Headquarters, I was limited very, very strongly to my own department, and it was the peculiarity of the Fuehrer to listen to any individual only on the thing that concerned him, and it was a matter of course that as far as the discussion of the military situation was concerned, only purely military matters were discussed, that is, no problems of domestic politics, of the SD or the SS, were discussed. So far as the latter was concerned, the SS, the conversation didn't deal with divisions which were used in certai army sectors and were at the disposal of certain army commanders. Therefore, I never had any knowledge of any of those things. As I have already said, I never received an order from the Fuehrer which in any way would infringe on soldierly ethics. Therefore, the Navy according to my firm conviction raid belief -- and I kept it clean up until the end in every way, even to the last small corner -- I had my face turned to naval warfare -- and the Navy as small as it was, tried to do its duty on the basis and the background of its tasks. Therefore, I didn't have any reason at all to separate myself from the Fuehrer.
Q Such a reason would not have to be shown in crimes; there might have been political reasons for this, and you have heard that repeatedly the question was broached whether there should have been a putsch. Did proposals like that meet you, or did you think or try a putsch?
A No. The word "putsch" has been used frequently in this court room by the various people. It is easy to say it, but I believe that the tremendous importance of such an activity would have to be well-known to an individual. The German nation was involved in a struggle of life and death. It was surrounded by enemies, and I might say, in a fortress-like way. And it is dear, in order to retain the illustration of the fortress, that each disturbance from within without doubt and perforce would have affected the ability to carry on war to the outside, and anyone who undertakes to act against this loyalty and against this oath in such a struggle to the death, to plan an overthrow and to try it, who must have the utmost conviction and who must know of the responsibility connected with it, that such an overthrew would have to be necessary for the people at all costs.
and he would not be able to maintain his position in history or before history. If the overthrow is successful, this measure would not work for the favor and for the best of his people. And this condition I did not consider as obtaining in Germany. a solution even though perhaps just a gradual one, would have resulted, conflict between various armies of the SS and others, and chaos from within would have resulted, for the binding system of the State would have collapsed slowly and thus under any circumstances a solution of the -
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the Defendant is making a long and political speech. It really hasn't very much to do with the questions with which we have to deal.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I was of the opinion that the question whether a Commander-in-Chief is obligated to bring about a putsch is considered a nuclear point by the Prosecution, and a nucleus to the question whether the system which is characterized as criminal, whether he is in agreement with it, but if the tribunal considers that question irrelevant I will not press it further.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think the Prosecution has put forward the view that anybody had to create a putsch.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: It seemed to me one of the points that the Prosecution must take for granted.
Q Mr. Grand Admiral, the Prosecution has submitted two documents, dating from the winter of 1943 and May 1945, and those were speeches by you to the troops. You are accused by the Prosecution of preaching National Socialist ideas to the troops. Please define your position on this point. I was responsible for the fighting capacity of the entire Navy, and the peculiar strength in this war was the unity of our people. And the one who had most to gain by this unity was the Wehrmacht, for each fragmentation from within would perforce have had repercussions within the troops and their fighting capacity would have been rendered loss. The Navy in the first World War, 1917-1913, had had bitter experiences in this direction.
May - A - GH -16 - 1 was to remain and that we should fool that we were guaranteeing this unity. This was necessary and right. It was necessary for me. As the leader of troops, I cannot preach disillusion or disunity, and it worked out in such a way that the fighting power of the navy and the morals was high up until the end. I believe that in every nation, such an achievement is considered as a correct and good achievement for a leader of troops, and those were the reasons for my speaking and talking the way I did. Chief of state, and the Prosecution concludes from that that prior to that time you had been a close confident of Hitler, since only a confident would be chosen to be one's successor when it comes to matters of state. Can you tell me please how this matter of succession was determined and whether Hitler before this time spoke about this possibility in any way? of the military situation. He never, in even the smallest hint, mentioned the matter of succession to me. This was entirely natural and clear, since, through laws, the Reichsmarshal was his successor. The misunderstanding, which is to be regretted, between the Fuehrer and the Reichsmarshal took place at the end of the year 1945, and it took place at a time when I was no longer in Berlin.
Q Where were you?
A I was at Holzstein. Therefore, not the is lightest thought arose within me--or with the Fuehrer either--that I was to be his successor, actually come about? headquarters to the effect that the Fuehrer was designating me his successor and that I was justified at once to take all measures which I considered necessary.
The next morning I received another wireless message. That was on the morning of the first of May. As a more detailed directive, it said that I to be Reichs President; that Minister Goebbels was to be Reichschancellor;
May - A- GH - 16 - 2 Bormann was to be the Party Minister, and Seyss-Inquart the Foreign Minister.
Q Did you adhere to this directive? wireless message in which it had been dearly that I night at once do everything that I considered necessary and correct. Then, as a matter of basic principle, I would never have adhered to this second wireless message, for, if I am to have responsibility, there may not be any restrictions placed upon no. Thirdly, under no circumstances would I have agreed to collaborate with the people mentioned, with the exception of Seyss-Inquart. of Finance Graf Schwering Krosigk, and had asked him to take over the business of government, to the extent that we could still talk about that, to take over this position. which had taken place several days before, I had seen that there was a complete agreement in our principles--principles that the German people belonged to the Christian west; that the basis of future conditions of life- that is, private property and the rights of the individual were to be kept up.
Q Mr. Great Admiral, you know the so-called Political Testament of Hitler in which you are charged to continue with the war. Did you receive such a mission at that time ?
A No. I saw this testament for the first time a few weeks ago here, when it was made public in the press, and if I had received any instructions when Germany's position was hopeless and when I received the responsibility, I would not have tolerated any restrictions on my actions. to--and this is British document 212--in which you exhorted the navy to fight on to the very end, and you are accused in this connection of being a fanatical Nazi who was ready to carry on a hopeless war at the expense of the women and children of your people. Please define your position on this particularly grave accusation.
A In this connectionI may say the following: First of all, in the spring of 1945 I was not the head of the state; I was a soldier. To continue the fight or not to continue the fight was a political decision. The head of the state wanted to continue the fight. I, as a soldier, had to obey. It is an Impossibility that one soldier of a state will say, "I will continue to fight," and another soldier will say, "I will not continue the fight," I could not have given any other piece of advice in the light in which I saw matters.
I can saying that for the following reasons: First, in the East the breaking through of our front at a point meant the extermination of the people living behind that front, We know all of that because of our practical experiences and because of all the reports which we had on this point. It was the belief of the entire people, The soldier in the East considered it his duty, as a soldier, and had to do his duty in the so very hard months of the war, those last few hard months. It was especially important because otherwise German women and children would have been lost.
The navy was deployed to a considerable extent in the East. Perhaps there were 100,000 men on the land in the East, and the entire surface fleet was concentrated to take care of the wounded and of those refugees from the East. months, the steadfastness of the German soldier was especially important. months of the next spring, then, according to everything that we know about the enemy, a disintegration and a complete breaking up would have taken place, in the someway as it is today, according to the Yalta agreement. There would have been an occupation of Germany, according to that agreement. into captivity. That means that if we had capitulated in January or February 1945, in the East, for example, 2,000,000 soldiers would have fallon into the hands of the Russians, and the care of those millions in a cold winter would have been impossible, as was obvious. To a large extent, we would have lost many people. That is also clear, for at the capitulation in My 1945--that is, in the spring, in the late spring. it was not possible in the West to take of the large number of prisoners according to the Geneva Convention.
May - A - GH - 16 - 4 and put into effect, then we would have lost a large number of people who had not fled from the eastern territories. We would havelost those people in the eastern territories. different. Then the front had approached each other so closely that the East and the West front were very close and in just a few days solders and a large number of refugees would be transported to the West. My efforts, when I became head of the state on I May, were directed to making peace as soon as possible and to capitulating and then to saving German blood, people, and to saving then from the East and to put them in safekeeping in the West. Accordingly, through my immediate bringing about of a capitulation on 2 May, I ask Field Marshal Montgomery for the area which was adjacent to his armies, for Holland and Denmark, these countries which were still with us, and accordingly, I immediately in this connection took stops to meet General Eisenhower. The same basic principle--to save the people--was the one that motivated me in the winter, taking cognizance of the situation, to keep on fighting. It was painful that our cities had to be bombed. Through those bombing attacks and through this fight, we lost human lives, and the number of these people is 300,000, to 400,000, mostly through the bombing attack on Dresden, which cannot be justified on a military basis raid which could not be predicted. Nevertheless, this figure is comparativelysmall in contrast to the millions of German people whom we would have lost in the East--soldiers and civilian population--if we had capitulated the winter before.
It is, therefore, in my opinion, through the opposite choice, when I was still a soldier, to call on my soldiers to keep on fighting. And, later, when, after May, I became head of the state and asked for an immediate capitulation, no German lives were lost; on the contrary, they were saved.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(a recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants' counsel wish to ask questions? BY DR. SIEMERS (Counsel for defendant Admiral Raeder):
Q Grand Admiral Doenitz, you've already explained what Admiral Raeder and the navy in the summer of 1939 did and that, in spite of certain indications, they did not believe that a war would happen. In the summer of 1939, you said you had seen Admiral Raeder, and I should like you to supplement one point and speak about the subject regarding the occasions when you talked to Admiral Raeder in detail. submarine exercises in the eastern waters. Following the exercises -
Q May I, first of all, ask you something? What sort of exercises were they? Were they submarine exercises and to what extent did they go and where did they take place? they were put into Service were collected by me in the Baltic. I can't remember the exact figure, but I think there were about thirty. Grand Admiral Raeder was being shown the abilities of these submarines.
Q Were all these submarines capable of travelling in the Atlantic? of lower tonnage, the operations of which could reach as far as the North Sea. two dozens of submarines capable of travelling in the Atlantic; is that right?
A That figure is put too high. U-Boats for the Atlantic, which we had at the time, amounted to not even fifteen. At the outbreak of war, as far as I remember, there were fifteen submarines suitable for the Atlantic. you see Raeder personally and did you see him alone?
A Yes. Grand Admiral Raeder told me something which he repeated before the entire court of officers during his final speech. He said that the Fuehrer had informed him that under no circumstances would there be a war in the West. He said that that would, be the end of the war with Germany Since I was about to go on leave, I asked, to be permitted to go, and on the 24th -- that was immediately after the exercise on the 24th of July -- I went on a recreational stay to Bad Gastein which lasted for six weeks. I'm merely stating that because that's an example of how we regarded the situation at that time.
Q But then the war happened rather more quickly, didn't it, and you had to interrupt the whole day which you had planned? would happen, and the words "Finus Germania", did Raeder tell you that personally in your private conversation or did he only mention it in his speech at Schwienemunde?
A In its sense, certainly. The words individually I cannot remember now. I can't differentiate which was the main speech and which was the main conversation, but he certainly said it during the main speech.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. BY ER. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW): supreme commander of the wartime navy and at the same time you become a member of the group which is indicted here, the General Staff and the OKW? have discussions with any of the members of this group regarding plans or aims in the sense of the indictment?
you relieved them of their jobs. What were the reasons for this? senior officers in the wartime navy, for instance, Admiral Karls and Admiral Boehms, and others, it was a matter of course that it was difficult for both parties. The change of personnel took place for those reasons and in spite of the fact that there was great mutual respect and admiration.
Q How many senior officers were concerned in this case? Navy on one side, and the Army and Air Force on the other side?
Q Did you know the majority of the members of the indicted group?
A No. Before my time as Supreme Commander of the wartime Navy, I only knew those with whom I had accidental contact or found myself in the same room with. For instance, when I was in France, I knew Field Marshal von Rundstedt. After I became Supreme Commander, I only knew those whom I met accidentally when I was at the headquarters where they were as well, and when there was a discussion of some sort.
Q So that it is right, isn't it, to say that you didn't know the whole of the group?
A That's right, I didn't. aim and line?
A I can't answer that as far as the Army and Air Force are concerned. As far as the wartime Navy is concerned, the answer is no, because we were soldiers and I was interested in seeing what a man could do as a soldier, what his personality was, and I didn't in any way concern myself with his political line of thought, at least, unless it affected his performance as a soldier.
I want to quote an example. My closest cooperator, who, beginning in 1934 and right to the end until 1945 was always with me as as my adjutant and later as chief of staff, was very critical of National Socialism, to say the least. However, despite this critical attitude, neither the official work during that long period nor my personal attitude towards him changed in any way. you have just referred. attitude of the generals of the Army. The question merely refers to those who belong to the indicted group.
occasional remark regarding an army commander, but I can't say today why it was made or what it was. Headquarters, Did it become clear to you on such occasions that supreme commanders were stating different views before the Fuehrer?
Q Can you remember any certain definite example? the northern sector in the East, the army commander concerned with that part of the front had a different opinion than the Fuehrer, and I remember that there was an argument about that.
Q Was that commander successful with his objections? about that because the connections weren't authentically known to me in detail, to do with the Special Action groups of the SD, the Einsatzgroups?
A The wartime Navy? No. As far as the Army is concerned, I want to say I don't believe so and I assume they didn't, but please don't ask me about anything but the Navy;
Q Yes. That, of course, was what I was asking you about. And now, some questions about leaders in the Navy. Did the supreme leaders of Navy group commandos have territorial authorities?
A No. There was the famous KG-4O, that is War Command 40, and the Navy had no territorial powers ashore. Its task was that when they were asho they had to see to the defense of the coast under the command of the Army, and that was divided in sectors. They were commanded by the divisions stationed in that particular sector, and apart from that they were dealing with the naval warfare before that coast.
Q So that supreme commanders of the Navy were troop commanders? of orders regarding submarine warfare?
A. No, none whatever.
Q. Did they influence decisions regarding ships which were to be sink?
A. No, not at all.
Q. And did they influence the orders regarding the treatment of rescued personnel.
A. No.
Q. Now the, the group also contains the Chief of the Naval Operational Staff. What were the tasks of the Chief of the Naval Operational Staff?
A. He was in the supreme commando He had a position where he dealt with purely military tactical and operational matters of the wartime Navy.
Q. Did the Chief of the SKL have powers to issue orders?
A. No.
Q. So that his position was similar to that of the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force or the Army?
A. I beg your pardon, but first of all I will have to put you right about the whole conception. I presume that by the Chief of Operational Staff you mean the Chief of Staff.
Q. Yes.
A. At the time of Admiral Raeder the name of the Chief of the Naval Warfare Command was the same as the Supreme Commander of the Navy. The organization about which you are making inquiries was called the Chief of Staff of Naval Warfare Command, whereas when I was the Supreme Commander of the Navy, the name of the Chief of Staff of Naval Warfare Command was changed to Chief of Naval Warfare Command, but it was the same person and he was under the command of the Supreme Commander of the Navy.
Q. Was there an Admiralty Staff in the Navy?
A. No, that didn't exist. Such an institution did not exist. Any necessary assistant leaders, as we called them, came from the front and they served on the staff and then they returned to the front.
Q. And now I shall ask one last question. The witness Gisevius has stated in this courtroom that the supreme military leaders had drifted into corruption by accepting donations, gifts. Did you receive any donation of any kind, any gift?
A. Apart from the salary to which I was entitled, I didn't receive a penny; no presents, no donation, nothing. And the same applies to all the officers of the Navy.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further questions. BY DR. NELTE (Counsel for defendant Keitel):
Q. Witness, you were present when the witness Gisevius was being examined here. That witness, without giving concrete facts, passed judgment on various matters and made the following statement, "Keitel had one of the most influential positions in the Third Reich," and then, sometime later, he said, "I have received very detailed information regarding the tremendous influence which Keitel had on everything relating to the Army, and also how he represented the Army before the German people." judgment, that opinion, regarding the position of Defendant Field Marshal Keitel is correct.
A. I consider it a great exaggeration. I think that Field Marshal Keitel position has been so explicitly described here that it ought to be clear by now, and that these big words which he used are not correct.
Q. May I gather from that that the description of the position and functions as given by Marshal Goering Field Marshal Keitel can be confirmed by you?
A. Yes, it is perfectly correct. When the witness Gisevius judged these matters, he wasn't relying on his own direct knowledge, but was relying on information which he had received from Admiral Canaris.
Q. Did you know Admiral Canaris?
A. I know Admiral Canaris from the time when he was still a member of the Navy.
Q. Later on, when he became the Chief of Foreign Intelligence in the OKW, did you not have contact with him, and did you not have discussions with him? Did he not come to see you in his capacity as Chief of Counter-Intelligence?
A. After I had just become Supreme Commander of the Navy, he visited me and he made a statement, a lecture in fact, regarding news which he thought he ought to place at the disposal of the Navy, something which was interesting to me, of course.
That was his last report to me. Following that, and as a matter of course, I received from him or his department written reports regarding these views, and that information interesting to the Navy.
ral Canaris as the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Department; that is, the espionage section, sabotage department and intelligence, was of great importance for the entire conduct of the war?
A His position?
Q He was the chief of that department, wasn't he? branches, and I must say in that connection that, as you are asking me about the importance of the work, I am of the opinion or was of the opinion that that information, interesting to the Navy, was very very lean, very meagre. Keitel; that is to say, the OKW were in any way impeding his work; that is to say, information and, his reports couldn't be taken to anybody? ring that first report but he didn't.
Q With reference to Canaris, I should like to know one more thing. Can you tell me anything about his character and his credibility as a source of information. Do you consider him reliable? an officer who didn't find a lot of confidence. He was a man quite different from us.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, we don't want to know about Admiral Canaris when he was in the navy. I don't think there is any use of telling us that Admiral Canaris was in the navy. The only relevance would be his character afterwards when he was head of the intelligence.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, don't you think that if someone who is a naval captain is regarded as unreliable and not very credible, that he might remain in the same light as an admiral in the OKW? Do you think that during the few years that could have changed all that much? BY DR. NELTE: witness, and I am now asking you to reply to my following question. Is it true that all parts of the armed forces were prohibited to make reports on political matters by Hitler and that they were told to confine themselves to their own sphere of work?
ed officers under his command with handing them over to the Gestapo if they were concerning themselves with politics; and I am now asking you, is it true that in accordance with instructions applicable to the armed forces, the police including the Gestapo and SD, and criminal police, had juridiction over members of the armed forces no matter what rank they were, or did they have no executive powers:
A It is correct that they didn't. also the OKW were preserving that right which the armed forces had before the police?
Q So that any such supposed threat as mentioned by Gisevious; namely that od handing these people ever to the Gestapo, was in fact not practicable? whom such a statement might be made, knew that of course, too?
A Yes, naturally they did. Soldiers were subject to military discipline and nobody could interfere with the armed forces. Chief of the OKW, have the right at all to deal with officers in the OKW without agreement of the commander in question, to dispose of such officers? Could he, for instance, transfer them to another job or could he relieve then of their duties or something like that?
for instance, would be commanded, would be attached to the OKW for a certain job. That would mean that he would be taken off the strength of the navy and attached to the OKW. It was quite natural that in the case of a different employment of that officer in the OKW, the armed forces section to which he belonged would have had to be heard.
Q Isn't it correct to say that these officers were still on the list of their own unit, since the OKW wasn't an actual military unit or proper formation; in other words, that if there were promotions, for instance, you would promote those people who originated from the Navy-Assuming, for instance, that Canaris was to be transferred, you, as the chief of the navy, would have to order such a transfer, of course, upon agreement or by suggestion of the OKW. I am merely concerned with the question of the actual orders, channel of orders? recollect, they were still on the nominal roll of the navy and they were headed "Detached from the navy, attached to the OKW."
Q But they didn't leave the navy, did they? I think, done by the personnel office of the navy in agreement with the OKW, and I also think that any such attachment could not be carried out without agreement of the unit, of the officer. was Fieldmarshal Keitel for the military sector, had formed a close ring of silence around Hitler so that nobody could approach Hitler, whom they didn't want to let through. My question to you is this: Did Fieldmarshal Keitel have the possibility, for instance, as far as you as supreme commander of the navy were concerned, to keep you away from the Fuehrer if you wanted to see him? supreme commander of the air force away if he wanted to report to the Fuehrer?
the army?
A I didn't experience that. When I was supreme commander of the navy, there wasn't such a position. the situation regarding the Chief of the General Staff of the army. Could he at any time get to the Fuehrer and get past Fieldmarshal Keitel to talk to Hitler? Fieldmarshal Keitel and he wouldn't have done a thing like that anyway. stated in this courtroom that his group was reporting to Keitel through Canaris; that they were submitting reports which were dealing with crimes against humanity, which has been mentioned by the prosecution here. These reports, he said, had been camouflaged as "foreign reports" and presumably you know the type of reports I am referring to. My question to you is this: Did you at any time see such camouflaged information in reports from Canaris was it ever put before you or sent to you?
Q In accordance with your knowledge of Keitel's personality, do you consider it possible that an important report, which was submitted to him, could have been kept away from the Fuehrer by him?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think that is a proper question for you to put.
DR. NELTE: That finishes this part of my question in any case and I have yet one more group of questions which can be dealt with very quickly, Mr. President, on the 26th of March, you had given me permission in writing, that I may submit an affidavit from Grand Admiral Doenitz, which deals with the functions and the position of the Chief of the OKW. That affidavit was submitted to the prosecution on the 13th of April and I understand, that there are objections being raised by the prosecut-ion, I have, however, not yet received the original back, after I had submitted them on the 13th of April, and I don't know whether it has in the meantime been handed to the Tribunal by the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't know anything about the affidavit that you are dealing with.
DR. NELTE: I should, therefore, now be forced to put these questions to Admiral Doenitz, -which, nevertheless, in their majority are dealing; with the questions which I have already put to the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution object to the affidavit at all?
DR. NELTE: No, they didn't raise any objections. Therefore, if the Prosecution would be good enough to return it to me, I should submit it to the Tribunal as an exhibit, without reading it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. NELTE: Thank you very much. BY DR. DIX (Counsel for defendant Schacht):
Q. Witness, you have stated that the SD and the Gestapo, in fact, the whole place, did not have executive powers regarding members of the armed forces, in particular, that they couldn't arrest members of the armed forces. Did I understand you correctly?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you, Witness, not know that officers which were suspected of participating in the affairs of the 20th of July had all, or at least most of them, been arrested by members of the SD; and that the department of the SD which arrested them sent them to the prisons which were under the control of the SD; and that they remained under the jurisdiction of the SD in these prisons; and that there was no jurisdiction of any military departments?
A. The answer is, no, I didn't know that, because after the 20th of July, as far as I can remember it, there was a specific order stating that the SD, as far as the armed forces were concerned, would have to name those soldiers which had participated in that revolt; and that those soldiers were then to be removed, to be dismissed from the armed forces, particularly because there was the principle of interference with the armed forces which was not to be infringed. So that this meant that afterwards the SD would have jurisdiction.
Q. That order came out, yes, but perhaps we can get nearer to the point when you answer further questions which I want to put to you. people arrested on the 20th of July, were exclusively carried out by officials of the SD or the Gestapo, respectively, raid not by the officers of the armed forces in military justice?