A. Yes.
Q. I read: "The following instructions have been sent out to all W.P.S.'s. "It has now been decided to provide all merchant ships of 12 knots or greater speed which are armed with protective weapons, with a single depth charge chute with hand release and 3 charges." Then there are some more detail: and at the end, a remark about the instructions, the training of the crews in the use of underwater bombs. The distribution list shows several naval officers. Is this use of depth charges by merchant men according to the experience of your submarines?
A. Yes, repeatedly.
Q. Speaking of a ship of 12 knot speed or more, can one say that a depth charge attack against the U-boat is a defensive measure?
A. No. Each depth charge attack against a submarine is definitely and absolutely an aggressive measure, an offensive measure, for the submarine dives is harmless underwater and the surface vessel which wants to carry out the depth charge attack, the attack approaches as closely as possible to the position where it assumes the U-boat to be, in order to drop as precisely as possible the depth charge on top of the U-boat. A torpedo boat, that is a warship, does not attack a submarine any different way.
Q. With this attitude on the part of enemy merchantmen, you want to justify the manner in which you attacked enemy ships. However, neutral ships also have suffered, and the prosecution accuses the command of the German U-boat arm for this. What do you have to say to that?
A. Neutral merchantmen, according to the political orders, the orders of the situation during the sea warfare, were only attacked without warning under such circumstances as when they were found in operation zones which had been definitely designated as such zones; or else, as a matter of course, they were attacked only when they did not act as neutrals should act, but acted like ships which were participating in the war.
Q. The prosecution has offered a document in evidence, according to which, in certain ocean areas, attack without warning against neutrals was authorized, beginning January, 1940.
I am referring to Document G.B. 194. I will read to you the sentence which is held against you.
THE PRESIDENTL What page did you say?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Page 30, sir. It is in the British document book of the prosecution, page 30. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q. I will read you the sentence which is held against you:
"In the Bristol Channel, attack against all ships without warning has been authorized, where it is possible to claim that mine hits had taken place." warned against using this shipping lane?
A. Germany had advised the neutrals on the 24th of November, 1939. The advice came through a note, and neutrals had been warned in this note against using these lanes. The neutrals had been given the recommendation to use the methods of the United States. These methods were that America had forbidden its ships to enter the waters around England, to avoid any incidents.
Q. I will present to you the note of which you speak, and I will at the same time submit it to the Tribunal as Doenitz Document 73, to be found on Page 206 of the Document book.
It is in Document Book 4, Page 206. November 24, 1939. It has the following text:
"To the missions, according to enclosed list.
"Telegram.
"Supplement to wire release of 22 October.
"Please inform the government there of the following:
"Since the warning issued, etc, etc, etc.
(Copy in document Doenitz 73, ending with "recommendations and warnings".)This is the note to which you referred?
A. Yes.
Q. In other words, according to your opinion, these sinkings beginning on 1 January were authorized in the Bristol Channel?
A. Yes; these ovean areas were clearly limited areas in which war actions took place continuously on both sides. The neutrals had been warned expressly against using these areas. If they entered this war area, they had to run the risk of coming into danger of being damaged.
the war. decision, in order to avoid complications with neutral countries. in your opinion, if this war measure was a legal one? role propaganda could play. Therefore, I think it might have been possible that our political leaders, for this reason, may have caused them to phrase this order in the manner in which they did. these political reasons? the U-boats, one for the fighting of enemy ships, and another for the purpose of the investigation of neutral ships. Were these orders actually executed? That was your responsibility, was it not? refuse to execute it. Of course, considering the large number of war actions, which ran into several thousands within the five and a half years of war, very few individual cases have occurred in which, by a mistake, an order of this sort was not followed.
Q How could such a mistake occur? occur at sea, not only during a war, but also during peace-times. These are caused by weather conditions, and other factors. of operational areas, although they were already outside of these limits? sailor knows, after a number of days of bad weather, some inaccuracy in the clearing of the position of a boat may occur. This may be caused by the submarine, but also by the steamer in question, the steamer commander possib believing that he was outside of the operational area when he was torpedoed.
It is very difficult to clarify such cases. to have done when you heard of such a case, a case in which a submarine exceeded its orders, even by a mistake? through education. They were told to be thorough, and to probe quietly and carefully before the commander took action.
This education had been carried through during peace-time. In our U-boat organization we had the motto, "We are a rock-bound firm." leaving port and after returning from a mission, had to report to me personally. That is, before leaving port he had to be briefed by me.
Q I beg your pardon. That was not at the time when you were still supreme commander, was it? commander. However, even then we did it once in a while. In any case, this was a rule with us during my time as commander of the submarine fleet. Therefore, a mission of a commander was considered completed and satisfactory, only then, after he had reported to me in full detail. If, after such a happening, I could find that a neglect had occurred, then I made my decision according to the situation of each case, and I decided whether disciplinary action or a court martial had to take place. at page 230, in Book 4 -- which I would like to read to you. This is the War Diary of the Commander of the U-boat Forces.
I read the remark of the 25th of September, 1942:
"U-512 reports that Monte Gorbea has been recognized as neutral ship before having been torpedoed. Assumed suspicions for being camouflaged English ship insufficient and do not justify sinking. The Commandant will have to stand court martial for his conduct. All boats at sea will be informed." read:
"Radiogram to all:
"The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy has personally and expressly ordered anew that all U-boat commanders are to comply exactly with the orders concerning the treatments of neutral ships. Violations of these orders will have incalculable political consequences.
"This order is to be disseminated at once to all commanders." you ordered in this document? return he would have to be responsible, before a court martial, because of the sinkings. The Commander did not return from this mission with his boat, and therefore no court martial took place. court martials affected the difficult tasks of the U-boat Commanders after you had ordered such a court martial?
A Yes. I remember one case against Captain-Lieutenant Kraemer, who had to be acquitted by the court martial because it was proven that, before firing the shot, it was known to be a breaker of the German blockade. He had read once more the warning of the ship and, in spite of that, was of the opinion that it was a different ship, an enemy ship, and that he, therefore, was authorized to sink it. In other words, it was not a case of neglect, and therefore he was acquitted. do you have the impression today that everything was done to cause the U-boat commanders to follow your orders explicitly, or did the U-boat commanders not follow you in keeping your orders?
A I don't think it is necessary to discuss this question; the sober facts speak for themselves. caused by submarines. The number of incidents is extremely low, and I know that this result can be traced to the unique leadership of all submarine commanders, coming from one office, and also to their proper training and their responsibility.
Excerpt from the war diary of the Naval War Command 1939 (KTB Skl, Part C, Issue VIII, 1939) To the missions, according to enclosed list. Supplement to wire release of 22 October. Please inform the government there of the following:
Since the warning issued on (date to be inserted here) regarding the use of English and French ships, the following two new facts are to be recorded: a) The United States has forbidden its ships to sail in a definitely defined b) Numerous enemy merchant ships have been armed. It is known that these armed ships have instructions to use their weapons aggressively and to ram U-boats. its warming, that in view of the increasingly frequent engagements, waged with all means of modern war technique, in waters around the British Isles and in the vicinity of the French coast, the safety of neutral ships in this area cou no longer be taken for granted. south and cast of the German-proclaimed danger zone, when crossing the North S. order to avoid losses of life and property for the neutrals, the German Cabinet furthermore feels obliged to recommend urgently legislative measures following the pattern of the U.S. Government, which in apprehension of the dangers of modern naval warfare forbade its ships to sail in an exactly defined area, in which according to the words of the President of the United States the traffic of American ships may seem imperiled by belligerent action. consequences brought about by disregarding recommendations and warnings.
to try to attack without being signted, and to act as though mine hits had taken place. Doesn't that indicate a bad conscience?
A No. During a war, there are no basic obligations to inform the enemy by what means one intends to do his fighting. In other words, this is not a question of legality, but a question of military or political usefulness. fighting she intended to employ or did employ; and I know how many headaches this caused me when I was supreme commander of the navy in order to employ the small means we had in the most economical manner. act as if mine hits had taken place. I considered this as military useful, because Intelligence had been in doubt whether mine sweepers or U-Boat defense means should be employed.
THE PRESIDENT: If the defendant is speaking so slowly because of the interpreter, I think he can go a little bit faster.
BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q The Prosecution has offered a document, G. B. 195 on page 32 of the Prosecution's document book. In this document there is an entry of the Order of the Fuehrer from the 18-7-1941 and it reads as follows:
"In the original operation area which equals the fighting area for the U.S.A. and which is not touched by ourselves, the attack upon boats in American or British escorts which involve U. S. merchantmen is authorized." cynical and opportunistic. Will you please explain to the Tribunal what the meaning of this order actually is? Beginning with the attack without warning within this operation area, or from this attack without warning, American ships expressly were excepted because, as we assumed, the political leadership wanted to avoid any possibility of an incident with the United States of America, I said the political leadership. The Prosecution regarding the treatment and attitude or the different attitude towards the neutrals, the Prosecution has accused me of having a masterful agility in adapting myself which was guided by my alleged cynicism and opportunism. It is obviously clear that my attitude towards neutrals is a purely political affair, and that particularly when one nation is at war this relation has to be decided exclusively by the political leadership. formation of this question. political leadership believed they should have to teat this neutral or that neutral. Regarding this particular case, knowing those orders which I received through the Chief of the Naval War Command from the political leadership, I would like to say the following: incident on the water with the United States. First, I have already stated that it was forbidden to the submarines to even stop American boats. Second -
Q One second, Mr. Admiral. To stop them where? Within the operation area, your outside the operation area?
A At first, everywhere. Secondly, that the American 300-mile safety zone was granted by Germany although according to the existing international law only a 3-mile zone was authorized.
Third -
THE PRESIDENT: An interesting distinction which may be drawn between the United States and other neutrals is net relevant to this trial, is it? What difference does it make?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Following the document which I submitted, G. B. 195, the Prosecution has made the accusation that Admiral Doenitz ran his U-boat campaign cynically and opportunistically; that is, in the matter that he treated one neutral well and the other one badly. This accusation has been made distinctly and I want to give opportunity to Admiral Doenitz to make his explanation to this accusation. He has already said that he had nothing to do with the formulation of this question.
THE PRESIDENT: What more can he say than that?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, according to the charge, a soldier is about made responsible for the orders which he merely executed. For this reason it is my opinion he must now have a chance to state whether he on his side had the impression he received cynical and opportunistic orders or whether to the contrary he had the impression that everything was done to avoid a conflict and that those orders which were given actually were necessary and legal.
THE PRESIDENT: You have dealt with this order about the United States ships, now.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I am almost finished.
BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q Did you want to say anything more about the third point?
(The Tribunal conferred).
THE PRESIDENT: You may go on, but we hope that you will deal, with this point shortly. It appears to be very unimportant to them.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, sir.
THE WITNESS: For instance, I had suggested that the port at Halifax or the British port of Nova Scotia, both of which ports are very important for warships and merchantmen, -- I had suggested to lay mine fields around these ports. The Fuehrer rejected this because he wanted to avoid every friction with the United States.
BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: orders regarding the treatment of American ships, never had the impression that this was caused by opportunism or cynicism but that everything was done with greatest self-control in order to avoid a conflict with the United States.
A Yes. This went so far when the American destroyers in the summer of 1941 received orders to attack German submarines, that is, before war started when they were still neutral, it was forbidden to me to fight back. I was then forced to order the submarines in this area not to attack British destroyers, in order to avoid that an American might be mistaken by a submarine for an English boat.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I will continue my examination of the witness. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: were sunk by German U-boats? necessary to do this? 2,472; and, of course, each attack did not lead to success. I would estimate that in these five and a half years perhaps five to six thousand fights actually took place. subordinate to you, give voice to any objections about the manner in which the U-boats acted, according to instructions? out your instructions so far as U-boat warfare was concerned? had been normal; I would have put him before a court-martial. self assumed the full responsibility for those orders which you either issued or which you transmitted?
Q In battle engagements of -boats, no doubt crews of merchant ships lost their lives.
Did you consider crews of foreign merchantmen as soldiers or as civilians, and for what reasons? they fought with weapons which had been put aboard the merchant ships. Of course, matters were such that, according to our knowledge, one or two soldiers of the Royal Navy were on board for the servicing or use of these arms. That is, the servicing of these munitions was taken from the rest of the crew.
Q And what kind of armament was that?
A That varied according to the size of the weapon. It might have been between five and ten. Then, munitions hampers were also included. The same applied to the servicing of depth bomb charges and their tubes. just as did the few soldiers who were present on board, and it was natural, of course, that the crew was considered as a unit. For instance, when we have a battleship we cannot distinguish between the man who is at the machine down in the boiler room and the man who services the gun up on deck. ships were combatants -- did that have any influence on the question of whether they were to be rescued or could be rescued? Or didn't it have any influence?
A No, in no way. As a matter of course, each soldier had a right to be rescued if circumstances permitted. This fact did have an influence upon the rights of the crews to be attacked and fought. beard the ship?
A Yes, nothing else was to be considered. That is, actual fighting with weapons, which were used for the attack against the ship. discussion between Adolf Hitler and the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima. This discussion took place on the 3rd of January, 1942. It is document GB-197, at page 34 of the document book of the prosecution. In this document Hitler promises the Japanese Ambassador that he will issue an order for the killing of these shipwrecked.
The prosecution concludes from this document that Hitler actually gave such an order aid that this order was carried out. an order of this type? about it through the submission of the record.
Q Grand Admiral, may I please ask you to answer my question? Did you receive a written order like that?
A No, I neither received a written nor an oral order. I did not know anything about this discussion at all, but I learned about this discussion through this piece of paper which was submitted to me here. this discussion, that is, January 1942?
at headquarters and told him about the situation in the U-boat warfare. and I would like to show you this note. It is Doenitz 16, to be found on page 29 of the Document Book 1.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I would like to submit this document as Doenitz Exhibit 16. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q I will read to you. The heading reads:
" Report of Commander in Chief of Submarines before the Fuehrer on 14 May 1942 in presence of supreme commander of Navy." That is Grand Admiral Raeder.
" Therefore it is necessary to improve the weapons of the submarines by all possible means, so that the submarines may resist. The most important development to that subject is the torpedo with rangepistol, which will increase precision of torpedoes shot against destroyers and therefore will put the submarine in a better position with regard to defense, and will in the first place also hasten essentially the speed of sinking of torpedoed ships. That way we economize torpedoes and protect the submarine from the enemy defense, as it may leave the place of combat quicker."
And now, the decisive sentence:
"A rangepistol will also have the great advantage that the crew will not be able to rescue themselves on account of the quick sinking of the torpedoed ship. This greater loss of crews will no doubt cause difficulties for the assignment of crews for the great American construction program."
Does this last sentence which I read mean that which you just mentioned?
THE PRESIDENT: You seem to attach importance to this document. Therefore, you should not put a leading question upon it. You should ask the defendant what the document means, and not put your meaning on it. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q Grand Admiral, what were these espositions to mean?
A They were to mean that as a result of the discussion at the Fuehrer's headquarters it was to be of value to us to arrive at a reasonable magnetic detonaor so that a more rapid sinking of the ships would result, so that in that way we would have those results which this report in the War Diary shows.
mean in this connection? that in a long and maintained attack a ship would be sunk that way, but now just one torpedoe would be required or very few, and through that, a more quic loss of the ship and of the crew would be brought about. broached whether other means might be possible to aim at a loss of life among the crows?
A Yes. In that way.
Q And by whom? a large percentage of the crews because of the excellence of the rescue means crews on now ships; and he asked whether against these rescue ships there might not be some action taken.
Q In What do you mean by "vorgehen" (action taken)? cipated, I rejected it very unequivocally and declared and explained that the only possibility to bring about more lossess among the crews could be brought in such a way that already at the attack through the intensified use of weapons, a more quick sinking of the ship would result. Therefore this report in my War Diary. I believe, because I received knowledge here through the Prosecution of the discussion between the Fuehrer and Oschima, that this question by the Fuehrer to Admiral Raeder and Myself was caused through this discussion this discussion which he had at that time with Oschima.
Q About this discussion, there is an affidavit by Admiral Raeder. You know the contents. Are the contents in line with your memory of this discussion
A Yes. Completely.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Then I would like to submit to the Tribunal as Doenitz 17 the affidavit of Grand Admiral Raeder; since it has the same content, I may dispense with the reading of it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was going to say in case it night help the Tribunal, I understand the defendant Raeder will be going into the witness box; therefore, I make no formal objection to this affidavit going in.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: It has the Number Doenitz 17 and is found on page 33 of the Document Book 1. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: vors in life-boats and told this to the Fuehrer The prosecution has presented two documents, one an order from the Winter of 1939 to 1940, and a second order going to the Autumn of 1942, in which you limited and prohibited rescue measures. Isn't there a contradiction present in the orders and in your attitude as far as the proposal of the Fuehrer is concerned?
A No. These two things are not connected with each other in any way at all. You are to distinguish very sharply here between the question of rescue or non-rescue, and that is a question of military possibility. During a war there may be the necessity to rescue. For example, if your own ship is endanged thereby, it will be militarily wrong, and, to say parenthetically it would not Be of value to the one who is being saved; and in no nation is any commander expected to rescue if his own ship is thereby endangered. is unequivocal and very clear, that rescueis to be denied, as is shown through their attitude and through their commands. rescue, of course. There may be other reasons, such as it is clear that throug a war the mission is of first importance. No one will rescue, for instance, if after the subduing of one's opponent another opponent is present. Then, as a matter of course, the combating of the second opponent is more important than the rescue of those who have lost their ship; and the other series of question concerns itself with the fighting of those shipwrecked.
Q Grand Admiral, whom do you call shipwrecked? Who in your eyes is shipwrecked?
Q Mr Great Admiral, whom do you call shipwrecked? who in your eyes is shipwrecked? sinking of their ship, are not able to fight any longer and are either in lifeboats or other rescue ships or who might be in the water. The combatting of these men is a question of soldierly ethics and under any and all circumstances is to be avoided. This avoidance is in the German Navy and U-boat warfare. With the exception of the one case, Eck, according to my definite and certain opinion, it was never exceeded. Never was there any order given in this connection, no matter what the decree might have been. Prosecution. It is your Permanent War Order Number 154.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: It is number GB 196 and in my book may be found on pages 13 to 15. you to turn to the last paragraph, which was read by the Prosecution. There it says, and I quote:
"Do not rescue crew-members nor take them along, and do not bother about boats of ships. Weather conditions and proximity of land are of no consequence. Concern yourself only with the safety of your own boat and try to achieve additional successes as soon as possible. We must be hard in this war. The enemy started it in order to destroy us, and we have to act accordingly." before May 1945. Can you fix the date a little more exactly? the end of November or the beginning of December 1939, and the reasons for my issuing the decree were as follows:
I had only a handful of U-boats at my disposal. In order, with this inadequate and small number, to bring about any effects, I had to come right up to the English coast, practically into the ports, and it came about that the magnetic mine was a very valuable weapon in war. Therefore I used these boats, equipped with mines and torpedoes, and, almost next to the ports, had them operate in waters close to the coast.
We fought there in constant and close contact and under surveillance of shore patrols and air patrols. Each U-boat which was sighted or reported there was fought by every possible means by U-boat fighting units on the sea and in the air. objectives of attack only ships which were protected. Therefore, it would have been suicide, in a position of that sort, the U-boat to surface and to rescue. I was the only one who had seen service in the first world war. I had to tell them in great detail and with urgency. It was hard for a young commander to judge a situation as well as I could.
Q Did you have experience with the rescuing of ships?
A Yes. In the first month of the war, I had some very bitter experiences. I had very great losses on sea areas far removed from any coast, and very soon through the Geneva Red Cross I had information that many members of crews had been rescued. It was clear that these U-boats had been lost above the water. If they had been lost below the water, the survival of personnel would have been impossible. I also had reports, as far as the human side was concerned, that there had been rescues, but they had been militarily very difficult and dangerous for the U-boats so now, as a master of course, where I did not want to fight in a free area but in waters adjacent to the coast, I had to warn the U-boats about the great danger of suicide. quite correctly--English U-boats in the Skagerrak and Kateggaat which were areas in which we dominated, the English had shown no concern for those who were shipwrecked, even though, without doubt, our defense was only a fraction of the British. immediate presence of defensive measures. Can you show us from this document whether that is actually true?
defense. It says, for example, "After you are out of range, the best safety--"
Q Where are you reading, please? The warning against fliers is there, and this warning about defenses is the sense in which we are concerned with the march. Otherwise, I would not have given an order about marching. In Number Two, it deals with the time prior to the attack. Here we deal with the conquering of moral objections which every soldier has before an attack. show that we are concerned with the fighting against enemy defenses.
A Then I will quote from 2(d). It says, "The protection-that is, the destroyers--may not have depth charges. Should one fire into a convoy from close quarters and then be compelled to submerge, one could always lose oneself among other ships of the convoy and thus remain sage from depth charges."