How do you reconcile this contradiction?
A I didn't understand what you said. in the order it is altogether different. The order deals with political questions, and Dr. Rudolphi testified to the fact that you were against introducing political courts into the army and the navy. Obviously there is contradiction in terms here, and I would like to have this contradiction explained.
A I do not see any contradiction, because Dr. Rudolphi says that I had been against the method that legal cases should be turned over to courts outside of the navy. In thecase of Comorau we deal with an action of the commander of that camp in a camp far away from home. He came to this action certainly after very grave doubts and considerations, which at home would have brought it before a military court. He did it, however, because of reasons of warfare and to stop the loss of submarines by treason he considered it necessary. Those are two entirely different things. Here we deal with an individual case in the camp of Comorau. before, and, as you heard, the Tribunal does not want to listen to any more. This is really not an answer to my question.
A Yes, I can't say anything else in answering that question but the truth, such as I have shown it.
Q Of course our ideas of truth may be altogether different. I, for instance, look upon this question in an altogether different manner.
A Excuse me, please. I am under oath here, and you do not want to accuse me of telling an untruth, do you? a different approach to the idea of truth. I, for instance, consider by this order -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) will you kindly put the question if you want to put a question?
COLONEL POKROVSKY: I want to ask him one question, my Lord, and I must explain to him why I am asking this question. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: loyalty to Fascism, and in connection with this I want to ask you whether you consider that, because of the fact that you revealed yourself as a fanatical follower of Fascism and Fascist ideas, that Hitler made his choice of you as his successor because you were known to Hitler as a fanatical follower who was capable of inciting the Army to any crime; and that still you would be calling this crime that you are inciting the Army to perform pure idealism.
A Well, I can only answer to that that I don't know. I have already explained that the legitimate successor would have been the Reichsmarshal, but through a regrettable incident a few days before, I was a pointed. He was removed, and then I was the next senior officer in command of an independent branch of the armed forces.
I believe that that element was the determining element. That the Fuehrer had confidence in me may have had something to do with it, indeed.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution, my Lord, has no more questions to ask of this Defendant.
1o. Mai-A-AG-21-1
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Kranzbuehler, do you want to re-examine ?
DR. KRANSBUEHLER : I should like to put a few more questions, Mr. Presiedent. BY DR. KRANSBUEHLER : Q : Grand Admiral, during the cross examination by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, you were asked about your knowledge of conditions in concentration camps ; and you wanted to make an additional statement, which you could not do at the time. concentration camps, or did you have any at all ? A : I had no connections with anybody, not with any person who had gotten into a concentration damp, with the exception of Pastor Niemoeller. Pastor Niemoeller was a former comrade of mine from the navy. When my last son had been killed, he expressed his sympathy, and at that occasion, I am thanking him, asked how he was.
Q : When was that ?
A : The summer of 1944. And thereupon I received the answer that he was all right.
Q : Did you write him directly, or how ?
A : No. That message I received through a third person.
Q : Was that the only message you received from a concentration camp ?
A : Yes, the only one.
Q : In the course of the cross examination, a statement by Captain Assmann was put to you about a conference with the Fuehrer of May, 1943. Do you remember its contents ? You are alleged to have said that in view of the present situation, it was desirable that Germany should come into the possession of Spain and Gibraltar.
Did you make a positive suggestion in that direction ? One man see that from the report.
A : Of course, when I discussed the situation, I mentioned 1o. Mai-A-AG-21-2 the narrow bounds of the Bay of Biscay, and that it would be desirable if we could use a larger area to start our U-boats.
Nobody at that time gave any serious thought to any enterprise in the direction of Spain, regardless of whether it might be with the consent of Spain or without it. It was quite obvious that our forces were not at all sufficient for that. about the concern about that narrow area. But I should say it would have been better if that area had been wider. That is what I meant by that statement. So that referred to U-boat warfare and not to any undertaking against Spain on land. I certainly cannot make any suggestion as a naval officer concerning land actions.
Q : In connection with the sinking of the Athenia, it has been hinted that your statement was considered an excuse; that is, that the commanding officer of the submarine confused the Athenia with an auxiliary cruiser. I should like to put to you an excerpt from the war diary of the same commanding officer, and I want you to confirm that it is really from the same commanding officer.
I shall read from the document of the Prosecution B.G. 222, on Page 142, in my document book, Volume 3. It is an excerpt from the war diary of the submarine U-30. It is dated the 11th of September, 1939. "Sighted a vessel with lights dimmed. Trailed. In zig-zag course recognized as merchant ship. Requested to stop by Morse lantern. Steamer signals 'not understood", tries to escape in the thick squall and sends out SOS 'chased by submarine and position by radiotelegraphy. Gave 'stop' signal by radiotelegraphy and Morse lantern. "Ran ahead. Fired 5 shots with machine gun C/30 across the bow. Steamer doesnot react. Turns partly, directly toward the boat. Sends 'Still chased'. Therefore, fire opened from aft bearing with 8,8 cm.
English steamer 'Blairlogie' 4425 tons. After 18 1o. Mai-A-AG-21-3 shots were fired and three hits, the steamer stops.
The crew boards the boats. Last message by radiotelegraphy : 'Shelled, taking the boats'. Fire immediately halted when an emergency light was shown and steamer stopped. Went to the life boats, gave an order to pull away toward the south. Steamer sunk by torpedo. Afterwards both ship crews supplied with Steinhaeger and cigarettes. 32 men in two boats. Red stars were shot until it became light. Since the American steamer 'American Skipper' was nearby, we departed. Crew was rescued." commanding officer of the same U-boat who nine days before had torpedoed the Athenia ?
A : Yes, that is the same commander, and on the same trip, where shortly before, he was a victim of that error.
Q : In the course of the cross examination, once more, very definitely the statement was made, or the allegation made that you had sent a destrucktion order to U-boat commanders. I should like to put to you a letter which is signed by Various U-boat commanders. You know the letter and know the signatures, and I should like to ask you to tell me whether the U-boat commanders who signed before September, 1942-- that is, before your alleged order--were captured afterwards. Doenitz 53, which I have already submitted to the Tribunal. I received it through the British War Ministry and the SecretaryGeneral of the Court. The date is the 18th of January, 1946, and the text is as follows :
" The commanders now here in this camp and who signed this letter, of U-boats that were active on the front want to give the following statement and express the request that this statement should be forwarded to the International Military Tribunal in Nurnberg.
" From the press and radio, we were informed that Grand Admiral Doenitz is charged with having issued the order to destry survivors of torpedoed ships and not to take any prisoners.
1o. Mai-A-AG-21-4 " The undersigned state under oath that neither in writing nor orally was such an order ever given by Grand Admiral Doenitz.
The order was in force reasons of security of the boat, after torpedoing, one culd not surface. The reason for that was that was that if the boat would surface for a rescue action, according to our experience during the first years of the war, we had to expeckt our own destricktion. This order could not be misunderstood. It has never been regarded as an order to annihilate shipwrecked crews.
" The undersigned declare that the German navy has always been educated by their leaders to respect the written and unwritten laws and rules of the sea. We have always regarded it as our honor to obey these laws and to put up a chivalrous fight while in action." who are at present in British prisons of war.
I ask you, Grand Admiral, do you know these signatures ? Were these commanders captured before Sptember, 1942, or after September, 1942 ? In order to examine that from both sides, I should like to see the list again. But most of them beyond doubt were captured after September, 1942.
DR. KRANSBUEHLER : I have no further questions, then.
DR. LATERNSER ( counsel for the General Staff and the O.K.W.) Mr. President, I should like to deal with only one point which came up during the cross examination.
BY DR. LATERNSER : Q Grand Admiral, during the cross examination, you have stated that you were present at the briefing conferences on the 19 th and the 22nd of February, 1945, and you said -
A (interposing) I believe that that date is here on the list. I do not know at this moment.
Q I marked it down, and you will find out right away why 1o. Mai - A-AG-21-5 I am asking.
alleged to have made the suggestion to leave the Geneva Convention. I ask you now to tell me which high military leaders were present during that conference.
A I believe we are confronted with a mistake here. I did not hear tha question or suggestion out of the mouth of the Fuehrer, but I was told about it through a naval officer, who was always present during these briefing conferences. Therefore, I do not know for certain whether that date is correct, and I do not know who was present when the Fuehrer first made that statement. thereafter, and then I believe the Reichsmarshal, and of course Jodl and Field Marshal Keitel, were present. At any rate, the armed forces were all against it and, in my recollection, the Fuehrer, because he saw our rejection, did not do it at DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant mayreturn to the dock. DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, after the experience of the cross-examination of today, I consider it proper to submit my documents to the Tribunal now, if that pleases the Tribunal, before I call further witnesses. I believe that I can shorten the questioning of the witness thereby, and that it will be more easily understood.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Kranzbuehler.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: May I first remind the Tribunal that in the document book of the prosecution GB-224 and GB-191 contain the general accusations against naval warfare upon which the following documents which I submit are based. The documents concerning these general accusations are in document book 3 and 4.
First, I submit Doenitz-54. I don't need to read it because it has already been mentioned. nance, and excerpt of which can be found on page 137. I should like to point out that Article 74 is, word for wrod, according to the regulations of the London protocols. signed by the Supreme Commander of the Navy, That is a contribution to the question as to whether the Supreme Commander of the Navy was a member of the Reich Government. He had no authority to sign that.
The next document which I submit is Doenitz-55. That is the order of 3 September 1939, by which the U-boats went out to war. that I can mention them together, or whether it is necessary to read parts of them.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you might mention them together, really, specifyi shortly what they relate to.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, sir. tion to all laws and rules of naval warfare. Furthermore, there is consideration of a preparatory order for the taking of severe measures, and this order is on page 144. Since I shall refer to that later in a mining the witness, I do not have to point it out now. that the boats were really acting according to these orders. It is document GB191. It is in the original on page 5. That sentence is not in the English excere and that is why I will read it in English, from the original:
"Thus the Germans started this ordinance, which was at any rate, a clear reasonable, and not inhuman document."
Mr. President, it is not copied there, it is not in the document book of the prosecution. Therefore, I read it from the original which the prosecution have submitted.
"German submarine commanders, with some exceptions, behaved in accordance with its provisions during the first months of the war. Indeed, in one case, a submarine had ordered the crew of a trawler to take to their boat if the ship was to be sunk. But when the commander saw the state of the boat, he said, 'Dirty me in that boat. You English are no good sending a ship to sea with a boat like that and the skipper was told to remark his crew on the trawler and make for home a full speed, with a bottle of German Gin and the submarine commander's compliment. War Command of 9 September 1939, at page 141.
"English information office disseminates the news through Router that Ger many has opened unlimited submarine warfare."
the experiences which the Naval War Command had in submarine warfare up until that date. It is an entry of the 21st of September 1939, in the war diary of the Naval War Command. I read under the figure "2":
"The commanders of submarines which had returned report the following valuable experiences:
"(b) English, party also neutral steamers, strong zig-zags, partly time lights. English steamer, when stopped, immediately radios SOS with exact position Thereupon commitment of English planes to fight submarines.
"(c) English steamers have repeatedly tried to escape. Some steamers are armed, one steamer returned fire.
"(d) Up to new no misuse of neutral steamers found." It is an excerpt from GB-222, war diary of the Submarine U 30, of the 14th of September. I will only read a few sentences from the beginning:
"Smoke clouds. Steamer in strong zig-zag. Eastern course. Ran toward her. When recognized, turns to counter-course and signals SOS.
"English steamer Fanad Hoad, 5200 tons, bound for Belfast.
"Pursued at full speed. Since steamer does not react to order to stop, a shot fired across her how from a distance of 2000 meters. Steamer stops. Crew takes to the boats. Boats pulled out of the danger zone." steamer, was attacked by airplanes, what difficulties it had in getting the prize crew on board again, and how, in spite of the bombing attacks of the planes, it did not sink the steamer before two English officers, who had still been on deck, had jumped overboard and had been rescued by the submarine. The depth charge pursuit lasted for ton hours. ly against submarines; and that also is an excerpt from the war diary of the Naval war Command.
I read the entry of the 24th of Spetember:
"Flag Officer, U-boat, reports that on September 6 the english steamer Manaar, on being told to stop by U-38 after a warning shot, tried to escape. Steamer sent wireless report and opened fire from Hockgeschuetz. Withdrawn from ship only after four or five hits, then sank it."
Then, another report of 22 September:
"English reports that when the English steamer Akenside was sunk, a German U-boat had been rammed by a fishing boat." I should only like to point out the considerations, from the point of view of the Naval War Command, as to radio messages.
I read from Figure 2 two sentences, beginning with the second:
"In almost every instance English boats on sighting U-boats have sent out wireless SOS calls and stated their position. Following these SOS calls by the ship, a certain time later, there always appeared English airplanes, which makes it positive that with the English it is a matter of a military measure and organization by an order. The SOS calls in connection with a given position may therefore be considered as military information, even as resistance." by the flag officer U-boats that ships who used their arms when stopped should be sunk. I read the entry of the 24th September, 1939. It is on the bottom under Figure 4:
"Based on the Fuehrer's approval, Groups and BdU received the following order:
"Against all merchant vessels using wireless when ordered to stop, force of arms should be employed. They are subject to seizure or sinking. Rescue of crew is advised."
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn).
(The Tribunal adjourned until May 11, 1946, at 1000 hours).
Hermann Wilhelm Goering et a,., Defendants,
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I continue to submit documents concerning naval warfare. statement of 26 September, 1939, by the First Lord of the Admiralty concerning the armament of British merchant vessels. In this declaration he announces that within a short time the entire British merchant fleet will be armed. Then he speaks about the training of the crews, and in the end he thanks his predecessors for the care with which they have prepared that work before the war. I submit it as document Doenitz 60, which is a collection of documents concerning naval warfare. It contains altogether 550 documents, and according to the request of the President, I have put special numbers on several documents. acted suspiciously and were for that reason attacked by the U-boats. The first document in that series is Doenitz 61, on page 150. It is a warning to neutral shipping against suspicious activities. That warning was sent in a note to all neutral delegations. At the end it points out that the ships should avoid any possibility of being confused with enemy warships or auxiliary cruisers, especially during the night. There is a warning against other suspicious conduct, for instance, changing of course, use of wireless at sight of German naval forces, zig-zagging course, dimming of lights, not stopping and the acceptance of enemy escort. That warning is repeated in the document Doenitz 62, which is on page 153, a renewed note of 19 October 1939 to the neutral governments. the Danish Government, according to the German notes warned their merchant shipping against suspicious conduct, and it is found on page 154.
on 28 September. issued to the submarines to attack dimmed vessels in certain operational areas close to the British Coast. That order is significant in connection with the cross examination of yesterday where the question was posed whether an order of that kind had been issued at all or whether that point was transmitted to the commanders orally with the directive to falsify their logs.
"Order by the SKL to the Front: Inasmuch as on the English and French coasts when encountering dimmed vessels it must be assumed that they are battleships or auxiliary battleships, full armed commitment is approved against dimmed vessels in the following territories:" U-boats West 1939 shows how this order was transmitted to the submarines. German submarines is shown by the next document which I have to submit, and it will receive the number Doenitz 101 and is on page 155. It is also under Doenitz 60. That is a statement by the British Admiralty which I will read:
"The British Admiralty on 1 October circulated the following warning among the British merchant marine:
"Withing the last few days some German U-boats have been attacked by British merchant marine vessels. In this connection the German radio announces that the German U-boats have so far observed rules of international law in warning the merchant marine vessels before attacking them. Now, however, Germany wishes to retaliate by considering every British merchant marine vessel as a battleship.
"While the first mentioned fact is absolutely untrue, it may indicate an immediate change in the policy of the German submarine warfare. Be prepared to meet it. The Admiralty."
On page 157 there is another report of the same day. The British Admiralty announces that German submarines are pursuing a new strategy. English boats are called upon to ram every German submarine. issued as a result of the armament and armed residtance by merchant vessels. I will read the order of 4 October, which was issued by the SKL to the front.
"Immediate full employment of all available weapons is permitted for submarines against merchant marine vessels of enemy nationality of which it can be noticed without a doubt that they are armed, or of which the fact that they are armed, based on conclusive evidence has been announced to the Command of Naval Warfare.
As far as circumstances permit, measures are to be taken to save the crew after every possibility of danger for the submarine has been eliminated. Passenger ships which are not used to transport troops are now as beforenot to be attacked, even if they are armed." marines. in a document on page 159, which is an excerpt from a document of the Prosecution, GB-196, Standing War Order 171, Experiences and Observations:
I should only like to read from Figure 4, the first sentence:
"Tactics of Enemy Merchant Marine Vessels: The British Navy --"
THE PRESIDENT: W hich document is that?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The document was issued before May, 1940, and I shall call on a witness to state the correct date. I assume it was in October, 1939:
"The British Navy has received the following instructions:
"(a) To fight every German submarine with all means, to ram it or attack it with water bombs, or if properly equipped, with depth charges," and there are other details given. Marine is summarized in Doenitz 66, at page 161. I shall read the order. It is an order of the 17th of October, 1939, at 1500 o'clock to the flag officers of submarines, who received the following order:
"Submarines are permitted immediate, full employment of weapons against allmerchant marine vessels, which are recognized beyond doubt as being of enemy nationality, as in any case the attempt to ram or otherwise active resistance is to be expected. Exceptions are still passenger boats of enemy nationality."
submitted already, that is a note to the neutral countries of the 22nd of October, 1932, and it summarizes the behaviour, the conduct of ships, which according to German opinion removed the peaceful character of a merchant ship.
I read from the last paragraph, the second sentence:
"According to previous experiences such tactics are certainly to be expected from English and French boats, particularly sailing in convoy, inadmissable use of wireless, dimmed out lights and beyond thatarmed resistance and attacks." of enemy ships. The German orders have been issued on the basis of the experience of our U-boats. 163, and it follows on the basis of a report of the British Admirality, on page 163. I should like to emphasize that the orders for merchant shipping are published in the hand book for the defense of merchant ships of 1938, that is, they were issued before the war. passenger ships. They are essential in connection with the Athenia case, since the Athenia was a passenger ship. of passenger ships. First is an order on the 4th of September, 1939, which I should like to read:
"On the Fuehrer's orders no enemy action against passenger ships for the time being even when in convoy." use of passenger ships as troop transports. merchant shipping, October to November, 1939, p. 3:
"As the enemy passenger lines are extensively used for transport service, therefore, any further sparing of those ships, in so far as they are convoyed could not be justified any more;"the following was ordered on the 29th of October: I read the order which is on the bottom of the page:
"Full use of armament against passenger lines if found in enemy conveys."
"Passenger liners in enemy conveys are to be subjected to immediate full use of armament by U-boats." warning had been issued during November and December against the use of armed passenger ships by publication of a list of these ships.
The next document is Doenitz 70, on page 171. It is an order of the 17th of November 1939, issued from S.K.L. to flag officers of U-boats, and I read the order:
"Immediate and full use of weapons against all clearly recognized enemy passenger ships, whose armament is detected or is already known, is permitter to U-boats." permitted. permitted also to attack passenger ships, that was four months later, after it has been permitted against other ships. 4 of my document book. I should like to emphasize again that this document is designed to encourage Grand Admiral Raeder and was termed by the Prosecution a cynical denial of international law. I should like to point out, and first, that according to the heading, it is concerned with considerations of the Skl on the Possibilities of intensifying Economic Warfare against England.
I should like to read a few paragraphs. I spoke about then, and which show a very thorough consideration of International Law has been male.
The first paragraph:
"The Fuehrer's proposal of reestablishing a just and honorable peace and setting anew the political order in Middle Europe has been rejected. The enemy powers want war with Germany's destruction as its goal. In the fight in which Germany is now forced to defend her existence and right, Germany must employ her weapons with ruthless security under full respect of the rules of soldierly conduct in combat." uses all possibility of ruthlessness.
which I should like to read:
From the paragraph, Military Demands. I read from the third sentence:
"It remains desirable to base the military measures taken, on the existing International Law; however, military measures recognized as being necessary must if successes decisive for the war can be expected, be carried out even in case the valid International Law cannot be applied in that instance. Therefore, as a matter of principle, the military weapon which could effectively break the end my power of resistance, must be based on legal maxims even if in doing so new rules of naval warfare are created.
"After weighing the political, military and economic consequences in the frame work of the entire warfare, the High Command must decide which military procedure and legal rule of warfare are to be applied."
Then there are a number of excerpts which show how S.L.L. was examining the legal situation; that is to say the present legal situation, the legal situation in case of a siege of England and in case of a blockade against England. The end, which is on page 203, emphasizes the political character of the final decision. I shall read it: "The decision to intensify economic warfare and the timing of the change to the most intensified and thus final form of naval warfare in this war is of far reaching political importance. It can be made only by the highest war command, which will weigh the military, political and economic requirements against each other." I should like to supplement that this document is of the 15th October, 1939. At the end of November, 1939, the Naval War Command took the consequent -
THE PRESIDENT: What day in October? The 15th of October?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: 15th October, Mr. President. It is a memorandum of the 15th October which has been submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you were dealing with Document GB-224. That is the one you have been reading just now.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Headed on our page 199, 3rd of November, 1939.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President, on the 3rd of November. The 3rd of November is the date at which the memorandum was distributed to the commander of the armed forces and the other commands. I am just told now that in the English text, above the word "Memorandum" the date is not printed. In the original it says, right above the word "Memorandum", "Berlin, 15 October, 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I have already submitted thedocument Doenitz 73, which is on page 206, in which neutrals are warned against the entry into the zone, which is the American combat zone declared by President Roosevelt. The German point of view, that the entry into this zone constitutes an endangering of all neutrals by their own action, is expressed also in Document Doenitz 103 on page 210. It is an interview which Grand Admiral Raeder gave to a representative of the National Broadcasting Company, New York, on 4 March, 1940 I should like to read several sentences from that document. In the second paragraph Grand Admiral Raeder points out what dangers exist for neutral ships if they act suspiciously and can be confused with enemy ships, enemy warships.