"In the early morning hours of March 15, after the announcement of the planned entry of German troops in various localities, German men had to act in some localities in order to assure a quiet course of events, either by assumption of the police authority, as for instance in Brunn, or by corresponding instruction of the police president, etc. In some Czech offices, men had likewise, in the early hours of the morning, begun to burn valauble archives and the material of political files. It was also necessary to take measures here in order to prevent foolish destruction. How significant the many-sides and comprehensive measures were considered by the competent German agencies, follows from the fact that many of the men either on March 15 itself or on the following days were admitted into the SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even through the Reich's leader of the SS himself or through SS Group Leader Heydrich. The activities and deeds of these men were thereby designated as accomplished in the interest of the SS.
"Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here placed themselves at once at their further disposition and became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators." Charter of three official documents. These are identified by us as Documents D-571, D-572, and 2943-PS. I offer than in evidence, respectively, D-571 as Exhibit USA 112; D-572, Exhibit USA 113 ; and 2943-PS, which is the French Official Yellow Book, at pages 66 and 67, as Exhibit US 114.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you cited 572?
MR. ALDERMAN: D-572 was Exhibit US 113. The first two documents are British diplomatic dispatches, properly certified to by the British Government, which give the background of intrigue in Slovakia--German intrigue in Slovakia. The third document, 2943-PS, or Exhibit USA 114, consists of excerpts from the French Yellow Book, principally excerpts from dispatches signed by M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin, to the French Foreign Office, between 13 and 18 March, 1939. I expect to draw on these three dispatches rather freely in the further course of my presentation, since the Tribunal will take judicial notice of each of these documents, I think; and, therefore, it may not be necessary to read them at length into the transcript. In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that day the Czechoslovakian Government dismissed those members of the Slovak cabinet who refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them Foreign Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within twenty-four hours the Nazis seized upon this act of the Czechoslovak Government as an excuse for intervention. The following day, March 11, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the Slovak Capital. I quote from Document D-571, which is US 112. That is the report of the British Minister in Prague to the British Government.
"Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart, and five German generals came at about 10 p.m. in the evening of Saturday, the 11th March, into a cabinet meeting in progress in Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia. When M. Sidor, the Prime Minister, showed hesitation, Herr Buerckel took him on one side and explained that Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czechoslovakia definitively. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her independence, because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest himself in her fate.
M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel for this information, but said that he must discuss the situation with the Government at Prague"--a very strange situation that he should have to discuss such a matter with his own Government before obeying instructions of Herr Hitler delivered by five German generals and Herr Buerckel and Seyss-Inquart.
ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where the facilities of the German broadcasting station were placed at his disposal. Arms and ammunition were brought from German offices in Engerau across the Danube into Slovakia, where they were used by the FS and the Hlinka Guards to create incidents and disorder of the type required by the Nazis as an excuse for military action. The German press and radio launched a violent campaign against the Czechoslovak Government; and, significantly, an invitation from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava. Tiso, the dismissed Prime Minister, was summoned by Hitler to an audience in the German Capital. A plane was awaiting him in Vienna. what the Nazi leaders liked to call the liquidation of Czechoslovakia were progressing with what to them must have been very satisfying smoothness. The military, diplomatic and propaganda machinery of the Nazi conspirators was moving in close coordination. As during the process of the Fall Gruen, or Case Green, of the preceding summer, the Nazi conspirators had invited Hungary to participate in this new attack. Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, was again greatly flattered by this invitation.
I offer in evidence Document 2816-PS, as Exhibit USA 115. This is a letter the distinguished Admiral of Hungary, a country which, incidentally, had no Navy, wrote to Hitler on 13 March 1939, and which we captured in the German Foreign Office files.
"Your Excellency, "I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the life of Hungary" -I suppose he needed some head waters for the non-existent Navy of which he was Admiral.
"In spite of the fact that our recruits have only been serving for 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasm. The dispositions have already been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will take place which will be followed by the big blow on Saturday" -- He doesn't like to use big words.
"Big Blow" is sufficient "I shall never forget this proof of friendship and your Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all times.
"Your devoted friend, "HORTHY."
THE PRESIDENT; Was that letter addressed to the Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin?
MR. ALDERMAN: I thought it was addressed to Hitler, if the President
THE PRESIDENT: There are some words at the top which look like a
MR. ALDERMAN: That is a letthead. As I understand it, the letter
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
MR. ALDERMAN: And I should have said it was--it ended with the-
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything on the letter which indicates that?
MR. ALDERMAN: Only the fact that it was found in the Berlin Foreign Office, and the wording of the letter and the address, "Your Excellency,"-we may be drawing a conclusion as to whom it was addressed; but it was for further military action against Czechoslovakia.
As it turned out the time table was advanced somewhat.
I would draw the inference that His of conduct he should pursue during the coming diplomatic pressure.
I offer in evidence Document 2815-PS as Exhibit U.S.A. 116.
This is the telegram "Berlin, 13 March 1939.
Prague. Telegram in secret code.
"With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today. In but pass them on here by cipher telegram.
Moreover, I must ask you and the Signed Ribbentrop."
On the afternoon of 13 March M. Tise, accompanied by Durcansky and M.
from Hitler to which I have heretofore referred. Late that afternoon Tise an ultimatum.
Two alternatives were given him: either declare the in dependence of Czechoslovakia or be left without German assistance; two, what were reffered to as the mergers of Poland and Hungary.
This decision Hitler said was not a question of days, but of hours.
I now offer in evidence Document 2802-PS as U.S.A. Exhibit No. 117, again a document captured in the German Foreign Office; German Foreign Office minutes of the meeting between Hitler and Tise on 13 March.
I read the bottom para lation.
The first paragraph I shall read is a summary of Hitler's remark.
displayed his customary disregard for the truth. I quote:
"Now he had sent Keppler as his minister to Pressburg, to whom Sidor "Now he had permitted Minister Tise to come here in order to make this question clear in a very short time.
Germany had no interests east of the Carpathian mountains.
It was indifferent to him what happened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not.
He did not wish for anything from Slovakia.
He would not pledge his people or Slovak people.
He would like to secure final confirmation as to what Slovakia really wished.
He did not wish that reproaches should come from at all.
He took a liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general, but instability.
He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason permitted Tise to come in order to hear his decision.
It was not a question of days, but of hours.
He had stated at that time that Slovakia wished to make it.
He would stand by his word so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence.
If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events, for which he was no longer responsible. In that case he would only intercede for German interests, and these did not lie east of the Carpathians. Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. She had never belonged to Germany.
"The Fuehrer asked the Reich Foreign Minister (the Defendant Ribbentrop) if he had any remarks to add. The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in this case a decision was a question of hours not of days. He showed the Fuehrer a message he had just received which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontiers. The Fuehrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would soon decide clearly for herself."
A most extraordinary interview. Germany had no interest in Slovakia; Slovakia had never belonged to Germany; Tiso was invited there. Now this is what happened: Those present at that meeting included the Defendant Ribbentrop, the Defendant Keitel, State Secretary Keppler, the German Minister of State Meissner. I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the presence of the Defendant Keitel on this occasion as on so many other occasions where purely political measures in furtherance of Nazi aggression were under discussion, and where apparently there was no need for technical military advice or value. Defendant Ribbentrop and with other high Nazi officials. Ribbentrop very solicitously handed Tiso a copy already drafted in Slovak language of the law proclaiming the end of Slovakia. On the night of the 13th a German plane was conveniently placed at Tiso's disposal to carry him home. On 14 March, pursuant to the wishes of the Nazi conspirators, the diet of Bratislava proclaimed the end of Slovakia. With Slovak extremeness acting at the Nazi bidding in open revolt against the Slovakian Government, the Nazi leaders were now in a position to move against Prague. On the evening of the 14th, at the suggestion of the German Legation in Prague, M. Hacha, the president of the Czechoslovak Republic and M. Chvalkowsky, his foreign minister, arrived in Berlin.
The atmos-
phere in which they found themselves might be described as somewhat hostile. Since the preceding weekend the Nazi press had accused the Czechs of using violence against the Slovaks and especially against the members of the German minority and citizens of the Reich. Both press and radio proclaimed that the lives of Germans were in danger. Such a situation was intolerable, and that it was necessary to smother as quickly as possible the focus of trouble, which Prague had become, in the heart of Europe--these peacemakers.
After midnight on the 15th at 1:15 in the morning Hacha and Chvalkowsky were ushered into the Reich Chancery. They found there Adolph Hitler, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Goering, and Keitel, and other high Nazi officials. I now offer in evidence Document 2798-PS as Exhibit U.S.A. 118. This document is the captured German Foreign Office account of this infamous meeting. It is a long document. Parts of it are so revealing and give so clear a picture of Nazi behavior and tactics that I shall read them in full.
remembered that this account of the fateful conference on the night of March 14-15 comes from German sources, and of course it must be read as an account biased by its source, or as counsel for the defendants said last week "a tendentious account."
Nevertheless, even without too much discounting of the report on account of its source, it constitutes a complete condemnation of the Nazis, who by pure and simple international banditry forced the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. And I interpolate to suggest that international banditry has been a crime against international law for centuries.
I will first read the headings to the minutes. In the English mimeographed version in the document books the time given is an incorrect translation of the original. It should read 0115 to 0215. Conference between the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and the president of Czechoslovakia Hacha, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and of the Czechoslovakia foreign minister Chvalkowsky, in the Reich Chancery on 15 March 1939, 0115 to 0215 hours. Others present were General Field Marshal Goering, General Keitel, Secretary of the State von Weissacher, Minister of the State Meissner, Secretary of the State Dietrich, Counsellor of the Legation Hewel. Hacha opened the conference. He was conciliatory -- even humble, though the president of a sovereign state. He thanked Hitler for receiving him and he said he knew that the fate of Czechoslovakia rested in the Fuehrer's hands. Hitler replied that he regretted that he had been forced to ask Hacha to come to Berlin, particularly because of the great age of the president. Hacha was then, I believe, in his seventies. But this journey, Hitler told the president, could be of great advantage to his country because, and I quote "It was only a matter of hours until Germany would intervene." I quote now from the top of page three of the English translation. You will bear in mind that what I am reading are rough notes or minutes of what Adolf Hitler said "Czechoslovakia was a matter of indifference to him."
"If Czechoslovakia had kept closer to Germany it would have been an obligation to Germany, but he was glad that he did not have this obligation now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the little Carpathian Mountains.
He did not want to draw the final consequences in the autumn -
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, don't you think you ought to read the last sentence on page two?
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps so; yes. The last sentence from the preceding page was: "For the other countries Czechoslovakia was nothing but a means to an end. London and Paris were not in a position to really stand up for Czechoslovakia."
(Continuing) "Czechoslovakia was a matter of indifference to him." Then I had read down to --"But even at that time and also later in his conversations with Chvalkowsky he made it clear that he would ruthlessly smash this state if Benes's tendencies were not completely revised. Chvalkowsky understood this and asked the Fuehrer to have patience. (He often bragged of his patience). The Fuehrer saw this point of view, but the months went by without any change. The new regime did not succeed in eliminating the old one psychologically. He observed this from the press, mouth-to-mouth propaganda, dismissals of Germans, and many other things which, to him, were a symbol of the total positive.
(Sounds like a continental expression to me). At first he had not understood this but when it became clear to him he drew his consequences because, had the development continued in this way, the relations with Czechoslovakia would in a few years have become the same as six months ago. Why did Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce its Army to a reasonable size? Such an army was a tremendous burden for such a state because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political mission of the state. Since Czechoslovakia no longer has a foreign political mission such an army is meaningless. He enumerates several examples which proved to him that the spirit in the army had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the army also would be a source of a severe political burden in the future. Added to this were the inevitable development of economic necessities, and, further, the protests for national groups which could no longer endure life as it was." cance of that language of Adolph Hitler to the President of a supposed sovereign state and its prime minister. Having in his presence General Field Marshal Goering, the commander of the Air Force, and General Keitel. And continuing the quote:
"This it is that the die was cast on the past Sunday. I sent for the Hungarian ambassador and told him that I am withdrawing my hands from this country. We were not confronted with this fact. He had given the order to the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czechoslovakia into the German Reich. He wanted to give Czechoslovakia fullest autonomy and a life of her own to a larger extent than she ever had enjoyed during Austrian rule. Germany's attitude towards Czechoslovakia will be determined tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and depends on the attitude of the Czechoslovakian people and the Czechoslovakian military towards the German troops. He no longer trusts the government. He belives in the honesty and straightforwardness of Hacha and Chvalkowsky, but doubts that the government will be able to assert itself in the entire nation. The German Army had already started out today, and at one barracks where resistance was offered it was ruthlessly broken; another barracks had given in at the deployment of heavy artillery.
"At six o'clock in the morning the German Army would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German Air Force would occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form (supportable). In that case it would be easy for the Fuehrer to give Czechoslovakia at the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own, autonomy, and a certain national liberty.
"We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He would not like to torture and de-nationalize the Czechs. He also did not do all that because of hatred but in order to protect Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not have yielded,***" I suppose that is a bad translation for "had not yielded. "***the Czech people would have been exterminated. Nobody could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will that the Czech people should live a full national life and he believed firmly that a way could be found which would make far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting would break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in counter pressure. One would annihilate one another and it would then not be possible any more for him to give the promised alleviations. Within two days the Czech army would not exist any more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would result in a hatred which would force him***" that is, Hitler, "***because of his instinct of self-preservation, not to grant autonomy any more. The world would not move a muscle. He felt pity for the Czech people when he was readying the foreign press. It would leave the impression on him which could be summarized in a German proverb: 'The Moor has done his duty, the Moor may go.'
"That was the state of affairs. There existed two trends in Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and wished in memory to the past that Czechoslovakia would be conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which corresponded with his just mentioned suggestions.
"That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the Czech people. If it would come to a fight, the blood shed would also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a form of construction which would be so far-reaching for Czechoslovakia as she could never have hoped for in the old Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for the German people.
"The hours went past. At 6 o'clock the troops would march in. He was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to each Czech battalion. The military action was no small one, but planned with all generosity. He would advise him ***"that is, Adolf Hitler advise Paul Hacha, "***now to retire with Chvalkowsky in order to discuss what should be done." German minutes, said that he agreed that resistance would be useless. He expressed doubt that he would be able to issue the necessary orders to the Czech Army in the four hours left to him, before the German Army crossed the Czech Border. He asked if the object of the invasion was to disarm the Czech Army. If so, he indicated that might possibly be arranged. Hitler replied that his decision was final; that it was well known what a decision of the Fuehrer meant. He turned to the circle of Nazi conspirators surrounding him, for their support, and you will remember that the Defendants, Goering, Ribbentrop, and Keitel were all present. The only possibility of disarming the Czech Army, Hitler said, was by the intervention of the German Army. of the German minutes of this infamous meeting. It is next to the last paragraph on page four.
"The Fuehrer states that his decision was irrevocable. It was well known what a decision of the Fuehrer meant. He did not see any other possibility for disarmament and asked the other gentlemen***" that is, including Goering, Ribbentrop, and Keitel, ***"whether they shared his opinion which was answered in the affirmative. The only possibility to disarm the Czech army was by the German army." official British War Blue Book, at page 24 and I offer it as Exhibit USA 119. This is an official document of the British Government, of which the Tribunal will take judicial notice under the provisions of Article 21 of the Charter.
The part from which I read is a Dispatch from the British Ambassador, from Neville Henderson, describing a conversation with the Defendant Goering, in which the events of this early morning meeting are set forth.
"From: Neville Henderson. To: Viscount Halifax. Berlin, May 28, 1939. My Lord: I paid a short visit to Field Marshal Goering at Karinhall yesterday." Then I skip two paragraphs and begin reading with paragraph four. I am sorry, I think I better read all of those paragraphs.
"Field Marshal Goering, who had obviously just been talking to someone else on the subject, began by inveighing against the attitude which was being adopted in England towards everything German and particularly in respect of the gold held there on behalf of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia. Before, however, I had had time to reply, he was called to the telephone and on his return did not revert to this specific question. He complained, instead, of British hostility in general, of our political and economic encirclement of Germany and the activities of what he described as the war party in England, etc.
"I told the Field Marshal, that before speaking of British hostility, he must understand why the undoubted change of feeling towards Germany in England had taken place. As he knew quite well the basis of all the discussions between Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler last year had been to the effect that, once the Sudeten were allowed to enter the Reich, Germany would leave the Czechs alone and would do nothing to interfere with their independence. Herr Hitler had given a definite assurance to that effect in his letter to the Prime Minister of the 27th September. By yielding to the advice of his 'wild men' and deliberately annexing Bohemia and Moravia, Herr Hitler had not only broken his word to Mr. Chamberlain but had infringed the whole principle of self-determination on which the Munich agreement rested.
"At this point, the Field Marshal interrupted me with a description of President Hacha's visit to Berlin. I told Field Marshal Goering that it was not possible to talk of free will when I understood that he himself had threatened to bombard Prague with his airplanes, if Doctor Hacha refused to sign.
The Field Marshall did not deny the fact but explained how the point had arisen. According to him, Doctor Hacha had from the first been prepared to sign everything but had said that constitutionally he could not do so without reference first to Prague. After considerable difficulty, telephonic communication with Prague was obtained and the Czech Government had agreed, while adding that they could not guarantee that one Czech battalion at least would not fire on German troops. It was, he said, only at that stage that he had warned Doctor Hacha that, if German lives were lost, he would bombard Prague. The Field Marshal also repeated, in reply to some comment of mine, the story that the advance occupation of Witkowitz had been effected solely in order to forestall the Poles who, he said, were known to have the intention of seizing this valuable area at the first opportunity." notice of the Tribunal, to Dispatch Number 77, in the French Official Yellow Book, at page 7 of the book, identified as our Document 2943-PS. appearing in the Document Book under that number, and I ask that it be given an identifying number Exhibit USA 114. This is a Dispatch from M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador, and it gives another well-informed version of this same midnight meeting. The account, which I shall present to the Court, of the remainder of this meeting is drawn from these two sources, the British Blue Book and the French Yellow Book. I think the Court may be interested to read somewhat further at large in those two books, which furnish a great deal of the background of all of these matters. chancellory, he was in such a state of exhuastion that he needed medical attention from a physician who was conveniently on hand for that purpose, a German physician. When the two Czechs returned to the room, the Nazi conspirators again told them of the power and invincibility of the Wehrmacht. They reminded them that in three hours at six in the morning -
THE PRESIDENT: You are not reading? I beg your pardon!
MR. ALDERMAN: I am not reading, I am summarizing.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
MR. ALDERMAN: They reminded him that in three hours at six in the morning, the Defendant would cross the border. The Defendant Goering boasted of what the Wehrmacht would do if the Czech forces dared to resist the invading Germans. If German lives were lost, Defendant Goering said, his Luftwaffe would blaze half of Prague into ruins in two hours and that, Goering said, would be only the beginning. and air, the aged President of Czechoslovakia at four-thirty in the morning, signed the Document with which the Nazi conspirators confronted him and which they had already had prepared. This Document is TC 49, the declaration of 15 March 1939, one of the series of documents which will be presented by the British Prosecutor, and from it I quote this, on the assumption it will subsequently be introduced.
"The President of the Czechoslovakian State entrusts with entire confidence the destiny of the Czech people and the Czech country to the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich" -- really a rendezvous with destiny. the representatives of the Czech Government, the Wehrmacht had in some areas already crossed the Czech Border. British Blue Book, of which I ask the Court to take Judicial notice. This is a speech by Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from which I quote one passage. This is Document 2860 PS, which I have already offered and had identified.
"It is to be observed -- and the fact is surely not without significance -- that the towns of Maehrisch-Ostrau and Vitkovice were actually occupied by German S.S. detachments on the evening of the 14th March, while the President and the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia were still on their way to Berlin and before any discussion had taken place."