, the Prime Minister, showed hesitation, Herr Buerckel took him on one side and explained that Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czechoslovakia definitively. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her independence, because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest himself in her fate.
M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel for this information, but said that he must discuss the situation with the Government at Prague"--a very strange situation that he should have to discuss such a matter with his own Government before obeying instructions of Herr Hitler delivered by five German generals and Herr Buerckel and Seyss-Inquart.
ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where the facilities of the German broadcasting station were placed at his disposal. Arms and ammunition were brought from German offices in Engerau across the Danube into Slovakia, where they were used by the FS and the Hlinka Guards to create incidents and disorder of the type required by the Nazis as an excuse for military action. The German press and radio launched a violent campaign against the Czechoslovak Government; and, significantly, an invitation from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava. Tiso, the dismissed Prime Minister, was summoned by Hitler to an audience in the German Capital. A plane was awaiting him in Vienna. what the Nazi leaders liked to call the liquidation of Czechoslovakia were progressing with what to them must have been very satisfying smoothness. The military, diplomatic and propaganda machinery of the Nazi conspirators was moving in close coordination. As during the process of the Fall Gruen, or Case Green, of the preceding summer, the Nazi conspirators had invited Hungary to participate in this new attack. Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, was again greatly flattered by this invitation.
I offer in evidence Document 2816-PS, as Exhibit USA 115. This is a letter the distinguished Admiral of Hungary, a country which, incidentally, had no Navy, wrote to Hitler on 13 March 1939, and which we captured in the German Foreign Office files.
"Your Excellency, "I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the life of Hungary" -I suppose he needed some head waters for the non-existent Navy of which he was Admiral.
"In spite of the fact that our recruits have only been serving for 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasm. The dispositions have already been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will take place which will be followed by the big blow on Saturday" -- He doesn't like to use big words.
"Big Blow" is sufficient "I shall never forget this proof of friendship and your Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all times.
"Your devoted friend, "HORTHY."
THE PRESIDENT; Was that letter addressed to the Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin?
MR. ALDERMAN: I thought it was addressed to Hitler, if the President
THE PRESIDENT: There are some words at the top which look like a
MR. ALDERMAN: That is a letthead. As I understand it, the letter
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
MR. ALDERMAN: And I should have said it was--it ended with the-
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything on the letter which indicates that?
MR. ALDERMAN: Only the fact that it was found in the Berlin Foreign Office, and the wording of the letter and the address, "Your Excellency,"-we may be drawing a conclusion as to whom it was addressed; but it was for further military action against Czechoslovakia.
As it turned out the time table was advanced somewhat.
I would draw the inference that His of conduct he should pursue during the coming diplomatic pressure.
I offer in evidence Document 2815-PS as Exhibit U.S.A. 116.
This is the telegram "Berlin, 13 March 1939.
Prague. Telegram in secret code.
"With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today. In but pass them on here by cipher telegram.
Moreover, I must ask you and the Signed Ribbentrop."
On the afternoon of 13 March M. Tise, accompanied by Durcansky and M.
from Hitler to which I have heretofore referred. Late that afternoon Tise an ultimatum.
Two alternatives were given him: either declare the in dependence of Czechoslovakia or be left without German assistance; two, what were reffered to as the mergers of Poland and Hungary.
This decision Hitler said was not a question of days, but of hours.
I now offer in evidence Document 2802-PS as U.S.A. Exhibit No. 117, again a document captured in the German Foreign Office; German Foreign Office minutes of the meeting between Hitler and Tise on 13 March.
I read the bottom para lation.
The first paragraph I shall read is a summary of Hitler's remark.
displayed his customary disregard for the truth. I quote:
"Now he had sent Keppler as his minister to Pressburg, to whom Sidor "Now he had permitted Minister Tise to come here in order to make this question clear in a very short time.
Germany had no interests east of the Carpathian mountains.
It was indifferent to him what happened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not.
He did not wish for anything from Slovakia.
He would not pledge his people or Slovak people.
He would like to secure final confirmation as to what Slovakia really wished.
He did not wish that reproaches should come from at all.
He took a liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general, but instability.
He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason permitted Tise to come in order to hear his decision.
It was not a question of days, but of hours.
He had stated at that time that Slovakia wished to make it.
He would stand by his word so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence.
If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events, for which he was no longer responsible. In that case he would only intercede for German interests, and these did not lie east of the Carpathians. Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. She had never belonged to Germany.
"The Fuehrer asked the Reich Foreign Minister (the Defendant Ribbentrop) if he had any remarks to add. The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in this case a decision was a question of hours not of days. He showed the Fuehrer a message he had just received which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontiers. The Fuehrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would soon decide clearly for herself."
A most extraordinary interview. Germany had no interest in Slovakia; Slovakia had never belonged to Germany; Tiso was invited there. Now this is what happened: Those present at that meeting included the Defendant Ribbentrop, the Defendant Keitel, State Secretary Keppler, the German Minister of State Meissner. I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the presence of the Defendant Keitel on this occasion as on so many other occasions where purely political measures in furtherance of Nazi aggression were under discussion, and where apparently there was no need for technical military advice or value. Defendant Ribbentrop and with other high Nazi officials. Ribbentrop very solicitously handed Tiso a copy already drafted in Slovak language of the law proclaiming the end of Slovakia. On the night of the 13th a German plane was conveniently placed at Tiso's disposal to carry him home. On 14 March, pursuant to the wishes of the Nazi conspirators, the diet of Bratislava proclaimed the end of Slovakia. With Slovak extremeness acting at the Nazi bidding in open revolt against the Slovakian Government, the Nazi leaders were now in a position to move against Prague. On the evening of the 14th, at the suggestion of the German Legation in Prague, M. Hacha, the president of the Czechoslovak Republic and M. Chvalkowsky, his foreign minister, arrived in Berlin.
The atmos-
phere in which they found themselves might be described as somewhat hostile. Since the preceding weekend the Nazi press had accused the Czechs of using violence against the Slovaks and especially against the members of the German minority and citizens of the Reich. Both press and radio proclaimed that the lives of Germans were in danger. Such a situation was intolerable, and that it was necessary to smother as quickly as possible the focus of trouble, which Prague had become, in the heart of Europe--these peacemakers.
After midnight on the 15th at 1:15 in the morning Hacha and Chvalkowsky were ushered into the Reich Chancery. They found there Adolph Hitler, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Goering, and Keitel, and other high Nazi officials. I now offer in evidence Document 2798-PS as Exhibit U.S.A. 118. This document is the captured German Foreign Office account of this infamous meeting. It is a long document. Parts of it are so revealing and give so clear a picture of Nazi behavior and tactics that I shall read them in full.