BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: orders regarding the treatment of American ships, never had the impression that this was caused by opportunism or cynicism but that everything was done with greatest self-control in order to avoid a conflict with the United States.
A Yes. This went so far when the American destroyers in the summer of 1941 received orders to attack German submarines, that is, before war started when they were still neutral, it was forbidden to me to fight back. I was then forced to order the submarines in this area not to attack British destroyers, in order to avoid that an American might be mistaken by a submarine for an English boat.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I will continue my examination of the witness. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: were sunk by German U-boats? necessary to do this? 2,472; and, of course, each attack did not lead to success. I would estimate that in these five and a half years perhaps five to six thousand fights actually took place. subordinate to you, give voice to any objections about the manner in which the U-boats acted, according to instructions? out your instructions so far as U-boat warfare was concerned? had been normal; I would have put him before a court-martial. self assumed the full responsibility for those orders which you either issued or which you transmitted?
Q In battle engagements of -boats, no doubt crews of merchant ships lost their lives.
Did you consider crews of foreign merchantmen as soldiers or as civilians, and for what reasons? they fought with weapons which had been put aboard the merchant ships. Of course, matters were such that, according to our knowledge, one or two soldiers of the Royal Navy were on board for the servicing or use of these arms. That is, the servicing of these munitions was taken from the rest of the crew.
Q And what kind of armament was that?
A That varied according to the size of the weapon. It might have been between five and ten. Then, munitions hampers were also included. The same applied to the servicing of depth bomb charges and their tubes. just as did the few soldiers who were present on board, and it was natural, of course, that the crew was considered as a unit. For instance, when we have a battleship we cannot distinguish between the man who is at the machine down in the boiler room and the man who services the gun up on deck. ships were combatants -- did that have any influence on the question of whether they were to be rescued or could be rescued? Or didn't it have any influence?
A No, in no way. As a matter of course, each soldier had a right to be rescued if circumstances permitted. This fact did have an influence upon the rights of the crews to be attacked and fought. beard the ship?
A Yes, nothing else was to be considered. That is, actual fighting with weapons, which were used for the attack against the ship. discussion between Adolf Hitler and the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima. This discussion took place on the 3rd of January, 1942. It is document GB-197, at page 34 of the document book of the prosecution. In this document Hitler promises the Japanese Ambassador that he will issue an order for the killing of these shipwrecked.
The prosecution concludes from this document that Hitler actually gave such an order aid that this order was carried out. an order of this type? about it through the submission of the record.
Q Grand Admiral, may I please ask you to answer my question? Did you receive a written order like that?
A No, I neither received a written nor an oral order. I did not know anything about this discussion at all, but I learned about this discussion through this piece of paper which was submitted to me here. this discussion, that is, January 1942?
at headquarters and told him about the situation in the U-boat warfare. and I would like to show you this note. It is Doenitz 16, to be found on page 29 of the Document Book 1.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I would like to submit this document as Doenitz Exhibit 16. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q I will read to you. The heading reads:
" Report of Commander in Chief of Submarines before the Fuehrer on 14 May 1942 in presence of supreme commander of Navy." That is Grand Admiral Raeder.
" Therefore it is necessary to improve the weapons of the submarines by all possible means, so that the submarines may resist. The most important development to that subject is the torpedo with rangepistol, which will increase precision of torpedoes shot against destroyers and therefore will put the submarine in a better position with regard to defense, and will in the first place also hasten essentially the speed of sinking of torpedoed ships. That way we economize torpedoes and protect the submarine from the enemy defense, as it may leave the place of combat quicker."
And now, the decisive sentence:
"A rangepistol will also have the great advantage that the crew will not be able to rescue themselves on account of the quick sinking of the torpedoed ship. This greater loss of crews will no doubt cause difficulties for the assignment of crews for the great American construction program."
Does this last sentence which I read mean that which you just mentioned?
THE PRESIDENT: You seem to attach importance to this document. Therefore, you should not put a leading question upon it. You should ask the defendant what the document means, and not put your meaning on it. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q Grand Admiral, what were these espositions to mean?
A They were to mean that as a result of the discussion at the Fuehrer's headquarters it was to be of value to us to arrive at a reasonable magnetic detonaor so that a more rapid sinking of the ships would result, so that in that way we would have those results which this report in the War Diary shows.
mean in this connection? that in a long and maintained attack a ship would be sunk that way, but now just one torpedoe would be required or very few, and through that, a more quic loss of the ship and of the crew would be brought about. broached whether other means might be possible to aim at a loss of life among the crows?
A Yes. In that way.
Q And by whom? a large percentage of the crews because of the excellence of the rescue means crews on now ships; and he asked whether against these rescue ships there might not be some action taken.
Q In What do you mean by "vorgehen" (action taken)? cipated, I rejected it very unequivocally and declared and explained that the only possibility to bring about more lossess among the crews could be brought in such a way that already at the attack through the intensified use of weapons, a more quick sinking of the ship would result. Therefore this report in my War Diary. I believe, because I received knowledge here through the Prosecution of the discussion between the Fuehrer and Oschima, that this question by the Fuehrer to Admiral Raeder and Myself was caused through this discussion this discussion which he had at that time with Oschima.
Q About this discussion, there is an affidavit by Admiral Raeder. You know the contents. Are the contents in line with your memory of this discussion
A Yes. Completely.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Then I would like to submit to the Tribunal as Doenitz 17 the affidavit of Grand Admiral Raeder; since it has the same content, I may dispense with the reading of it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was going to say in case it night help the Tribunal, I understand the defendant Raeder will be going into the witness box; therefore, I make no formal objection to this affidavit going in.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: It has the Number Doenitz 17 and is found on page 33 of the Document Book 1. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: vors in life-boats and told this to the Fuehrer The prosecution has presented two documents, one an order from the Winter of 1939 to 1940, and a second order going to the Autumn of 1942, in which you limited and prohibited rescue measures. Isn't there a contradiction present in the orders and in your attitude as far as the proposal of the Fuehrer is concerned?
A No. These two things are not connected with each other in any way at all. You are to distinguish very sharply here between the question of rescue or non-rescue, and that is a question of military possibility. During a war there may be the necessity to rescue. For example, if your own ship is endanged thereby, it will be militarily wrong, and, to say parenthetically it would not Be of value to the one who is being saved; and in no nation is any commander expected to rescue if his own ship is thereby endangered. is unequivocal and very clear, that rescueis to be denied, as is shown through their attitude and through their commands. rescue, of course. There may be other reasons, such as it is clear that throug a war the mission is of first importance. No one will rescue, for instance, if after the subduing of one's opponent another opponent is present. Then, as a matter of course, the combating of the second opponent is more important than the rescue of those who have lost their ship; and the other series of question concerns itself with the fighting of those shipwrecked.
Q Grand Admiral, whom do you call shipwrecked? Who in your eyes is shipwrecked?
Q Mr Great Admiral, whom do you call shipwrecked? who in your eyes is shipwrecked? sinking of their ship, are not able to fight any longer and are either in lifeboats or other rescue ships or who might be in the water. The combatting of these men is a question of soldierly ethics and under any and all circumstances is to be avoided. This avoidance is in the German Navy and U-boat warfare. With the exception of the one case, Eck, according to my definite and certain opinion, it was never exceeded. Never was there any order given in this connection, no matter what the decree might have been. Prosecution. It is your Permanent War Order Number 154.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: It is number GB 196 and in my book may be found on pages 13 to 15. you to turn to the last paragraph, which was read by the Prosecution. There it says, and I quote:
"Do not rescue crew-members nor take them along, and do not bother about boats of ships. Weather conditions and proximity of land are of no consequence. Concern yourself only with the safety of your own boat and try to achieve additional successes as soon as possible. We must be hard in this war. The enemy started it in order to destroy us, and we have to act accordingly." before May 1945. Can you fix the date a little more exactly? the end of November or the beginning of December 1939, and the reasons for my issuing the decree were as follows:
I had only a handful of U-boats at my disposal. In order, with this inadequate and small number, to bring about any effects, I had to come right up to the English coast, practically into the ports, and it came about that the magnetic mine was a very valuable weapon in war. Therefore I used these boats, equipped with mines and torpedoes, and, almost next to the ports, had them operate in waters close to the coast.
We fought there in constant and close contact and under surveillance of shore patrols and air patrols. Each U-boat which was sighted or reported there was fought by every possible means by U-boat fighting units on the sea and in the air. objectives of attack only ships which were protected. Therefore, it would have been suicide, in a position of that sort, the U-boat to surface and to rescue. I was the only one who had seen service in the first world war. I had to tell them in great detail and with urgency. It was hard for a young commander to judge a situation as well as I could.
Q Did you have experience with the rescuing of ships?
A Yes. In the first month of the war, I had some very bitter experiences. I had very great losses on sea areas far removed from any coast, and very soon through the Geneva Red Cross I had information that many members of crews had been rescued. It was clear that these U-boats had been lost above the water. If they had been lost below the water, the survival of personnel would have been impossible. I also had reports, as far as the human side was concerned, that there had been rescues, but they had been militarily very difficult and dangerous for the U-boats so now, as a master of course, where I did not want to fight in a free area but in waters adjacent to the coast, I had to warn the U-boats about the great danger of suicide. quite correctly--English U-boats in the Skagerrak and Kateggaat which were areas in which we dominated, the English had shown no concern for those who were shipwrecked, even though, without doubt, our defense was only a fraction of the British. immediate presence of defensive measures. Can you show us from this document whether that is actually true?
defense. It says, for example, "After you are out of range, the best safety--"
Q Where are you reading, please? The warning against fliers is there, and this warning about defenses is the sense in which we are concerned with the march. Otherwise, I would not have given an order about marching. In Number Two, it deals with the time prior to the attack. Here we deal with the conquering of moral objections which every soldier has before an attack. show that we are concerned with the fighting against enemy defenses.
A Then I will quote from 2(d). It says, "The protection-that is, the destroyers--may not have depth charges. Should one fire into a convoy from close quarters and then be compelled to submerge, one could always lose oneself among other ships of the convoy and thus remain sage from depth charges."
Then the next paragraph which deals with night conditions:
It says: "Stay above surface", and in staying above surface it perhaps goes in back of the ship, and every sailor knows that you should go around the back; and, further, in the third paragraph, I am again remaining above water for a blind to the U-boat, and I say:
"One cannot determine where the hole is in order toescape the enemy, and there might be new attacks."
Then the figure C E, and that is3 C, and there it says:
"Should it become necessary during an attack on a convey, because of being sighted by fliers, it is necessary to submerge to a depth of 20 meters, because of danger of being sighted or rammed."
We are talking about a convey. Now, we turn to point "D", and here it says:
"Should it become necessary to submerge to depth, because for example, the destroyer was proceeding directly toward the periscope, I believe in all instances he would then turn directions, and how one is to do and act under depth and attack, and the entire document
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is necessary to go into all of these military tactics. He has made a point on paragraph "E". He has given his explanation of that paragraph, and I don't think it is necessary to go into all of these o her tactics.
THE WITNESS: Yes. I have concluded, Mr. President. I want to say only the last paragraph about the non-rescue is not to be considered alone, and as such it has to be changed, first of all in this light; The U-boat in the presence of enemy defense had be be fighting near the English coast and in English ports, and secondly, the objective were ships in conveys, or protected ships as is shown from the document and I say very clearly.
Q You said that this order was given perhaps in December, 1939. Now after the issdance of this order did the German U-boats actually continue rescues? winter months. The U-boats, and according to my memory after the Norway enterprise, went out into the Atlantic, and to these U-boats the general order of rescue applies, which was only limited in this way; In that it was said not to rescue if the security or safety of your own ships did not permit it, and in this sense I would like to show the U-boats acted.
Q You wish to say then that you had reports from Gommanders about rescue measures?
and then through the war diary. rescinded, that is, formally rescinded? very shallow waters in the downs near the mouth of the Thames. It had been destroyed through depth charges, and for this beat in May, 1940, this order still applied. Then in the year 1940, after the Norway Campaign, the center of gravity in this direction was again placed in the open waters of the Atlantic, and for this boat this decree would not apply as to the facts of the rescue measures which I have just explained also. the first tool as to how U-boats were to act toward a convey, and then later it was not necessary to give instructions like that, for then the U-boat Commanders knew what they had to do and in my memory, at the latest, in November, 1940, the order was completely stricken.
Q Mr. Great Admiral. I have the table of contents of the Standing War Decree before me, dealing with the year 1942, and that may be found on page 16 of the document, and so I will hand it to you, and I wish to submit it as Doenitz No. 11. In this table of contents the number 154 deals with the order which I have just mentioned. This number is empty. Does itmean that this order did not a ply any more?
Q When were the standing orders for the year 1942 out together? you object to these measures? Did you criticize or prohibit them? great. If, for example. I had a report from a Commander to the effect that perhaps through hesitating too long with life beats, and perhaps a call had been made to the escorts for assistance and that he had been attacked by depth charges and had been damaged. That is something which would not have happened if he had left the scene of action. Then naturally I pointed out the things he had done militarily wrong in this connection, and I am of the opinion that I lost ships through rescue.
Of course, I cannot prove that because the boats are gone, but with the complete mentality of the mind of the Commander, it is entirely natural, and every sailor is of the opinion that rescue is the noblest and most honorary thing ha can do, and he knows that from the days of peace, and Ibelieve there was no officer in the Navy, and I believe it is trueof all the other nations in peace, who would not consider the medal ofrescue as the highest decoration he could have, and as a basic principle it is dangerous not to shift your position in war so that the security or safety of your own ship is first, and that war is a serious thing. is, that U-boats would not rescue when it was dangerous? end of 1939 boats were still operating, and then the different operations of 1940 which I have mentioned, and decree 154 applies during the Norway campaign, and then it went also into the spring of 1940, and this order of rescue or non-rescue, if your ship was endangered, was for the years 1940, 1941 and 1942.
Q Was this decree in writing? matter of course, and not only at the beginning of the war it was contained in certain orders of the Naval WarfareCommand, and bythe limitation of nonrescue, if the safety of your ship was at stake, that is taken for granted in every navy, and this was something I wasalways concerned with as I have stated. and this is your Number, Doenitz No. 22, Ibeg your pardon -- It isDoenitz No, 23, and is found on page 45 of the Document Book I. I will have this document submitted to you.
"According to instructions received from Naval War Command, submarines receive the order from F. 0. U-boats to take on board captains with their papers of ships sunk, if it is possible without endangering the boat or without impairing the fighting capacity."
How did this order come about? I did net quite understnad. What were the antecedents? captains are to be taken prisoner and that means to take them home, which, of course, is something different again from the matter of rescue. The naval war command -- and rightly -- was of the opinion that if we could not cause or bring about a high percentage, say 80 to 90 percent, of the crews of the sunk merchant-men home, to which rescue orders we gave cur support, which of course was taken for granted, then at least it is important that we have the most important and significant parts of the crews, that is, the captains -- have them taken away from our enemy for reassignment. That is why the decree to take the captains from their lifeboats and to take them along on the U-Boats as prisoners was issued. war? War Command. what results? years of the war it was maintained. But in general the result of this order was very slight. I personally can remember only a few cases. But through letters which I received from my commanders, and which I have read, I saw that there were a few more cases than I at first believed, altogetherperhaps ten or twelve cases at the most. just a few captains that were taken prisoner? How do you account for that?
A The chief reason, without doubt, was this: That the mass of the U-boats attacked enemy conveys, as the convey system of the enemy was perfected and the great bulk of the U-Boats were used in that connection.
In the other few cases, for reasons of safety of the ship, there wasn't always an approach to thelifeboats; it wasn't always possible to pick up such a captain.
And thirdly, I believe that the commanders of the U-Boats objected, and I believe correctly. They did not want to have a captain on board as long as all that. In any event, I know that the commanders were not happy about this order in any respect.
Q Mr. Grand Admiral, now I shall turn to a document which is really to be termed the nucleus of the accusation against you. It is Document GB-99, page 36 of the British Document Book. It is your wireless message of the 17th of September, about which the Prosecution asserts it to be a decree as to the destruction of these shipwrecked. It is of such importance that I wish to read this order to you. It is addressed to all commanding officers:
"1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.
"2. Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply.
"3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of importance for our boat.
"4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of women or children in his bombing attacks on German cities." is decisive for the intentions connected with it. Describe first of all the military position in general, the situation out of which it arose. conveys. In the North Atlantic the centre of gravity in the use of U-Boats for theprotection of conveys operated between England and America. In the same way, the U-Boats which fought in the North Sea also attacked conveys. There was nothing else. The same thing applied to the Mediterrainean. There also the object of our fight was the convey. Beyond that, a part of the boats were used to operate directly to American ports, like New York and other ports.
middle or South Atlantic, and the criterion was that everywhere and in increasingly large numbers the surveillance by the American air force was taking place. There was a patrolling. And that was the point which caused me great concern, for as a matter of course, the airplane is the most dangerous threat to the U-Boat, especially because of its speed. And that was not a matter of fiction on my part. For since the, beginning of the summer of 1942 -- that is, a few months before September, before the decree was issued -- the losses of our U-Boats through air attacks was tremendous and they arose more than 300 per cent.
Q Mr. Grand Admiral, for clarification of this point, I am giving a diagram to you, a diagram which I would like to submit to the High Tribunal as Doenitz 99. Will you show us the curve of losses, using the diagram? corroborates the statements which I have just made. One can see that up until June of 1942 U-Boats losses were kept within reasonable limits and that suddenly in July, 1942, that came about which I have just described. If the losses up to new per month, as the diagram shows, changed to 4, 5, 3, 4, or 2 U-Boats, so in July per month the losses jumped ten, eleven, 8, 13, 14. And the two winter months follow, which were used for overhauling of ships, and the tendency of losses is not concerned with this problem here. number of orders to the commanders as to how they were to act while they were on the surface, and that is wherethe losses came about, because the airplane could sight them, that they were to limit their surface activities as much as possible. And I was also giving our memorandums to the SKL -
Q What was that, in July, 1942?
A Yes. SKL is Navy Far Command. future, that air power might stifle us some day and force us into the water. fears for the future were great, and that that is not imagination on my fart is shown by the losses which ensued. After the submarines left their dock, that is, about February, 1941, there, was a loss of 18 boats. In March, there were 15; in April, 14. And then the losses jumped to 38.
planes through Radar -- which in my opinion, next to the atom bomb, is the most decisive war winning invention of this war, an invention by the Anglo-Americans -- these brought about the collapse of the U-boat warfare. This forced me into the water for I could not maintain my position on the surface. Not only was I put out of position when the airplane saw me but it was already many miles, up to sixty sea miles beyond there, beyond range or sight. Through this Radar apparatus, this development, and the necessity to remain submerged during the day as well as the night -- of course this was an impossibility with the old U-boats; at least for recharging of their motors they had to surface -- this development forced me, therefore, as far as the old U-boats were concerned, to have them fitted with the so-called "Schnorchel". This was an entirely new U-boat weapon which made it possible for them to stay in the water and they could travel from Germany to Japan without surfacing at all. You can see, therefore, that I was in a very dangerous situation, a situation which was dangerous and which was increasing.
Q Mr. Grand Admiral, in order to characterize the situation I would like to confront you with your War Diary of this time. This will have the number Doenitz 18, found on Page 32, Volume 1. I am confronting you with the entries from the 2nd until 14th of September by showing just the contents. Page 32. On the 2nd of September: U 256 surprised and bombed by aircraft; unfit for sailing and diving; on the 3rd of September: Aircraft sights U-boat; on the 4th of September: U 756 did not report, must be presumed lost on the 5th of September: Aircraft sights U-boat; on the 6th of September: U 705 probably lost through enemy aircraft attack- 7th of September: U 130 bombed by Boeing Bomber; 8th of September: U 202 on trip through Biscay bombed by aircraft; 9th of September -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the defendant has already tell us of the losses and of the reason for the losses. What is the good of giving us details of the fact that U-boats were fighting aircraft?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I wanted to show therewith, Mr. President, that the testimony of Admiral Doenitz is confirmed through his entries in his diary at that time.
But if the Tribunal is not -
THE PRESIDENT: We can read it. Anyhow, if you just draw our attention to the document we will read it. We don't need you to read the details of it.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER* Yes, Mr. President. Very well.
THE WITNESS: That is a typical and characteristic entry in my war diary just in those days before the issuance of my decree; but I wanted to say the following as well : The aircraft was so very dangerous and especially for psychological reasons. Why, perhaps in just one moment the commander of the U-boat considered his situation as perfectly clear if the aircraft is not present and in the next moment, when the aircraft is in sight, his situation is already hopeless. And that happened not only to young commanders but to old experienced commanders who remembered the good old days. Perhaps I may, but briefly, describe this with an example. A U-boat needs one minute, practically one minute, for the crew to come in through the hatch to submerge. An airplane flies on the average in one minute six thousand meters. The U-boat, therefore, must, in order to be able to submerge at all -- so that it will not be attacked while it is still on the surface -- the U-boat must sight the aircraft from a distance of six thousand meters at least. But that is not sufficient, for if the U-boat has submerged it still has not reached its safety depth. The U-boat, therefore, must see the airplane before that and almost at the limit of perspicasity. Therefore, -- and this is the condition so that you might meet with success -- the U-boat is in a matter of constant alertness a state of alarm and that means above all that it should proceed at maximum speed, because the faster the speed the faster the U-boat can submerge; and, secondly, that as few people as possible are on the tower of the U-boat, so that the going in of the people into the U-boat and the closing of the hatch can be done as soon as possible, that there shall be no crew on the upper deck, and so on.
All of those things interrupt the state of alertness of the U-boat completely. In that case, the U-boat would be hopelessly delivered to any air attack.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I wish to consult on the case and I am reluctant to interrupt. If it is agreeable to the High Tribunal, I would suggest that we have our recess now.
(A recess was taken.)
the enemy in September, 1942. During these days of September you received the report about the sinking of the British transport boat "Laconia." I submit to the Tribunal the war diaries concerning that incident under number Doenitz 16, 20, 2l and 22. These are the war diaries of the flag officer of the U-boats in question under Hartenstein, Schacht and Wuerdemann. They are reproduced in the document book on page 34 and following pages. I shall read to you the report which you have received. That is on page 34 of the document book under 13 September, the time 0125, and I read:
"Wireless message sent on America circuit:
"Sunk by Hartenstein British ship Laconia."
Then the position is given and the message continues:
"Unfortunately with 1,500 Italian prisoners of war. Up to now picked up 90,157" -- then the details, and the end is : "request orders."
THE PRESIDENT: Where are you now?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: On page 35, Mr. President, the entry of the 13th of September, time 0125, the beginning of the line; it is on the bottom of the page, second paragraph from the bottom of the page. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q (continuing) I had the documents submitted to you to refresh your memory. Please tell me, first, what your impression or what your knowledge was about that ship Laconia, which had been reported sunk and of its crew. we had at our disposal, that the Laconia was armed with fourteen guns. I had to expect, therefore, that it would have at least a British crew of do out 500 men. When I found out that there were also Italian prisoners on board, it was clear to me that the number would be increased by the necessary guards for the prisoners. which became necessary by your order of the 17th of September and emphasize, if you please, first, the question of rescue or non-rescue of British or Italians; and, secondly, your concern for the safety of the U-boats in question, U-boats that were in that area.