before you became Commander in Chief of the Navy? Grand Admiral Raeder in the Autumn of 1934 as Commander of the Cruiser Emden I told him that I was leaving for foreign parts. I saw him again on my return with the Emden some time later. From the Autumn of 1934 until the outbreak of war in 1939, in the five years I saw him a total of four times; that that includes the two reports that I made to him. political occasions? of the fleet in the Baltic Sea, and during this review of the fleet when two U-boats should maneuvers and attacks I was together with him on the bridge of the flagship so I could give him the necessary technical explanation.
The other occasion was a very large festivity; the entire group of generals and admirals were present when the new Reichschancellery was completed in the Forststrasse. That was in 1938 or 1939. I saw him there on that occasion but I did not speak with him.
Q How many times during the war until you were mode the chief had you seen the Fuehrer?
A In the years 1939, 42, 43, I saw the Fuehrer four times. Each time there were short military discussions about U-boat warfare; and always large groups. military scope or sector? in Chief of the Navy? in the offensive or defensive stages? political or military position, that as Commander in Chief of the Navy? for I was to be the first soldier, or the head of the Navy; and my appointment to this position arose from purely military reasons and military reasons which motivated Great Admiral Raeder to propose my name for this position. Purely military considerations were the determining ones for the filling of this position.
Q You know, Mr. Great Admiral, that the prosecution, from your taking of this position, draw very extensive conclusions, especially as for as the conspiracy is concerned, and among other things, the prosecution contends that your accepting of this position ratified prior happenings, such as all efforts of the Party since 1920 or '22, and the entire German policy, domestic and foreign, at least since 1933. Are you familiar or do you realize that there was any such there? Did you have any reason or thoughts about this?
A This idea was very, very far from my mind. In fact, it never entered into my mind, and I do not believe that there is a soldier who, if he received the military command, would have any such thoughts, would have any such knowledge.
My position as Commander in Chief of the Navy was for me a position of authority and it was a command which I, of course, had to follow as I had to follow every other military order unless my health would not permit it.
I had to agree and believed thatI could be effective and useful to the Navy, and I took this position and my inner convictions went along with it. Anything else would have been desertion or disobedience. close relationship to Adolf Hitler, and you know, also, just what conclusions the prosecution draws from this relationship. Please tell me just what this relationship was and what about the bases therefore?
A In order to be brief, I may perhaps explain the matter as follows: My relation had three bases. First of all, I accepted and agreed to the national and social ideas of National Socialism:
the national ideas which were expressed and the honor and dignity of the national, its freedom and its equality of rights and its protection and security; and the social tenets which perhaps had as their nucleu no cast struggle, but human and social admiration of each parson, disregarding career, profession or economic consideration.
On the other hand, subordination of each and every one to the interests of the community and of all. It was a matter, of course, for me to see with respect the high authority, and I hailed the high authority of Hitler when, in peace time, he succeeded in carrying through his national and social objectives and realized them as quickly as possible in a peaceful manner. Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht and the Wehrmacht, through its oath, had vowed him loyalty. That this oath was holy to me is a matter of course, and I believe that the decency in the world everywhere will be on the side of him who keeps his oath.
The third tie was my personal relationship to him. Before I became Commander in Chief of the Navy I believe that Hitler did not have a complete picture of me and of my personality. He had seen me too few times and only in a circle of many people. How my relationship was to be to himwhen I became Commander in Chief of the Navy was completely open, and my starting this connection was very unfavorable. My position was burdened because of the imminent collapse of U-boat weapon and, second, through my refusal to scrap large ships, and that was a conviction which Raeder had to put over, for in his opinion they did not have any great value. I, as well as Grand Admiral Raeder, had been against the scrapping of these ships, and only as the result of argument he finally agreed. But despite that, I noticed very soon that, so far as matters of the Navy were concerned, he had confidence in me, and in other things as well treated me with dignity and respect, far as military matters were concerned of the Army or of the Luftwaffe. He never asked for my advice or consulted main militarymatters, matters which did not concern the Navy as well; nor did I at any time give any expression dealing with matters of the Army and of the Luftwaffe, for on the whole I lacked the basic knowledge along these lines. Of course, never did he consult me on political matters of a domestic or a foreign nature; never did he ever consult me or call me in onmatters of that sort.
Q You said, Mr. Great Admiral, that he never asked you for advice on political things, but those things might have had some connection perhaps with questions of the Navy.
Didn't you participate then either?
A If you mean by "political, for instance, consultations of the commanders through the so-called Nationalist leaders who belonged to this group, then I of course participated, because this came within the sphere of the Navy.
Q Beyond those questions, didn't Hitler ever consider you a general councilor or adviser, as the prosecution claims and which they base on a long series of meetings which you had with Hitler since 1923 at the Fuehrer's headquarters? a matter of principle, and in particular, as I have already said, the Fuehrer asked me for advice and received advice from me only in matters of the Navy and sea warfare, and it was very strictly limited to this department.
Q You were then, according to the diagram, from 1933 to 1945, sometimes once and sometimes twice a month called to the Fuehrer's Headquarters?
Please describe to the Tribunal, just how a day like that would be. Describe your activities, what you did during the day? when the Fuehrer was at Berlin. I flew to the Fuehrer's Headquarters at intervals of two to three weeks, but only then if I had a concrete military problem of the Navy which I had to present to him, and for which I needed his decision. discussion of the general military situation. That was a discussion with the Fuehrer in which the Staff reported to the Fuehrer about these things which had taken place within the last twenty-four hours along various sectors of the front. At the military discussion of the situation the center of gravity was with the armymatters or aerial matters, and I only spoke when my Naval Expert who described the naval situation, when this report needed some explanation or supplementation by me. Then at a certain time which was determined by the Adjutant's Office, my military speech, which was the aim of my journey, actually took place, and when it came to this report of mine, only those were present who were concerned with this matter, that is, since it was mostly a matter of reinforcements, Kaitel or Jodl were present or the Fuehrer. six weeks on one occasion, and when I came to the Fuehrer at the Headquarters the Fuehrer invited me for lunch. This invitation was after the 20th of July, 1944, the day of the attempted plot. These invitations stopped then. against the ethics of war. I, and with me the entire Navy, and this is my conviction, about the mass extermination of people, of which I am accused in the indictment, including concentration camps, after the capitulation in May, 1945, I only received knowledge of them then. I did not know about it at that time. intelligence, who seemed to have an almost universal education, and a person who almost exuded power and who had tremendous strength. On the other hand I knew and very seldom deliberately went to the Headquarters, for I knew that my power would be strongest that way, and, secondly, that after several days, say two or three days sojourn at the Headquarters I had the feeling to go away from his powers and suggestions, and I am telling about this, and in this connection without doubt it was better for me at his death than to have been constantly exposed to his personality and tremendous power of suggestion.
Q You said just now, Mr. Great Admiral, that you never received an order which was in violation of soldierly ethics. You know the decree Stated destruction and sabotage of civilians in 1942, didn't you receive this order?
was Commander in Chief of the U-boats. For the soldier at the front this order was unequivocal. I have the feeling that I was a very grave matter, but under Point I of this order it was clearly and nuequivocally expressed that they were directed to act in view of the demeanor of the enemy forces, and the killing of prisoners, but beyond the superficial order, the Fuehrer had demanded reprisals and these reprisals had been made public in a report to the Wehrmacht. there was no possibility and no authority to ask for an accounting if the considerations were present that this decree was justified, and as Commander in Chief of this U-boats through you they had to carry through this order? concerned with carrying through of this order? Chief of the Navy was I ever concerned with this order, and one may not forget first of all in this decree exclued expressly were those who were taken prisoners in battles at sea, and , secondly, that the Navy had no territorial authority on land, and then as a matter of basic principle I was really not in a position to have carried out many one of the points of this order. dent of this sort is described where in the summer of 1943, a group of saboteurs were shot in Norway, and I mean document of the Prosecution, GB-208. The incident is described and pictured in such a way that the crew of a Norwegian Motor Torpedo was inprisoned on a Norwegian Island. The Motor Torpedo Boat was on a belligerent mission at sea. The document does not say who interned the crew, but it does say that the crew members while they were being taken prisoner were wearing their uniforms, and they were interrogated by a naval officer, and that on the order of Admiral Von Schroeder they were given over to Security Service and that Security Service later shot them. Was this incident over reported to you or did you ever learn of it? cution.
this nature was not brought to your attention? Wouldn't this have been reported to you? captured by the Navy, Admiral Von Schroeder, who was Commander in Chief there at Alcott would have had to report this matter to his Commander in Chief of the Navy and I am convinced that he would have done so, for the regulations were very unequivocal in this matter would have been reported to me as Commander in Chief of the Navy.
of it through the document? this applies and if they had a mission at sea, then this measure, the shooting whichtook place -- was completely wrong under any circumstances -for it considered very expressedly this commander order, Therefore I consider it completely out of the question, I do not believe that Admiral von Schrader whom I consider an especially noble sailor -- he would have participated in a matter of this sort. According to the circumstances of this incident, this was not reported to the High Command; this incident as it is now ascertained, through the control of the German press in that day, was not made public in the Wehrmacht report, as it would have had to take place if it had been a matter concerned with the Wehrmacht. For all of these reasons I assume the following: they were taken from this island by come vehicle to Bergen, that there some eleven or twelve -- if I recall correctly -- naval officers interrogated them, as the Navy, of course, was interested in this interrogation, and that then the giving over of these people to theSecurity Police took place, since prior to that time they had been captured by the Security Police, the SD. never prisoners of the navy?
A No. If they had been such, a report to the High Command would have taken place.
Q Mr. Grand Admiral, from this case I would like to ask you, on the whole, in your position as Commander-in-Chief and in your visits at the Fuehrer headquarters, didn't you experience some things which brought to your attention to separate yourself from Hitler?
Headquarters, I was limited very, very strongly to my own department, and it was the peculiarity of the Fuehrer to listen to any individual only on the thing that concerned him, and it was a matter of course that as far as the discussion of the military situation was concerned, only purely military matters were discussed, that is, no problems of domestic politics, of the SD or the SS, were discussed. So far as the latter was concerned, the SS, the conversation didn't deal with divisions which were used in certai army sectors and were at the disposal of certain army commanders. Therefore, I never had any knowledge of any of those things. As I have already said, I never received an order from the Fuehrer which in any way would infringe on soldierly ethics. Therefore, the Navy according to my firm conviction raid belief -- and I kept it clean up until the end in every way, even to the last small corner -- I had my face turned to naval warfare -- and the Navy as small as it was, tried to do its duty on the basis and the background of its tasks. Therefore, I didn't have any reason at all to separate myself from the Fuehrer.
Q Such a reason would not have to be shown in crimes; there might have been political reasons for this, and you have heard that repeatedly the question was broached whether there should have been a putsch. Did proposals like that meet you, or did you think or try a putsch?
A No. The word "putsch" has been used frequently in this court room by the various people. It is easy to say it, but I believe that the tremendous importance of such an activity would have to be well-known to an individual. The German nation was involved in a struggle of life and death. It was surrounded by enemies, and I might say, in a fortress-like way. And it is dear, in order to retain the illustration of the fortress, that each disturbance from within without doubt and perforce would have affected the ability to carry on war to the outside, and anyone who undertakes to act against this loyalty and against this oath in such a struggle to the death, to plan an overthrow and to try it, who must have the utmost conviction and who must know of the responsibility connected with it, that such an overthrew would have to be necessary for the people at all costs.
and he would not be able to maintain his position in history or before history. If the overthrow is successful, this measure would not work for the favor and for the best of his people. And this condition I did not consider as obtaining in Germany. a solution even though perhaps just a gradual one, would have resulted, conflict between various armies of the SS and others, and chaos from within would have resulted, for the binding system of the State would have collapsed slowly and thus under any circumstances a solution of the -
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the Defendant is making a long and political speech. It really hasn't very much to do with the questions with which we have to deal.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I was of the opinion that the question whether a Commander-in-Chief is obligated to bring about a putsch is considered a nuclear point by the Prosecution, and a nucleus to the question whether the system which is characterized as criminal, whether he is in agreement with it, but if the tribunal considers that question irrelevant I will not press it further.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think the Prosecution has put forward the view that anybody had to create a putsch.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: It seemed to me one of the points that the Prosecution must take for granted.
Q Mr. Grand Admiral, the Prosecution has submitted two documents, dating from the winter of 1943 and May 1945, and those were speeches by you to the troops. You are accused by the Prosecution of preaching National Socialist ideas to the troops. Please define your position on this point. I was responsible for the fighting capacity of the entire Navy, and the peculiar strength in this war was the unity of our people. And the one who had most to gain by this unity was the Wehrmacht, for each fragmentation from within would perforce have had repercussions within the troops and their fighting capacity would have been rendered loss. The Navy in the first World War, 1917-1913, had had bitter experiences in this direction.
May - A - GH -16 - 1 was to remain and that we should fool that we were guaranteeing this unity. This was necessary and right. It was necessary for me. As the leader of troops, I cannot preach disillusion or disunity, and it worked out in such a way that the fighting power of the navy and the morals was high up until the end. I believe that in every nation, such an achievement is considered as a correct and good achievement for a leader of troops, and those were the reasons for my speaking and talking the way I did. Chief of state, and the Prosecution concludes from that that prior to that time you had been a close confident of Hitler, since only a confident would be chosen to be one's successor when it comes to matters of state. Can you tell me please how this matter of succession was determined and whether Hitler before this time spoke about this possibility in any way? of the military situation. He never, in even the smallest hint, mentioned the matter of succession to me. This was entirely natural and clear, since, through laws, the Reichsmarshal was his successor. The misunderstanding, which is to be regretted, between the Fuehrer and the Reichsmarshal took place at the end of the year 1945, and it took place at a time when I was no longer in Berlin.
Q Where were you?
A I was at Holzstein. Therefore, not the is lightest thought arose within me--or with the Fuehrer either--that I was to be his successor, actually come about? headquarters to the effect that the Fuehrer was designating me his successor and that I was justified at once to take all measures which I considered necessary.
The next morning I received another wireless message. That was on the morning of the first of May. As a more detailed directive, it said that I to be Reichs President; that Minister Goebbels was to be Reichschancellor;
May - A- GH - 16 - 2 Bormann was to be the Party Minister, and Seyss-Inquart the Foreign Minister.
Q Did you adhere to this directive? wireless message in which it had been dearly that I night at once do everything that I considered necessary and correct. Then, as a matter of basic principle, I would never have adhered to this second wireless message, for, if I am to have responsibility, there may not be any restrictions placed upon no. Thirdly, under no circumstances would I have agreed to collaborate with the people mentioned, with the exception of Seyss-Inquart. of Finance Graf Schwering Krosigk, and had asked him to take over the business of government, to the extent that we could still talk about that, to take over this position. which had taken place several days before, I had seen that there was a complete agreement in our principles--principles that the German people belonged to the Christian west; that the basis of future conditions of life- that is, private property and the rights of the individual were to be kept up.
Q Mr. Great Admiral, you know the so-called Political Testament of Hitler in which you are charged to continue with the war. Did you receive such a mission at that time ?
A No. I saw this testament for the first time a few weeks ago here, when it was made public in the press, and if I had received any instructions when Germany's position was hopeless and when I received the responsibility, I would not have tolerated any restrictions on my actions. to--and this is British document 212--in which you exhorted the navy to fight on to the very end, and you are accused in this connection of being a fanatical Nazi who was ready to carry on a hopeless war at the expense of the women and children of your people. Please define your position on this particularly grave accusation.
A In this connectionI may say the following: First of all, in the spring of 1945 I was not the head of the state; I was a soldier. To continue the fight or not to continue the fight was a political decision. The head of the state wanted to continue the fight. I, as a soldier, had to obey. It is an Impossibility that one soldier of a state will say, "I will continue to fight," and another soldier will say, "I will not continue the fight," I could not have given any other piece of advice in the light in which I saw matters.
I can saying that for the following reasons: First, in the East the breaking through of our front at a point meant the extermination of the people living behind that front, We know all of that because of our practical experiences and because of all the reports which we had on this point. It was the belief of the entire people, The soldier in the East considered it his duty, as a soldier, and had to do his duty in the so very hard months of the war, those last few hard months. It was especially important because otherwise German women and children would have been lost.
The navy was deployed to a considerable extent in the East. Perhaps there were 100,000 men on the land in the East, and the entire surface fleet was concentrated to take care of the wounded and of those refugees from the East. months, the steadfastness of the German soldier was especially important. months of the next spring, then, according to everything that we know about the enemy, a disintegration and a complete breaking up would have taken place, in the someway as it is today, according to the Yalta agreement. There would have been an occupation of Germany, according to that agreement. into captivity. That means that if we had capitulated in January or February 1945, in the East, for example, 2,000,000 soldiers would have fallon into the hands of the Russians, and the care of those millions in a cold winter would have been impossible, as was obvious. To a large extent, we would have lost many people. That is also clear, for at the capitulation in My 1945--that is, in the spring, in the late spring. it was not possible in the West to take of the large number of prisoners according to the Geneva Convention.
May - A - GH - 16 - 4 and put into effect, then we would have lost a large number of people who had not fled from the eastern territories. We would havelost those people in the eastern territories. different. Then the front had approached each other so closely that the East and the West front were very close and in just a few days solders and a large number of refugees would be transported to the West. My efforts, when I became head of the state on I May, were directed to making peace as soon as possible and to capitulating and then to saving German blood, people, and to saving then from the East and to put them in safekeeping in the West. Accordingly, through my immediate bringing about of a capitulation on 2 May, I ask Field Marshal Montgomery for the area which was adjacent to his armies, for Holland and Denmark, these countries which were still with us, and accordingly, I immediately in this connection took stops to meet General Eisenhower. The same basic principle--to save the people--was the one that motivated me in the winter, taking cognizance of the situation, to keep on fighting. It was painful that our cities had to be bombed. Through those bombing attacks and through this fight, we lost human lives, and the number of these people is 300,000, to 400,000, mostly through the bombing attack on Dresden, which cannot be justified on a military basis raid which could not be predicted. Nevertheless, this figure is comparativelysmall in contrast to the millions of German people whom we would have lost in the East--soldiers and civilian population--if we had capitulated the winter before.
It is, therefore, in my opinion, through the opposite choice, when I was still a soldier, to call on my soldiers to keep on fighting. And, later, when, after May, I became head of the state and asked for an immediate capitulation, no German lives were lost; on the contrary, they were saved.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(a recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants' counsel wish to ask questions? BY DR. SIEMERS (Counsel for defendant Admiral Raeder):
Q Grand Admiral Doenitz, you've already explained what Admiral Raeder and the navy in the summer of 1939 did and that, in spite of certain indications, they did not believe that a war would happen. In the summer of 1939, you said you had seen Admiral Raeder, and I should like you to supplement one point and speak about the subject regarding the occasions when you talked to Admiral Raeder in detail. submarine exercises in the eastern waters. Following the exercises -
Q May I, first of all, ask you something? What sort of exercises were they? Were they submarine exercises and to what extent did they go and where did they take place? they were put into Service were collected by me in the Baltic. I can't remember the exact figure, but I think there were about thirty. Grand Admiral Raeder was being shown the abilities of these submarines.
Q Were all these submarines capable of travelling in the Atlantic? of lower tonnage, the operations of which could reach as far as the North Sea. two dozens of submarines capable of travelling in the Atlantic; is that right?
A That figure is put too high. U-Boats for the Atlantic, which we had at the time, amounted to not even fifteen. At the outbreak of war, as far as I remember, there were fifteen submarines suitable for the Atlantic. you see Raeder personally and did you see him alone?
A Yes. Grand Admiral Raeder told me something which he repeated before the entire court of officers during his final speech. He said that the Fuehrer had informed him that under no circumstances would there be a war in the West. He said that that would, be the end of the war with Germany Since I was about to go on leave, I asked, to be permitted to go, and on the 24th -- that was immediately after the exercise on the 24th of July -- I went on a recreational stay to Bad Gastein which lasted for six weeks. I'm merely stating that because that's an example of how we regarded the situation at that time.
Q But then the war happened rather more quickly, didn't it, and you had to interrupt the whole day which you had planned? would happen, and the words "Finus Germania", did Raeder tell you that personally in your private conversation or did he only mention it in his speech at Schwienemunde?
A In its sense, certainly. The words individually I cannot remember now. I can't differentiate which was the main speech and which was the main conversation, but he certainly said it during the main speech.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. BY ER. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW): supreme commander of the wartime navy and at the same time you become a member of the group which is indicted here, the General Staff and the OKW? have discussions with any of the members of this group regarding plans or aims in the sense of the indictment?
you relieved them of their jobs. What were the reasons for this? senior officers in the wartime navy, for instance, Admiral Karls and Admiral Boehms, and others, it was a matter of course that it was difficult for both parties. The change of personnel took place for those reasons and in spite of the fact that there was great mutual respect and admiration.
Q How many senior officers were concerned in this case? Navy on one side, and the Army and Air Force on the other side?
Q Did you know the majority of the members of the indicted group?
A No. Before my time as Supreme Commander of the wartime Navy, I only knew those with whom I had accidental contact or found myself in the same room with. For instance, when I was in France, I knew Field Marshal von Rundstedt. After I became Supreme Commander, I only knew those whom I met accidentally when I was at the headquarters where they were as well, and when there was a discussion of some sort.
Q So that it is right, isn't it, to say that you didn't know the whole of the group?
A That's right, I didn't. aim and line?
A I can't answer that as far as the Army and Air Force are concerned. As far as the wartime Navy is concerned, the answer is no, because we were soldiers and I was interested in seeing what a man could do as a soldier, what his personality was, and I didn't in any way concern myself with his political line of thought, at least, unless it affected his performance as a soldier.
I want to quote an example. My closest cooperator, who, beginning in 1934 and right to the end until 1945 was always with me as as my adjutant and later as chief of staff, was very critical of National Socialism, to say the least. However, despite this critical attitude, neither the official work during that long period nor my personal attitude towards him changed in any way. you have just referred. attitude of the generals of the Army. The question merely refers to those who belong to the indicted group.