The last sentence of that paragraph reads: "The German standpoint may be expressed tersely by the formula: Whoever depends on armed assistance must be prepared for armed attack." I shall read the two last paragraphs: "In discussing the possibility of frequent differences of opinion, the commander in chief of the Navy spoke of President Roosevelt's order prohibiting American shipping in the dangerous ones around England. He said the following: 'This prohibition is the best proof against England's practice of forcing neutrals to sail through these zones without being able to guarantee their security. Germany can only advise all neutrals to imitate the policy of your President.' Question: 'Thus, according to the present state of affairs, there is no safety for neutral shipping in the war-endangered zones?' Answers: 'Probably not, so long as England adheres to her nethods...."
By the collapse of France the entire U.S.A. combat zone was declared German blockade area, That can be soon from the documents Doenitz 104 on page 212. I read from the middle of the long paragraph: "The entire sea area around England has thus become a theater of war operations. Every ship sailing this zone runs the risk of being destroyed not only by mines but also by other fighting means --
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, did you call that exhibit Doenitz 60 or-
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That was originally also one of the documents from Doenitz 60, which I have given a new number now. The new number now is Doenitz 104.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: "Every ship sailing this zone runs the risk of being destroyed not only by mines but also be other fighting means. For that reason the German Government warns again and most urgently against sailing in the endangered zone." At the end of it: "Note: The German Government refuses to assume any responsibility for damages or losses in these areas." I have included an official statement at the occasion of the proclamation of the total blockade of 17 August 1940. I should like to mention it only.
outside of these danger zones. As the first document I point to page 226. That is an excerpt of a document from the prosecution GB-196. It is a permanent order from the Flag Officer U-boats which was also issued before May, 1940. I read the first sentences: "Not to be sunk are: (a) all ships readily recognized as neutrals so long as they do not (1) move in an enemy convoy, (2) move into a declared danger zone." War Command that the neutrals should really be recognizable. I read the first sentences of the entry of 10 January, 1942: "The Naval War Command has asked the Foreign office because of the new extension of the war to point out once more to the neutral, seafaring nations with the exception of Sweden the necessity of marking their ships carefully in order to avoid having their ships mistaken for enemy ships." from the War Diary of the Flag Officer U-boats: "All commanders are once more exhaustively instructed as to their conduct towards neutrals." mitted. Doenitz 78, on page 229, contains examples of the consideration which the Flag Officer U-boats took for neutrals. The entry of 2.3 November, 1942, shows that a submarine received an order to leave the ocean area entirely because there was strong neutral traffic in that area. The second entry of December, 1942, specifies that a Portugese naval tanker had to be treated according to directives; that is to say, should not be bothered.
On page 230 there is a document which I have already mentioned. It informs us about court martial proceedings against a commanding officer who had torpedoed a neutral by mistake.
The next document is Doenitz 79 on page 231. That is the order which until the end of the war was valid for the treatment of neutrals. I do not think I have to read it. It points out again the discernibility of neutral ships and points to the agreements about shipping which have been made with a number of countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the correct date on it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: August 1, 1944, Mr. President. The original date is the 1st of April, 1943. The order was then reissued on the 1st of August, 1944, on the basis of the correction which had become necessary by shipping agreements. attacked by the document of the Prosecution, GB 191 and GB 224. Now I should like to submit several documents concerning details of the document of the Prosecution GB 191. the words:
"Every ship whether with or without escort which comes in front of our torpedo tubes will be torpedoed."
I now wish to present Doenitz 80. In Doenitz 80 there is an excerpt from that speech, on page 232, which shows in that connection that the statement of the Fuehrer was only concerned with ships which are bringing war materials to England. characteristic examples for German naval warfare. The first is the case of the Danish Steamer "Vendia." The document of the Prosecution says:
"On the 30th of September, 1939, the first sinking of a neutral ship by a submarine took place without a warning signal having been given. On that occasion people were killed. The ship was the Danish steamer 'Vendia'."
I submit that as Doenitz Exhibit 83 on page 235. That is the War Diary of the Submarine U-3, which had sunk the "Vendia."
I should like to read parts of it. I begin with the second sentence.
"The steamer turns away gradually and increases speed. The boat comes up only very slowly. Obvious attempt to escape.
"The steamer can be clearly recognized as the Danish steamer 'Vendia.' Boat reduces speed and prepares the machine-gun. Several warning shots are fired across the steamer's bow. The steamer stops very slowly; nothing happens for a while. Then some more shots are fired. The 'Vendia' lies into the wind. For ten minutes nothing can be recognized on deck, which could remove the suspicion of a possible intentional resistance. At 11.24 hours I suddenly see waves in front of the steamer and screw movements. The steamer turns sharply toward the boat. My opinion that this is an attempt at ramming is shared by the officer on watch and the first mate. Consequently I turn with the steamer. A torpedo is fired 30 seconds later; point of aim, bow; point of impact, extreme rear of the stern. The stern is torn off and goes down. The front part is still afloat.
"At the risk of the life of the crew and the boat (heavy sea and numerous floating pieces of wreckage) six men of the Danish crew are rescued, among them the captain and helmsman. Other survivors cannot be recognized. During this time the Danish steamer "Sawa" approaches and is stopped. It is requested to send the papers in a boat. It is carrying a mixed cargo from Amsterdam to Copenhagen. The six persons rescued are transferred to the steamer for repatriation.
"After the crew of the steamer had been transferred it was learned that the engineer of the steamer had told Blank that the captain had had the intention of ramming the submarine." Prosecution GB 82, shows that the case "Vendia" was the subject of a protest from the German Government to the Danish Government.
I shall deal now with the sinking of the "City of Benares" on the 18 September, 1940, and therefore I should like to read several sentences from the document of the Prosecution because it characterizes the probative value of the entire document GB 191.
I read from the British document book page 23, beginning from the passage where the Prosecution stopped reading. The Tribunal will remember that the "City of Benares" had children on board. It says here:
"The captain of the U-boat presumably did notknow that there were children on board the 'City of Benares' when he fired the torpedoes. Perhaps he did not even know the name of the ship, although there is strong evidence that he must have been dogging her for several hours before torpedoing her. probably with civilian passengers on board, certainly with a crew of merchant seamen. He knew the state of the weather, and he knew that they were six hundred miles from land and yet he followed them outside the blockade area and deliberately abstained from firing his torpedo until after nightfall when the chances of rescue would be enormously diminished." of the U-boat 48, which sunk the "City of Benares." I read the entry of the 17th of September, 1940.
"Time 1002. Convoy sighted. Course about 240 degrees. Speed seven nautical miles. Contact maintained, since underwater attack is no longer possible because of the heavy swell. No escort can be seen with the convoy." Then the entry of the 18th of September, 1940, describes a torpedo fired against a ship of that convoy, the "City of Benares." ship of that convoy, the British steamer "Marina." Both ships send wireless messages. Twenty minutes later the submarine has an artillery combat with a tanker from that convoy. That is a true story of the "City of Benares." once more concerning the sinking of "Sheaf Mead." I should like to emphasize that that ship was considerably armed and that it probably was no merchant vessel but a submarine trap.
during the cross-examination yesterday, an order by the Fuehrer of July, 1941, was submitted concerning the attack against United States merchant vessels in the blockade zone around England. The Prosecution says on account of this document that oentiz had conducted a cynical and opportunistic warfare against the neutrals.
My next document is Doenitz 86. On page 143 -
THE PRESIDENTL Was it not 243?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: 243, Mr. President. I beg your pardon. It deals with the attampts to avoid a conflict with the United States. I read the entry of 5 March 1940 from the War Diary of the Naval War Command, SKL:
"The Naval Forces are given orders, with regard to the conduct of trade warware, that U.S. ships should neither be stopped nor seized nor sunk. The reason was the assurance given by the Commander-in-Chief to the American Naval Attache, whom he received on 20 February, that German submarines were under orders not to stop any American ships. All difficulties that could arise from trade warfare between the U.S.A. and Germany are thereby to be eliminated from the start." tion of the American neutral zone, the zone of neutrality. I quote:
"The following wireless is directed to all ships at sea: American neutrality zone from now on to be observed south of 20 North only at a distance of 300 nautical miles from the coast. For reasons of foreign policy, the hitherto existing limitation will for the time being continue to be observed north of the above-mentioned line." concerning the question of neutrality toward Germany in that war. It is an excerpt from the speech of the 11th of September, 1941, which is well known:
"Hitler knows that he must win mastery of the seas if he wants to win mastery of the world. He knows that he must first tear down the bridge of ships which we are building over the Atlantic, over which we continuously transport the war material that will help destroy our patrols on the sea and in the air."
that the crews of merchant ships had been civilians and non-combatants. On page 254 I have copied the part of the document, Doenitz 67, which I have already submitted. It is an excerpt from the confidential order from the Admiralty and it deals with the training -- the gunnery training -- of civilian crews of merchant ships. I should like to point to the first page of these orders which say that in general there should be only one navy man at a gun and all other men should be taken from the crew of the ship. I read from the paragraph, under "Training":
"In addition to the gun pointer and the men specially trained for operating guns, further men are needed to complete the operating crew -- depending on the size of the gun, five to seven men -- and for bringing of the ammunition from the magazine." of the crew. the French Minister for the Merchant Marino, dated 11 November 1939, concerning the creation of an insignia for crew members of French merchant ships who can be mobilized. Page 256. I should like to emphasize that this decree was signed by the Director, the head of the Military Cabinet, The Rear Admiral, and the charac er of that order can be seen best from the paragraph before last:
"This armband, which is intended to be worn on civilian clothes, will consi of an armband of blue material with a vertical anchor of red wool. This armband can be worn only in France or in the French colonies. In any event, the men who have been provided with it must not wear it when they are in foreign territories. survivors. These documents can be found in Document Books 1 and 2 -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, don't you think it would be sufficient if you were to refer to these documents, give us the numbers of the ones, without reading from them?
They all deal, as you say, with rescue.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I believe I can do this in the case of most of them. of the GenevaConvention to naval warfare. On page 10 is a document, Doenitz 6, the order of the 4th of October, 1939, concerning the sinking of armed merchantmen, which clarifies the order I have already submitted, to rescue wherever possible without endangering their own ship. by German submarines which let go of enemy ships on that occasion. found on pages 19 to 26. I should like to put it in connection with the War Order 145, which is the document of the Prosecution, GB-196. These statements contain numerous examples out of all the years of war concerning rescue measures on the part of German submarines. One of these statements also is supplemented by photographs -- on page 21, which are included in the original. The contents of these statements are confirmed by Document Doenitz 140, page 27, where a commanding officer of a U-boat reports about rescue measures in the War Diary, and at the end there is the sentence "Taking on board of English aviators agreed to," signed by the Flag Officer, U-boats. Diary, giving an example of rescue measures after a battle with a convoy, October, 1941. It is on page 28. Tribunal has permitted me to use the standing war orders 511 and 513, in the cross-examination of Moehle. They deal with the capture of captains and chief engineers. I submit them as Doenitz 24 and 25, and they can be found on page 46 and 47. I should like to emphasize that in both orders it is said explicitly that capture should only be effected as far as it is possible without endangering the boats. on its part has issued orders to prevent the capture of the British captains by German submarines.
British order was carried out and that a U-boat is searching in vain among the life-boats for the captain.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, could you inform the Tribunal what paragraph 2 on page 46 refers to and means?
DR. KRANSBUEHIER: Yes. The paragraph points to the standing war order, No. 10; that is the order in which it is stated which neutral ships can be sunk.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it mean that those officers have to be sunk with the ship, or what?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, Mr. President. That means that captains and ships' officers of neutral ships could be left in the lifeboats and should not be taken from the life-boats; that it was in fact much safer on the life-boat than on the submarine, as seen from the English order which tells the captains to remain in the life-boats and to hide from the U-boats.
THE PRESIDENT: What if they haven't got life-boats?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I believe, Mr. President, that that case has not been ruled on. I know no case where a ship did not have life-boats, particularly in 1943, Which is the year when this order originates. That ship not only had life-boats but automatically inflating floats.
May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER : A number of examples for the fact that captains were rescued under these orders are contained in the statements of the commanders, which can be found on pages 22, 25, and 26, under Exhibit No. Doenitz 13.
played a very imprtant part in Captain Moehle's statement. The Tribunal will no doubt remember that this case was the decisive reason for the interpretation which Moehle gave to the Laconia order. I submit Exhibit No. Doenitz 26, with reference to this case, which is the affidavit from Captain Witt. Ishould like to quote a few paragraphs from that.
THE PRESIDENT : What page ?
DR. KRANSBULHLER : On page 50, Mr. President.
" In November, 1943, in the course of my official duty in the staff of the Commander in Chief of the submarines, I had to interview Naval Lieutenant Albrecht, commander of the submarine U-386, concerning his experiences during his action just terminated. Albrecht reported that at the height of Cape Finisterre he had seen by day a rubber boat with shipwrecked British aviators in the Gulf of Biscay. He did not take rescue measures he was on the way to a convoy in process of being formed. He could only have reached his position by continuing without a stop. Besides he was afraid-- "
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Kranzbuehler, is it necessary to go into the details of each partcular case ? I mean, they all depend upon their own particular circumstances. You need not to read the documents very carefully. It is not necessary at this stage of the case.
DR. KRANSBUEHLER : Very well, Mr. President, I shall only report. The affidavit briefly states that the commander hat been enlightened regarding the fact that he should have brought the aviators back. That is, in fact, the contrary of what Moehle has Said in this courtroom.
The correctness of Captain Witt's statements are confirmed by the next document, Doenitz 27.
It's the war diary, the log of the submarine. It contains the views of the commander of submarines. The dicisions disapproved of the fact that the Englishmen were not taken aboard. The fact that Admiral Doenitz attitude regarding rescues was not aiming at cruelties, but that it was based on military considerations, is shown in the following document, Doenitz ExhibitNo. 28. It is on page 53. He is consider rescuing of personnel and he comes to the conclusion that from military consideration such a rescue may have to be refrained from.
The following document, which is Doenitz No. 29, deals with the statement by witness Heisig. It is on page 54 and the following. To start with, it contains an affidavit from the Adjutant, Captain Lieutenant Furhmann, which deals with general thoughts, which was the basis of Admiral Doenitz' lectures and speaches. At the end he is emphasizing that never was he approached by young officers at the end of any lectures and speeches by Grand Admiral Doenitz, where they might have expressed any doubts regarding treatment of shipwrecked persons. Kress, who was present at the same lecture as Heisig, was, and he is saying that, neither literally nor by hinting, did Admiral Doenitz order the killing of survivors.
This, in turn, is confirmed by the statement of Lieutenant Steinhoff on page 59. commander at the time regarding fights against Jews becomes clear from the following document, which is Doenitz No. 30. It is on pages 60 and 61. There, again, appears no word regarding the killing of survivors. Incidentally it is a record of a conference with the Fuehrer on the 28th of September, 1942, where admiral Raeder and Admiral Doenitz were present. rescue ships as aims to be attained, if possible. In the same document there is contained a statement saying that they have the same significance as submarine traps. For that reason I have printed a document on page 63, which is standing war order No. 173, dated the 2nd of May, 1940; and in that order it is stated that "In accordance with the instructions of the British Admiralt: U-boat traps should be made use of whenever possible in convoys." respect paid to hospital ships is proved by the document Doenitz No. 34, which is in document book No.2, on page 67. It is the last standing order referring to hospital ships, dated August the 1st, 1944. It begins with the words: "Hospital ships must not be sunk."
My next document, Doenitz No. 35, is meant to show that the naval command staff, with reference to hospital ships, went beyond the rules of International Law. The entry of July 17, 1941, proves that the Soviet Government in turn has refused to adhere to the hospital ship agreement, referring in that connection to violations by Germany. According to paragraph 18 of that agreement, that would mean that the significance of that agreement would cease for all signatories. only example which we know of to the effect that a U-boat commander did in fact fire at means of rescue. This is the interrogation or examination of Captain Eck, which was carried out on the 21st of November, 1945, by order of this Tribunal.
That was ten days before he was shot; According to the wishes of the Tribunal, I shall only summarize. After sinking of the Greek steamer "Peleus", Eck tried to fire at the lifeboats by trying to sink them; and the reason which he quotes is that by this action he would do away with debris, wishing to avoid that the enemy air force might pick him up in that manner. He states that he had the Laconia order aboard, but that this order hadn't had the slightest influence upon his decision. In fact, he hadn't even thought of it. Moehle instructed him, but said nothing in that connection about the killing of rescued personnel; and Eck says he knows nothing about the example of U-3 86. At the end of Eck's examination he states that he expected that his actions would be approved of by Admiral Doenitz. Furthermore, during cross examination yesterday, the question was once more touched upon whether Admiral Doenitz-
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for a few minutes -- only for a short time.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Very well.
(A recess was taken).
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal, as you kno w, was going to deal with the applications for documents and witnesses, but if you could finish your documents in a short time, they would like to go on with that and get them finished, if you can.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I believe that even if I keep up this present speed, I shall need about one hour. I should like to ask you, therefore that I may continue Monday morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Wall, Dr. Kranzbuehler, if you think it will be anything like as long as that, of course we must put it off until Monday morning, but the Tribunal does hope that you won't take anything like so long as that, because going into detail on these documents doesn't really help the Tribunal. They have all got to be gone into again in great detail, both in your speech and in furthe consideration by the Tribunal.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I shall confirm myself only to bringing out the connections, Mr. President, but in spite of that, it would be better if I did so Monday morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, yes. Then the Tribunal will now deal with the applications.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases, the first application is on behalf of the defendant von Schirach, who asks for one Hans Marsilek as a witness for cross examination. The Prosecution have already introduced an affidavit from this man, and they have no objection to his being called for cross examination. in respect of one Hoffmann. The Defense desires to administer interrogatories to Hoffmann in lieu of calling Hoffmann, who has already been allowed as a witness. There is no objection to that.
My Lord, the next matter is an application by Dr. Seidl on behalf of the defendant Hess, and it is a request for five documents relating to the GermanSoviet agreements in August and September 1939. There is also a request for the calling of Ambassador Gauss as a witness in connection with the above. But the position with regard to previous applications is somewhat lengthy, and without going into detail, I tell the Tribunal that this matter has already been before them on six occasions. I have the details if the Tribunal would like them.
THE PRESIDENT: No, because the Tribunal made an order, did they not, that these documents were to be translated?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: And that they would then be considered by the Tribunal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is so, my Lord. The Tribunal made an order for them to be translated on the 25th of March, and, my Lord, if I may just remind your Lordship of the bare facts, on the 28th of March Fraulein Blank, the private secretary of the defendant von Ribbentrop, was asked about the agreement Your Lordship may remember that my friend General Rudenko objected, but the Tribunal ruled that the questions were admissible, and the witness said she knew of the existence of the secret pact, but gave no details.
Then, on the first of April, in the course of Dr. Seidl's cross examination of the defendant von Ribbentrop, the Gauss affidavit was read, and on the third of April, Dr. Seidl applied for Hilger and Weizacker to be called as witnesses on this point, and on the 15th of April Dr. Seidl applied for Ambassador Gauss to be called. when I said that in view of the Tribunal's previous ruling I could not contest the question of the agreement, but I objected to the witnesses. General Rudenko I think, stated that he had submitted written objections, and the Tribunal said they would consider the matter. that the affidavit of Dr. Gauss is already in evidence. My Lord, that is the first affidavit. The second affidavit of Dr. Gauss is notin evidence. With regard to the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, that is already in evidence. As to the secret supplementary protocol appended to the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, the substance is already in evidence. It was given in the Gauss affidavit. the 28th September 1939, and the secret supplementary protocol to that pact, The Prosecution submit that these documents have no relevance to the defense of the defendant Hess, and they cannot see any reason for their being wanted. If necessary, my Soviet colleague can deal further with the matter, but that is the general position. We also submit that the second affidavit of Ambassador Gauss is unnecessary in view of his previous affidavit, and without stating then again, I refer to and repeat my objections to witnesses to the discussions anterior to the conclusion of the agreement.
unnecessary to occupy the tine of the Tribunal regarding it.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal, as I have said, is going to consider this matter. They haven't yet had an opportunity to consider these documents, but I should like to ask you whether there is any reason why Ambassador Gauss should be called as a witness.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: None at all, myLord.
THE PRESIDENT: He has already stated the substance of these documents, as has the defendant Ribbentrop, and if the documents are now produced, supposing that the Tribunal took the view that they ought to be admitted, it would be entirely irrelevant to call Gauss as a witness.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FIFE: In my submission that is so, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Well , I think the Tribunal had better consider these documents, as they stated in their order they were going to do when the documents had been produced.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: If your Lordship pleases. he requests permission to read the affidavit of the witness Kalus. The permission was previously granted to the defendant Funk to submit an interrogatory to Kalus, which has been done, and the interrogatory has already been introduced in evidence. The affidavit now in question has been received and supplements the interrogatory, and the Prosecution havens objection. to call the witness Gassner as a witness, and he is desired to speak as to the Stuermer and the size of the circulation and the profits. The Prosecution submits that it is unnecessary to call a witness as to the form of the Stuermer after 1933. A representative number of copies of the newspaper are before the Tribunal and the form of the newspaper can be seen from them. given evidence as to the Stuermer's circulation, and it is respectfully submitted that the takings of the Stuermer and the use to which they were put are irrelevant.
Then, my Lord, the next application, on behalf of the defendant Sauckel, is for one Biedermann as a witness instead of a witness allowed previously who cannot be found.
The Prosecution have no objection to that, and they have no objection to the documents that are asked for, so with the approval of the Tribunal I shan't go through them in detail.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we should like to know when you think the most appropriate time would be to hear the evidence on behalf of those defendants whose cases have already been presented, whether to hear it at the end of all the evidence or to hear it earlier?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: My Lord, I should have thought that it was better to hear it earlier if the Tribunal could put aside a Saturday morning for it, or something of that kind, before the cases of the various defendants have got too far into the backgraound.
THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that and let you know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: If your Lordship pleases. Now, My Lord, the next application is in behalf of the defendant Seyss-Inquart and he asks for an interrogatory to be submitted to Dr. Stuckhardt (?) to supplement the testimony of the witness Lammers. The prosecution have no objection to such and interrogatory They ask the Tribunal to let them reserve the right to put in a cross- interrogatory. The , next, the defendant Frick asks for Dr. Konrad (?) as a witness on the question of church persecution, and the prosecution suggests that an interrogatory would be sufficient on this point and I think there is a little con fusion here. I think that what is desired is for an affidavit. The original application says: "Contrary to the charge to the effect that the defendant participated in the persecution of the churches, an affidavit by the witness is to establish that Frick strongly defended ccurch interests." So the only question is between an affidavit and an interrogatory, not between an oral witness and an interrogatory. Then if I might leave the next one it is the application on behalf of the defendant Goering. My friend, Colonel Pokrovsky is going to deal with that. I pass to the application of the defendant Hess and Frank, That is Dr. Seidl's application: and if i might just read what is stated in the General Secretary's note, it is official information from the ministry of War of the United States of America, or another Ministerial Service official of the Office of Strategic Services. It is stated that such a report is desired to show that the witness Gisevius had perjured himself on the witness stand and that they desire to show this to attack his credibility. It is alleged that the perjuring consits of his denial of receiving any favors from any power at war with Germany, which is supposed to be at variance with his statement that he had friendly and political relations with the American Secret Service and with some subsequently published reports.
Confirmation of these two factors, alleged to be at variance with his prior statements, is sought by request on official state ment; and they ask for the United States Secretary of war, Mr. Patterson, as a witness for the essential points in case the Tribunal does not consider an official report admissible or sufficient or the United States Ministry of War refuses the information.
Now, My Lord. I deal with this matter simply as a question of jurisprudence on which I submit that the English view is a sound one and should be followed by this Tribunal. The law of England, as I understand it, is that when you cross examine a witness to credit, you are bound by his answers. There is only one exception from that which is, in my recollection contained in a note in Rescue Criminal .Evidence, that when you have cross examined a witness to credit, you may call a witness that is to say, that knowing the general reputation of the witness who has been cross examined to credit, on that general reputation and only on his general reputation, the witness, one would not believe him on it. That is the only exception that I know in English Law.
THE PRESIDENT: And, of course, if he is cross examined as to a crime or a misdemeanor, he may be contradicted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: Certainly, your Lordship is quite right. I should have put that as an exception; that if he is cross-examined as to a specific conviction, then the conviction may be proved. I am very grateful to your Lordship. But, my Lord, what is not permissible in English jurisprudence is that when a witness has been cross examined to credit on particular facts other than a conviction by the state, evidence may be adduced as to these particular facts.
I should submit that the princip which I am sure obtains in all systems of jurisprudence, Interest reipublicae out sit finis litium must apply and support that condition. Now, I put that in English. I am sorry. "It is in the interests of the community that there should be an end of the legal proceedings."
My Lord, if one didn't apply the limit which English jurisprudence has applied, one would then call evidence to attack the credit of witnesses for the prosecution. The prosecution would then render a rebuttal and call evidence to attack the credit of each of these witnesses who had attacked the credit of the prosecution's witness and there would never be an end to legal proceedings at all. My Lord, on that point which is a general point -- and I don't meant be academic -- it is a point of practical importance for preserving some december limit to legal proceedings -- I should submit that this application should be refused. My Lord, I think that covers ail the points except the question of the defendant Goering's application with which, my friend, Colonel Pokrovsky will deal.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: The defendant Goering applied for calling supplement witnesses in regard to the mass murder in the Katyn Forest and on the standpoint and the particular part played by the armed forces regarding it, and he wants to prove that German armed forces were not in any way concerned with this Hitler provocation on the part of the Hitlerites. The prosecution of the Soviet Union strenuously protests.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, we have this matter fully in our mind as we have already had to consider it therefore, it isn't necessary for you at deal with it in detail, for I understand these are new witnesses who haven't before been applied for.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: I had in mind the fact that the new witnesses have I called and, previsely, I would like to inform the Tribunal about our point of view and that is as far as the calling of the new witnesses is concerned, without going into detail about the Katyn Forest murders.