navy; that he should murder political opponents in a way that wouldn't be found out by the guard?
A. No, that's different. It had been reported to me that there was a spy who was to be put amongst new crews and who should listen to them, and then pass information on to the enemy. It would have been the result of that, based on that information, that submarines would now have been lost; and it was then that the senior man, an uncommissioned officer in that camp, decided to remove that man as a traitor, That is what was reported to me; something which I shall prove by means of a witness. In my opinion, and every nation will recognize that, that has been acted upon under great responsibility and in a very difficult situation.
Q. Why didn't you say that, defendant? If you had stated that this man had killed a spy who had endangered the spreading of information, I wouldn't have put this to you. But what you say is that it was Communists who made themselves noticeable and this man had killed them without knowledge of the guard. Why do you put Communists in your order if you mean a spy?
A. I think this is an order from a Baltic station. I had been told, and that's a fact, that it was a spy, and it's something that a witness will prove. What reasons there were -- perhaps reasons of counter-intelligence, not to divulge that. I never entered into it.
Q. Where you -
A. I am responsible for it.
Q. Are you putting the responsibility for this order on one of your junior officers? Are you saying it was one of your junior officers who put the order out like this? It wasn't what you meant at all; is that what you are saying?
A. I have merely said how the order came about; how it happened to be like this. I have never yet refused the responsibility.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further cross examination?
COLONEL POKROVSKY: My Lord, the Soviet Prosecution has several questions to sak of the defendant Doenitz. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: to the armed forces in connection with Hitler's death were composed by you on the 30th of April 1945, isn't taht so?
Q In these documents you informed the people that Hitler's successor appointed by Hitler himself, was you. That is correct, isn't it? you? and I came to the conclusion that after tje Reichsmarshal had been removed, I was the senior officer of an independant branch of the armed forces, and that that was the reason. nuation of military operations, and all those who were opposed to resistance were called traitors and cowards, isn't that so? unconditionally, isn't that right?
A Yes. I said clearly in the first order that I would like to fight in the East until troops and refugees could be rescues from the East to the West, and that I would not fight one moment longer. That was my intention, and that is clearly expressed in that order.
Q By the way, it isn't clearly stated in this order, but it is not so important -- do you agree that on the 30th of April -
Q First listen to my question. Do you agree with the fact that on the 30th of April also, right on the day when you published both documents that we are talking about now, it was absolutely clear that further resistance of Hitlerite Germany was absolutely valueless and useless?
Do you understand my question? I had to continue fighting in the East in order to cover the refugees who were moving to the West. That is clearly stated. I said that we would continue to fil in the East until hundreds and thousands of families from the German eastern are could be transferred to the West.
Q Still, you didn't answer my question, did you, even though it was very clearly put. I can repeat it once again so that you can manage to understand it. Do you agree with the fact that already on the 30th of April it was absolutely clear that Germany had no further prospects, and that further resistance of Hitlerite Germany was absolutely useless? Do you agree with that?
A No, that was not clear. From the military point of view the war was absolutely lost, and there was only the problem then of saving as many human beings as possible, and therefore we had to keep up our resistance in the East, be that is why that resistance in the East had a purpose.
Q Very well, I understood you, but will you deny that your address which called to continue war, led to further bloodshed?
Q One moment, please. One moment please, will you wait, Doenitz. Don't try and make any comparisons. First answer and them explain. This is the order that we are going under. First yes or no and then an explanation, please. You unterstood me?
A Of course; in the course of the fighting during the few days losses did occur but they were necessary in order to save hundreds of thousands of refugees.
Q You didn't answer my question. I repeat it for the third time.
THE PRESIDENT: He did answer; he said "yes, that bloodshed would be cause. That is an answer to your question.
COLONEL POKROVSKY. Thank you. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: upon yourself, first and foremost, as a politician or do you look upon yourself as a soldier who disobeyed direct orders of his own superiors without any analysis of of political meaning and content of such orders?
A I don't know that question - - in generality, as chief of the state from the 1st of May on, I was a political man.
Q And before that time? hall you mentioned. "As a soldier I did not have in mind such political considerations which might have been in existence." On the 10th of May, at twelve hours thirty-five minutes, here, you said, when the question of submarine warfare was taken up: "All this concerns political aims but I, as a soldier, was engaged in military problems." Isn't that so?
A Yes, It is correct. I said before the 1st of May 1945, I was a soldier, and as soon as I became the head of the state I had to relinquish the supreme command of the Navy because I became the chief of state and not a political personality.
Q Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, about fifteen minutes ago, addressed you also and referred to two documents, and in particular to document GB-186, D-640, and he cited one sentence out of this, quoted one sentence which contradicts greatly what you said just now.
You remember this sentence "nonsensical chatter"?
Q I want to ask you: How can you reconcile these two contradictory statements, the statement about unnecessary chatter about the fact that the officer is not a politician. This statement took place on the 15th of February 1944, at the time when you were not the supreme head of the state. Isn't that so? government, that doesn't make him a politician and that is said in that sentence that was meant by that sentence.
Q All right. We will be more exact about it, whether this is really the fact. You, several times in a very different manner right here at the Tribunal meeting, testified thay for many years before the war and during the war, you were indoctrinating the navy in the spirit of pure idealism and firm respect to the customs and laws of war. Is that so? four minutes, you said "I indroctrinated the submarine fleet in the pure idealise and I continued such indoctrination during the war. It was necessary for me to achieve high morale." Five minutes after on the same day, you said, in speaking about the navy: "I never could tolerate giving orders to such people which would be contradictory to such morale and, of course, it is beyond the question that I myself could give such an order. You acknowledge that those were your words, or approximately your words, considering the inexactness of translation; isn't that so? possession now, the document presented by your defense counsel, Doenitz 91. In this document, your defense counsel presents an excerpt from the testimony, sworn testimony - - - an affidavit made by Dr. Joachim Rudolphi. In order now not to consume unnecessary time, I would like you to tell us briefly in one word, yes or no, whether Rudolphi is correct in his testimony; that you were always decisively protesting against introducing into the armed forces of Germany so-called "People's Military Tribunals?"
Did you understand me? courts. I said that one has to carry the responsibility for a branch of the armed forces and in doing so also has to have the judiciary power. That is what it means.
Q And you are familiar with Rudolphi's affidavit? presented by you to the Tribunal, it is said there that "In the beginning, early in the summer of 1943, the first threatening attempt to undermine the non-political system of the armed forces was initiated." Is Rudolphi correct in explaining this question and is it true that you were against this attempt to introduce special political courts into the navy and armed forces? but early in the summer things were already going on, may be right.
Q Do you acknowledge, Doenitz, or not that this so-called people's court had to do with what Rudolphi considers as the smallest hint towards a political attack? That is his sentence which you can find on the first page in document D-91. but I wanted to keep the soldiers under my own jurisdiction. I did not mean to judge and I could not authentically judge the proceedings outside of the Navy, of courts outside of the navy, because I wouldn't know anything about that. My point was that my soldiers should be under the jurisdiction of the navy.
Q For also crimes, including political; isn't that so? Did I understand you correctly? opinion that they should remain under military jurisdiction. encouraging murder of defenseless people, among those who were members of the armed forces, due to purely political reasons and you were looking upon such murders as the acts of military valor and heroism?
A I don't understand you. I don't know what you mean.
Q You didn't understand my question?
A No, I haven't understood it. I didn't understand what you meant by the question.
Q I can repeat it. Perhaps it will be clearer to you. I am asking you: will you deny the fact that you preached in favor of murders of those members of the armed forces, by other members of other forces, and the members who had to be killed were killed purely for political reasons? Now, is the question clear to you?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal doesn't find your question quite clear?
COLONEL POKROVSKY: What I have in mind, my Lord, is the order No. 19, for the Baltic Fleet, which was in part ecplained by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe. There is one point of this order and permits to clarify the motives for publishing and promulgating this order. It is said in there this way - - - one idea is expressed in a cery clear manner - - - and with your permission, I shall read one paragraph from this document.
For instance, it is said in Order Number 19:
"In the prisoner-of-war camp from -
THE PRESIDENT: Which paragraph?
COLONEL POKROVSKY: The paragraph before the last of the document D-650, page 4 of the English text. It is the last paragraph of the third page of the English copy.
THE PRESIDENT: It was read already in cross examination.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: This particular part wasn't read in the cross examination, and it is really very important for the case.
THE PRESIDENT: We have just heard this very question, this very example, read by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, not a half an hour ago.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: But Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe in reading this example did not read one particular sentence which is of great importance to me, and which clarifies the matter finally, and that is the reason why I permitted myself to come back once again to this particular passage. It is said in there -
THE PRESIDENT: What sentence are you referring to?
COLONEL POKROVSKY: The first sentence in the second paragraph from the end. It is the paragraph which begins, "For example, in the prisonerof-war camp -
THE PRESIDENT: You are entirely wrong. He read the whole of the paragraph. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe read the whole of the paragraph. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe read the whole of the paragraph.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: When, with your permission, I shall read these few words, then you will convince yourself that these particular words were not read, and they are very important.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I have a note in my notebook made at the time, which shows that the whole of this was read; that the Defendant was cross examined about the meaning of the word "Communist"; and that he explained it by saying that he was referring to a spy among the crew who might give away submarine secrets. The whole matter was gone into fully by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, and the Tribunal does not wish to hear any more about it.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: It is absolutely necessary for me to read two words out of this sentence which were not read into the record here, and I ask your permission to read these two words.
THE PRESIDENT: Which two words do you say were not road? State the two words.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: "Plan" or "systematically." That is, according to a certain plan, and also "noticeable." They are not talking about one particular instance, but they are talking about the whole definite plan.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but that was all read, Colonel Pokrovsky; You must have missed it.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: It wasn't read. Of course Sir David may have omitted that,
THE PRESIDENT: That was read by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe and put to the witness, to the Defendant.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: Perhaps Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe might have accidentally omitted this, but it is really very important for me, because Doenitz mentioned here, testified here, to the conversation about killing only one spy, but really what is meant here is that there was a plan to exterminate all Communists.
THE PRESIDENT: It is exactly what Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe put to the witness. He said "How can you say that this refers to a case of spies or one spy, when it is referring to all Communists?" It is exactly the question he put to him.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: Perhaps I didn't understand quite correctly what our interpreter translated, but in our translation this wasn't mentioned. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: of high military valor, that military valor which serves as a basis or the reason for extraordinary promotion of non-commissioned officers, that you used, as one example, systematic murders of people for political reasons? Do you deny that this order was correctly understood?
A No, that is quite wrong. That order refers to one incident in a prison camp, and it should express in what serious conflict of responsibility that camp commander was, and that from the point of view of responsibility he had acted correctly in removing that Communist, in the interest of the German nation, as a spy.
It would have been easier for him and simpler if he just would have let things go. That would have caused a damage and the loss of U-boats. He knew that he would have been put before the responsibile authorities after his return home. That is the reason why I gave the order. happenings as you explain them now are absolutely different from what are written in your order.
THE PRESIDENT: I have already told you that the Tribunal does not wish to hear further cross examination upon this subject. You are now continuing to do that, and I must draw your attention again clearly to the ruling of the Tribunal, that the Tribunal will not hear further cross examination upon this subject. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: about some alleged objections in principle against the special political courts--that is, special political considerations which are being sworn to in this affidavit by Dr. Rudolphi?
How do you reconcile this contradiction?
A I didn't understand what you said. in the order it is altogether different. The order deals with political questions, and Dr. Rudolphi testified to the fact that you were against introducing political courts into the army and the navy. Obviously there is contradiction in terms here, and I would like to have this contradiction explained.
A I do not see any contradiction, because Dr. Rudolphi says that I had been against the method that legal cases should be turned over to courts outside of the navy. In thecase of Comorau we deal with an action of the commander of that camp in a camp far away from home. He came to this action certainly after very grave doubts and considerations, which at home would have brought it before a military court. He did it, however, because of reasons of warfare and to stop the loss of submarines by treason he considered it necessary. Those are two entirely different things. Here we deal with an individual case in the camp of Comorau. before, and, as you heard, the Tribunal does not want to listen to any more. This is really not an answer to my question.
A Yes, I can't say anything else in answering that question but the truth, such as I have shown it.
Q Of course our ideas of truth may be altogether different. I, for instance, look upon this question in an altogether different manner.
A Excuse me, please. I am under oath here, and you do not want to accuse me of telling an untruth, do you? a different approach to the idea of truth. I, for instance, consider by this order -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) will you kindly put the question if you want to put a question?
COLONEL POKROVSKY: I want to ask him one question, my Lord, and I must explain to him why I am asking this question. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: loyalty to Fascism, and in connection with this I want to ask you whether you consider that, because of the fact that you revealed yourself as a fanatical follower of Fascism and Fascist ideas, that Hitler made his choice of you as his successor because you were known to Hitler as a fanatical follower who was capable of inciting the Army to any crime; and that still you would be calling this crime that you are inciting the Army to perform pure idealism.
A Well, I can only answer to that that I don't know. I have already explained that the legitimate successor would have been the Reichsmarshal, but through a regrettable incident a few days before, I was a pointed. He was removed, and then I was the next senior officer in command of an independent branch of the armed forces.
I believe that that element was the determining element. That the Fuehrer had confidence in me may have had something to do with it, indeed.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution, my Lord, has no more questions to ask of this Defendant.
1o. Mai-A-AG-21-1
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Kranzbuehler, do you want to re-examine ?
DR. KRANSBUEHLER : I should like to put a few more questions, Mr. Presiedent. BY DR. KRANSBUEHLER : Q : Grand Admiral, during the cross examination by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, you were asked about your knowledge of conditions in concentration camps ; and you wanted to make an additional statement, which you could not do at the time. concentration camps, or did you have any at all ? A : I had no connections with anybody, not with any person who had gotten into a concentration damp, with the exception of Pastor Niemoeller. Pastor Niemoeller was a former comrade of mine from the navy. When my last son had been killed, he expressed his sympathy, and at that occasion, I am thanking him, asked how he was.
Q : When was that ?
A : The summer of 1944. And thereupon I received the answer that he was all right.
Q : Did you write him directly, or how ?
A : No. That message I received through a third person.
Q : Was that the only message you received from a concentration camp ?
A : Yes, the only one.
Q : In the course of the cross examination, a statement by Captain Assmann was put to you about a conference with the Fuehrer of May, 1943. Do you remember its contents ? You are alleged to have said that in view of the present situation, it was desirable that Germany should come into the possession of Spain and Gibraltar.
Did you make a positive suggestion in that direction ? One man see that from the report.
A : Of course, when I discussed the situation, I mentioned 1o. Mai-A-AG-21-2 the narrow bounds of the Bay of Biscay, and that it would be desirable if we could use a larger area to start our U-boats.
Nobody at that time gave any serious thought to any enterprise in the direction of Spain, regardless of whether it might be with the consent of Spain or without it. It was quite obvious that our forces were not at all sufficient for that. about the concern about that narrow area. But I should say it would have been better if that area had been wider. That is what I meant by that statement. So that referred to U-boat warfare and not to any undertaking against Spain on land. I certainly cannot make any suggestion as a naval officer concerning land actions.
Q : In connection with the sinking of the Athenia, it has been hinted that your statement was considered an excuse; that is, that the commanding officer of the submarine confused the Athenia with an auxiliary cruiser. I should like to put to you an excerpt from the war diary of the same commanding officer, and I want you to confirm that it is really from the same commanding officer.
I shall read from the document of the Prosecution B.G. 222, on Page 142, in my document book, Volume 3. It is an excerpt from the war diary of the submarine U-30. It is dated the 11th of September, 1939. "Sighted a vessel with lights dimmed. Trailed. In zig-zag course recognized as merchant ship. Requested to stop by Morse lantern. Steamer signals 'not understood", tries to escape in the thick squall and sends out SOS 'chased by submarine and position by radiotelegraphy. Gave 'stop' signal by radiotelegraphy and Morse lantern. "Ran ahead. Fired 5 shots with machine gun C/30 across the bow. Steamer doesnot react. Turns partly, directly toward the boat. Sends 'Still chased'. Therefore, fire opened from aft bearing with 8,8 cm.
English steamer 'Blairlogie' 4425 tons. After 18 1o. Mai-A-AG-21-3 shots were fired and three hits, the steamer stops.
The crew boards the boats. Last message by radiotelegraphy : 'Shelled, taking the boats'. Fire immediately halted when an emergency light was shown and steamer stopped. Went to the life boats, gave an order to pull away toward the south. Steamer sunk by torpedo. Afterwards both ship crews supplied with Steinhaeger and cigarettes. 32 men in two boats. Red stars were shot until it became light. Since the American steamer 'American Skipper' was nearby, we departed. Crew was rescued." commanding officer of the same U-boat who nine days before had torpedoed the Athenia ?
A : Yes, that is the same commander, and on the same trip, where shortly before, he was a victim of that error.
Q : In the course of the cross examination, once more, very definitely the statement was made, or the allegation made that you had sent a destrucktion order to U-boat commanders. I should like to put to you a letter which is signed by Various U-boat commanders. You know the letter and know the signatures, and I should like to ask you to tell me whether the U-boat commanders who signed before September, 1942-- that is, before your alleged order--were captured afterwards. Doenitz 53, which I have already submitted to the Tribunal. I received it through the British War Ministry and the SecretaryGeneral of the Court. The date is the 18th of January, 1946, and the text is as follows :
" The commanders now here in this camp and who signed this letter, of U-boats that were active on the front want to give the following statement and express the request that this statement should be forwarded to the International Military Tribunal in Nurnberg.
" From the press and radio, we were informed that Grand Admiral Doenitz is charged with having issued the order to destry survivors of torpedoed ships and not to take any prisoners.
1o. Mai-A-AG-21-4 " The undersigned state under oath that neither in writing nor orally was such an order ever given by Grand Admiral Doenitz.
The order was in force reasons of security of the boat, after torpedoing, one culd not surface. The reason for that was that was that if the boat would surface for a rescue action, according to our experience during the first years of the war, we had to expeckt our own destricktion. This order could not be misunderstood. It has never been regarded as an order to annihilate shipwrecked crews.
" The undersigned declare that the German navy has always been educated by their leaders to respect the written and unwritten laws and rules of the sea. We have always regarded it as our honor to obey these laws and to put up a chivalrous fight while in action." who are at present in British prisons of war.
I ask you, Grand Admiral, do you know these signatures ? Were these commanders captured before Sptember, 1942, or after September, 1942 ? In order to examine that from both sides, I should like to see the list again. But most of them beyond doubt were captured after September, 1942.
DR. KRANSBUEHLER : I have no further questions, then.
DR. LATERNSER ( counsel for the General Staff and the O.K.W.) Mr. President, I should like to deal with only one point which came up during the cross examination.
BY DR. LATERNSER : Q Grand Admiral, during the cross examination, you have stated that you were present at the briefing conferences on the 19 th and the 22nd of February, 1945, and you said -
A (interposing) I believe that that date is here on the list. I do not know at this moment.
Q I marked it down, and you will find out right away why 1o. Mai - A-AG-21-5 I am asking.
alleged to have made the suggestion to leave the Geneva Convention. I ask you now to tell me which high military leaders were present during that conference.
A I believe we are confronted with a mistake here. I did not hear tha question or suggestion out of the mouth of the Fuehrer, but I was told about it through a naval officer, who was always present during these briefing conferences. Therefore, I do not know for certain whether that date is correct, and I do not know who was present when the Fuehrer first made that statement. thereafter, and then I believe the Reichsmarshal, and of course Jodl and Field Marshal Keitel, were present. At any rate, the armed forces were all against it and, in my recollection, the Fuehrer, because he saw our rejection, did not do it at DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant mayreturn to the dock. DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, after the experience of the cross-examination of today, I consider it proper to submit my documents to the Tribunal now, if that pleases the Tribunal, before I call further witnesses. I believe that I can shorten the questioning of the witness thereby, and that it will be more easily understood.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Kranzbuehler.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: May I first remind the Tribunal that in the document book of the prosecution GB-224 and GB-191 contain the general accusations against naval warfare upon which the following documents which I submit are based. The documents concerning these general accusations are in document book 3 and 4.
First, I submit Doenitz-54. I don't need to read it because it has already been mentioned. nance, and excerpt of which can be found on page 137. I should like to point out that Article 74 is, word for wrod, according to the regulations of the London protocols. signed by the Supreme Commander of the Navy, That is a contribution to the question as to whether the Supreme Commander of the Navy was a member of the Reich Government. He had no authority to sign that.
The next document which I submit is Doenitz-55. That is the order of 3 September 1939, by which the U-boats went out to war. that I can mention them together, or whether it is necessary to read parts of them.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you might mention them together, really, specifyi shortly what they relate to.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, sir. tion to all laws and rules of naval warfare. Furthermore, there is consideration of a preparatory order for the taking of severe measures, and this order is on page 144. Since I shall refer to that later in a mining the witness, I do not have to point it out now. that the boats were really acting according to these orders. It is document GB191. It is in the original on page 5. That sentence is not in the English excere and that is why I will read it in English, from the original:
"Thus the Germans started this ordinance, which was at any rate, a clear reasonable, and not inhuman document."
Mr. President, it is not copied there, it is not in the document book of the prosecution. Therefore, I read it from the original which the prosecution have submitted.
"German submarine commanders, with some exceptions, behaved in accordance with its provisions during the first months of the war. Indeed, in one case, a submarine had ordered the crew of a trawler to take to their boat if the ship was to be sunk. But when the commander saw the state of the boat, he said, 'Dirty me in that boat. You English are no good sending a ship to sea with a boat like that and the skipper was told to remark his crew on the trawler and make for home a full speed, with a bottle of German Gin and the submarine commander's compliment. War Command of 9 September 1939, at page 141.
"English information office disseminates the news through Router that Ger many has opened unlimited submarine warfare."
the experiences which the Naval War Command had in submarine warfare up until that date. It is an entry of the 21st of September 1939, in the war diary of the Naval War Command. I read under the figure "2":
"The commanders of submarines which had returned report the following valuable experiences:
"(b) English, party also neutral steamers, strong zig-zags, partly time lights. English steamer, when stopped, immediately radios SOS with exact position Thereupon commitment of English planes to fight submarines.