"(c) English steamers have repeatedly tried to escape. Some steamers are armed, one steamer returned fire.
"(d) Up to new no misuse of neutral steamers found." It is an excerpt from GB-222, war diary of the Submarine U 30, of the 14th of September. I will only read a few sentences from the beginning:
"Smoke clouds. Steamer in strong zig-zag. Eastern course. Ran toward her. When recognized, turns to counter-course and signals SOS.
"English steamer Fanad Hoad, 5200 tons, bound for Belfast.
"Pursued at full speed. Since steamer does not react to order to stop, a shot fired across her how from a distance of 2000 meters. Steamer stops. Crew takes to the boats. Boats pulled out of the danger zone." steamer, was attacked by airplanes, what difficulties it had in getting the prize crew on board again, and how, in spite of the bombing attacks of the planes, it did not sink the steamer before two English officers, who had still been on deck, had jumped overboard and had been rescued by the submarine. The depth charge pursuit lasted for ton hours. ly against submarines; and that also is an excerpt from the war diary of the Naval war Command.
I read the entry of the 24th of Spetember:
"Flag Officer, U-boat, reports that on September 6 the english steamer Manaar, on being told to stop by U-38 after a warning shot, tried to escape. Steamer sent wireless report and opened fire from Hockgeschuetz. Withdrawn from ship only after four or five hits, then sank it."
Then, another report of 22 September:
"English reports that when the English steamer Akenside was sunk, a German U-boat had been rammed by a fishing boat." I should only like to point out the considerations, from the point of view of the Naval War Command, as to radio messages.
I read from Figure 2 two sentences, beginning with the second:
"In almost every instance English boats on sighting U-boats have sent out wireless SOS calls and stated their position. Following these SOS calls by the ship, a certain time later, there always appeared English airplanes, which makes it positive that with the English it is a matter of a military measure and organization by an order. The SOS calls in connection with a given position may therefore be considered as military information, even as resistance." by the flag officer U-boats that ships who used their arms when stopped should be sunk. I read the entry of the 24th September, 1939. It is on the bottom under Figure 4:
"Based on the Fuehrer's approval, Groups and BdU received the following order:
"Against all merchant vessels using wireless when ordered to stop, force of arms should be employed. They are subject to seizure or sinking. Rescue of crew is advised."
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn).
(The Tribunal adjourned until May 11, 1946, at 1000 hours).
Hermann Wilhelm Goering et a,., Defendants,
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I continue to submit documents concerning naval warfare. statement of 26 September, 1939, by the First Lord of the Admiralty concerning the armament of British merchant vessels. In this declaration he announces that within a short time the entire British merchant fleet will be armed. Then he speaks about the training of the crews, and in the end he thanks his predecessors for the care with which they have prepared that work before the war. I submit it as document Doenitz 60, which is a collection of documents concerning naval warfare. It contains altogether 550 documents, and according to the request of the President, I have put special numbers on several documents. acted suspiciously and were for that reason attacked by the U-boats. The first document in that series is Doenitz 61, on page 150. It is a warning to neutral shipping against suspicious activities. That warning was sent in a note to all neutral delegations. At the end it points out that the ships should avoid any possibility of being confused with enemy warships or auxiliary cruisers, especially during the night. There is a warning against other suspicious conduct, for instance, changing of course, use of wireless at sight of German naval forces, zig-zagging course, dimming of lights, not stopping and the acceptance of enemy escort. That warning is repeated in the document Doenitz 62, which is on page 153, a renewed note of 19 October 1939 to the neutral governments. the Danish Government, according to the German notes warned their merchant shipping against suspicious conduct, and it is found on page 154.
on 28 September. issued to the submarines to attack dimmed vessels in certain operational areas close to the British Coast. That order is significant in connection with the cross examination of yesterday where the question was posed whether an order of that kind had been issued at all or whether that point was transmitted to the commanders orally with the directive to falsify their logs.
"Order by the SKL to the Front: Inasmuch as on the English and French coasts when encountering dimmed vessels it must be assumed that they are battleships or auxiliary battleships, full armed commitment is approved against dimmed vessels in the following territories:" U-boats West 1939 shows how this order was transmitted to the submarines. German submarines is shown by the next document which I have to submit, and it will receive the number Doenitz 101 and is on page 155. It is also under Doenitz 60. That is a statement by the British Admiralty which I will read:
"The British Admiralty on 1 October circulated the following warning among the British merchant marine:
"Withing the last few days some German U-boats have been attacked by British merchant marine vessels. In this connection the German radio announces that the German U-boats have so far observed rules of international law in warning the merchant marine vessels before attacking them. Now, however, Germany wishes to retaliate by considering every British merchant marine vessel as a battleship.
"While the first mentioned fact is absolutely untrue, it may indicate an immediate change in the policy of the German submarine warfare. Be prepared to meet it. The Admiralty."
On page 157 there is another report of the same day. The British Admiralty announces that German submarines are pursuing a new strategy. English boats are called upon to ram every German submarine. issued as a result of the armament and armed residtance by merchant vessels. I will read the order of 4 October, which was issued by the SKL to the front.
"Immediate full employment of all available weapons is permitted for submarines against merchant marine vessels of enemy nationality of which it can be noticed without a doubt that they are armed, or of which the fact that they are armed, based on conclusive evidence has been announced to the Command of Naval Warfare.
As far as circumstances permit, measures are to be taken to save the crew after every possibility of danger for the submarine has been eliminated. Passenger ships which are not used to transport troops are now as beforenot to be attacked, even if they are armed." marines. in a document on page 159, which is an excerpt from a document of the Prosecution, GB-196, Standing War Order 171, Experiences and Observations:
I should only like to read from Figure 4, the first sentence:
"Tactics of Enemy Merchant Marine Vessels: The British Navy --"
THE PRESIDENT: W hich document is that?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The document was issued before May, 1940, and I shall call on a witness to state the correct date. I assume it was in October, 1939:
"The British Navy has received the following instructions:
"(a) To fight every German submarine with all means, to ram it or attack it with water bombs, or if properly equipped, with depth charges," and there are other details given. Marine is summarized in Doenitz 66, at page 161. I shall read the order. It is an order of the 17th of October, 1939, at 1500 o'clock to the flag officers of submarines, who received the following order:
"Submarines are permitted immediate, full employment of weapons against allmerchant marine vessels, which are recognized beyond doubt as being of enemy nationality, as in any case the attempt to ram or otherwise active resistance is to be expected. Exceptions are still passenger boats of enemy nationality."
submitted already, that is a note to the neutral countries of the 22nd of October, 1932, and it summarizes the behaviour, the conduct of ships, which according to German opinion removed the peaceful character of a merchant ship.
I read from the last paragraph, the second sentence:
"According to previous experiences such tactics are certainly to be expected from English and French boats, particularly sailing in convoy, inadmissable use of wireless, dimmed out lights and beyond thatarmed resistance and attacks." of enemy ships. The German orders have been issued on the basis of the experience of our U-boats. 163, and it follows on the basis of a report of the British Admirality, on page 163. I should like to emphasize that the orders for merchant shipping are published in the hand book for the defense of merchant ships of 1938, that is, they were issued before the war. passenger ships. They are essential in connection with the Athenia case, since the Athenia was a passenger ship. of passenger ships. First is an order on the 4th of September, 1939, which I should like to read:
"On the Fuehrer's orders no enemy action against passenger ships for the time being even when in convoy." use of passenger ships as troop transports. merchant shipping, October to November, 1939, p. 3:
"As the enemy passenger lines are extensively used for transport service, therefore, any further sparing of those ships, in so far as they are convoyed could not be justified any more;"the following was ordered on the 29th of October: I read the order which is on the bottom of the page:
"Full use of armament against passenger lines if found in enemy conveys."
"Passenger liners in enemy conveys are to be subjected to immediate full use of armament by U-boats." warning had been issued during November and December against the use of armed passenger ships by publication of a list of these ships.
The next document is Doenitz 70, on page 171. It is an order of the 17th of November 1939, issued from S.K.L. to flag officers of U-boats, and I read the order:
"Immediate and full use of weapons against all clearly recognized enemy passenger ships, whose armament is detected or is already known, is permitter to U-boats." permitted. permitted also to attack passenger ships, that was four months later, after it has been permitted against other ships. 4 of my document book. I should like to emphasize again that this document is designed to encourage Grand Admiral Raeder and was termed by the Prosecution a cynical denial of international law. I should like to point out, and first, that according to the heading, it is concerned with considerations of the Skl on the Possibilities of intensifying Economic Warfare against England.
I should like to read a few paragraphs. I spoke about then, and which show a very thorough consideration of International Law has been male.
The first paragraph:
"The Fuehrer's proposal of reestablishing a just and honorable peace and setting anew the political order in Middle Europe has been rejected. The enemy powers want war with Germany's destruction as its goal. In the fight in which Germany is now forced to defend her existence and right, Germany must employ her weapons with ruthless security under full respect of the rules of soldierly conduct in combat." uses all possibility of ruthlessness.
which I should like to read:
From the paragraph, Military Demands. I read from the third sentence:
"It remains desirable to base the military measures taken, on the existing International Law; however, military measures recognized as being necessary must if successes decisive for the war can be expected, be carried out even in case the valid International Law cannot be applied in that instance. Therefore, as a matter of principle, the military weapon which could effectively break the end my power of resistance, must be based on legal maxims even if in doing so new rules of naval warfare are created.
"After weighing the political, military and economic consequences in the frame work of the entire warfare, the High Command must decide which military procedure and legal rule of warfare are to be applied."
Then there are a number of excerpts which show how S.L.L. was examining the legal situation; that is to say the present legal situation, the legal situation in case of a siege of England and in case of a blockade against England. The end, which is on page 203, emphasizes the political character of the final decision. I shall read it: "The decision to intensify economic warfare and the timing of the change to the most intensified and thus final form of naval warfare in this war is of far reaching political importance. It can be made only by the highest war command, which will weigh the military, political and economic requirements against each other." I should like to supplement that this document is of the 15th October, 1939. At the end of November, 1939, the Naval War Command took the consequent -
THE PRESIDENT: What day in October? The 15th of October?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: 15th October, Mr. President. It is a memorandum of the 15th October which has been submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you were dealing with Document GB-224. That is the one you have been reading just now.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Headed on our page 199, 3rd of November, 1939.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President, on the 3rd of November. The 3rd of November is the date at which the memorandum was distributed to the commander of the armed forces and the other commands. I am just told now that in the English text, above the word "Memorandum" the date is not printed. In the original it says, right above the word "Memorandum", "Berlin, 15 October, 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I have already submitted thedocument Doenitz 73, which is on page 206, in which neutrals are warned against the entry into the zone, which is the American combat zone declared by President Roosevelt. The German point of view, that the entry into this zone constitutes an endangering of all neutrals by their own action, is expressed also in Document Doenitz 103 on page 210. It is an interview which Grand Admiral Raeder gave to a representative of the National Broadcasting Company, New York, on 4 March, 1940 I should like to read several sentences from that document. In the second paragraph Grand Admiral Raeder points out what dangers exist for neutral ships if they act suspiciously and can be confused with enemy ships, enemy warships.
The last sentence of that paragraph reads: "The German standpoint may be expressed tersely by the formula: Whoever depends on armed assistance must be prepared for armed attack." I shall read the two last paragraphs: "In discussing the possibility of frequent differences of opinion, the commander in chief of the Navy spoke of President Roosevelt's order prohibiting American shipping in the dangerous ones around England. He said the following: 'This prohibition is the best proof against England's practice of forcing neutrals to sail through these zones without being able to guarantee their security. Germany can only advise all neutrals to imitate the policy of your President.' Question: 'Thus, according to the present state of affairs, there is no safety for neutral shipping in the war-endangered zones?' Answers: 'Probably not, so long as England adheres to her nethods...."
By the collapse of France the entire U.S.A. combat zone was declared German blockade area, That can be soon from the documents Doenitz 104 on page 212. I read from the middle of the long paragraph: "The entire sea area around England has thus become a theater of war operations. Every ship sailing this zone runs the risk of being destroyed not only by mines but also by other fighting means --
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, did you call that exhibit Doenitz 60 or-
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That was originally also one of the documents from Doenitz 60, which I have given a new number now. The new number now is Doenitz 104.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: "Every ship sailing this zone runs the risk of being destroyed not only by mines but also be other fighting means. For that reason the German Government warns again and most urgently against sailing in the endangered zone." At the end of it: "Note: The German Government refuses to assume any responsibility for damages or losses in these areas." I have included an official statement at the occasion of the proclamation of the total blockade of 17 August 1940. I should like to mention it only.
outside of these danger zones. As the first document I point to page 226. That is an excerpt of a document from the prosecution GB-196. It is a permanent order from the Flag Officer U-boats which was also issued before May, 1940. I read the first sentences: "Not to be sunk are: (a) all ships readily recognized as neutrals so long as they do not (1) move in an enemy convoy, (2) move into a declared danger zone." War Command that the neutrals should really be recognizable. I read the first sentences of the entry of 10 January, 1942: "The Naval War Command has asked the Foreign office because of the new extension of the war to point out once more to the neutral, seafaring nations with the exception of Sweden the necessity of marking their ships carefully in order to avoid having their ships mistaken for enemy ships." from the War Diary of the Flag Officer U-boats: "All commanders are once more exhaustively instructed as to their conduct towards neutrals." mitted. Doenitz 78, on page 229, contains examples of the consideration which the Flag Officer U-boats took for neutrals. The entry of 2.3 November, 1942, shows that a submarine received an order to leave the ocean area entirely because there was strong neutral traffic in that area. The second entry of December, 1942, specifies that a Portugese naval tanker had to be treated according to directives; that is to say, should not be bothered.
On page 230 there is a document which I have already mentioned. It informs us about court martial proceedings against a commanding officer who had torpedoed a neutral by mistake.
The next document is Doenitz 79 on page 231. That is the order which until the end of the war was valid for the treatment of neutrals. I do not think I have to read it. It points out again the discernibility of neutral ships and points to the agreements about shipping which have been made with a number of countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the correct date on it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: August 1, 1944, Mr. President. The original date is the 1st of April, 1943. The order was then reissued on the 1st of August, 1944, on the basis of the correction which had become necessary by shipping agreements. attacked by the document of the Prosecution, GB 191 and GB 224. Now I should like to submit several documents concerning details of the document of the Prosecution GB 191. the words:
"Every ship whether with or without escort which comes in front of our torpedo tubes will be torpedoed."
I now wish to present Doenitz 80. In Doenitz 80 there is an excerpt from that speech, on page 232, which shows in that connection that the statement of the Fuehrer was only concerned with ships which are bringing war materials to England. characteristic examples for German naval warfare. The first is the case of the Danish Steamer "Vendia." The document of the Prosecution says:
"On the 30th of September, 1939, the first sinking of a neutral ship by a submarine took place without a warning signal having been given. On that occasion people were killed. The ship was the Danish steamer 'Vendia'."
I submit that as Doenitz Exhibit 83 on page 235. That is the War Diary of the Submarine U-3, which had sunk the "Vendia."
I should like to read parts of it. I begin with the second sentence.
"The steamer turns away gradually and increases speed. The boat comes up only very slowly. Obvious attempt to escape.
"The steamer can be clearly recognized as the Danish steamer 'Vendia.' Boat reduces speed and prepares the machine-gun. Several warning shots are fired across the steamer's bow. The steamer stops very slowly; nothing happens for a while. Then some more shots are fired. The 'Vendia' lies into the wind. For ten minutes nothing can be recognized on deck, which could remove the suspicion of a possible intentional resistance. At 11.24 hours I suddenly see waves in front of the steamer and screw movements. The steamer turns sharply toward the boat. My opinion that this is an attempt at ramming is shared by the officer on watch and the first mate. Consequently I turn with the steamer. A torpedo is fired 30 seconds later; point of aim, bow; point of impact, extreme rear of the stern. The stern is torn off and goes down. The front part is still afloat.
"At the risk of the life of the crew and the boat (heavy sea and numerous floating pieces of wreckage) six men of the Danish crew are rescued, among them the captain and helmsman. Other survivors cannot be recognized. During this time the Danish steamer "Sawa" approaches and is stopped. It is requested to send the papers in a boat. It is carrying a mixed cargo from Amsterdam to Copenhagen. The six persons rescued are transferred to the steamer for repatriation.
"After the crew of the steamer had been transferred it was learned that the engineer of the steamer had told Blank that the captain had had the intention of ramming the submarine." Prosecution GB 82, shows that the case "Vendia" was the subject of a protest from the German Government to the Danish Government.
I shall deal now with the sinking of the "City of Benares" on the 18 September, 1940, and therefore I should like to read several sentences from the document of the Prosecution because it characterizes the probative value of the entire document GB 191.
I read from the British document book page 23, beginning from the passage where the Prosecution stopped reading. The Tribunal will remember that the "City of Benares" had children on board. It says here:
"The captain of the U-boat presumably did notknow that there were children on board the 'City of Benares' when he fired the torpedoes. Perhaps he did not even know the name of the ship, although there is strong evidence that he must have been dogging her for several hours before torpedoing her. probably with civilian passengers on board, certainly with a crew of merchant seamen. He knew the state of the weather, and he knew that they were six hundred miles from land and yet he followed them outside the blockade area and deliberately abstained from firing his torpedo until after nightfall when the chances of rescue would be enormously diminished." of the U-boat 48, which sunk the "City of Benares." I read the entry of the 17th of September, 1940.
"Time 1002. Convoy sighted. Course about 240 degrees. Speed seven nautical miles. Contact maintained, since underwater attack is no longer possible because of the heavy swell. No escort can be seen with the convoy." Then the entry of the 18th of September, 1940, describes a torpedo fired against a ship of that convoy, the "City of Benares." ship of that convoy, the British steamer "Marina." Both ships send wireless messages. Twenty minutes later the submarine has an artillery combat with a tanker from that convoy. That is a true story of the "City of Benares." once more concerning the sinking of "Sheaf Mead." I should like to emphasize that that ship was considerably armed and that it probably was no merchant vessel but a submarine trap.
during the cross-examination yesterday, an order by the Fuehrer of July, 1941, was submitted concerning the attack against United States merchant vessels in the blockade zone around England. The Prosecution says on account of this document that oentiz had conducted a cynical and opportunistic warfare against the neutrals.
My next document is Doenitz 86. On page 143 -
THE PRESIDENTL Was it not 243?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: 243, Mr. President. I beg your pardon. It deals with the attampts to avoid a conflict with the United States. I read the entry of 5 March 1940 from the War Diary of the Naval War Command, SKL:
"The Naval Forces are given orders, with regard to the conduct of trade warware, that U.S. ships should neither be stopped nor seized nor sunk. The reason was the assurance given by the Commander-in-Chief to the American Naval Attache, whom he received on 20 February, that German submarines were under orders not to stop any American ships. All difficulties that could arise from trade warfare between the U.S.A. and Germany are thereby to be eliminated from the start." tion of the American neutral zone, the zone of neutrality. I quote:
"The following wireless is directed to all ships at sea: American neutrality zone from now on to be observed south of 20 North only at a distance of 300 nautical miles from the coast. For reasons of foreign policy, the hitherto existing limitation will for the time being continue to be observed north of the above-mentioned line." concerning the question of neutrality toward Germany in that war. It is an excerpt from the speech of the 11th of September, 1941, which is well known:
"Hitler knows that he must win mastery of the seas if he wants to win mastery of the world. He knows that he must first tear down the bridge of ships which we are building over the Atlantic, over which we continuously transport the war material that will help destroy our patrols on the sea and in the air."
that the crews of merchant ships had been civilians and non-combatants. On page 254 I have copied the part of the document, Doenitz 67, which I have already submitted. It is an excerpt from the confidential order from the Admiralty and it deals with the training -- the gunnery training -- of civilian crews of merchant ships. I should like to point to the first page of these orders which say that in general there should be only one navy man at a gun and all other men should be taken from the crew of the ship. I read from the paragraph, under "Training":
"In addition to the gun pointer and the men specially trained for operating guns, further men are needed to complete the operating crew -- depending on the size of the gun, five to seven men -- and for bringing of the ammunition from the magazine." of the crew. the French Minister for the Merchant Marino, dated 11 November 1939, concerning the creation of an insignia for crew members of French merchant ships who can be mobilized. Page 256. I should like to emphasize that this decree was signed by the Director, the head of the Military Cabinet, The Rear Admiral, and the charac er of that order can be seen best from the paragraph before last:
"This armband, which is intended to be worn on civilian clothes, will consi of an armband of blue material with a vertical anchor of red wool. This armband can be worn only in France or in the French colonies. In any event, the men who have been provided with it must not wear it when they are in foreign territories. survivors. These documents can be found in Document Books 1 and 2 -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, don't you think it would be sufficient if you were to refer to these documents, give us the numbers of the ones, without reading from them?
They all deal, as you say, with rescue.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I believe I can do this in the case of most of them. of the GenevaConvention to naval warfare. On page 10 is a document, Doenitz 6, the order of the 4th of October, 1939, concerning the sinking of armed merchantmen, which clarifies the order I have already submitted, to rescue wherever possible without endangering their own ship. by German submarines which let go of enemy ships on that occasion. found on pages 19 to 26. I should like to put it in connection with the War Order 145, which is the document of the Prosecution, GB-196. These statements contain numerous examples out of all the years of war concerning rescue measures on the part of German submarines. One of these statements also is supplemented by photographs -- on page 21, which are included in the original. The contents of these statements are confirmed by Document Doenitz 140, page 27, where a commanding officer of a U-boat reports about rescue measures in the War Diary, and at the end there is the sentence "Taking on board of English aviators agreed to," signed by the Flag Officer, U-boats. Diary, giving an example of rescue measures after a battle with a convoy, October, 1941. It is on page 28. Tribunal has permitted me to use the standing war orders 511 and 513, in the cross-examination of Moehle. They deal with the capture of captains and chief engineers. I submit them as Doenitz 24 and 25, and they can be found on page 46 and 47. I should like to emphasize that in both orders it is said explicitly that capture should only be effected as far as it is possible without endangering the boats. on its part has issued orders to prevent the capture of the British captains by German submarines.
British order was carried out and that a U-boat is searching in vain among the life-boats for the captain.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, could you inform the Tribunal what paragraph 2 on page 46 refers to and means?
DR. KRANSBUEHIER: Yes. The paragraph points to the standing war order, No. 10; that is the order in which it is stated which neutral ships can be sunk.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it mean that those officers have to be sunk with the ship, or what?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, Mr. President. That means that captains and ships' officers of neutral ships could be left in the lifeboats and should not be taken from the life-boats; that it was in fact much safer on the life-boat than on the submarine, as seen from the English order which tells the captains to remain in the life-boats and to hide from the U-boats.
THE PRESIDENT: What if they haven't got life-boats?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I believe, Mr. President, that that case has not been ruled on. I know no case where a ship did not have life-boats, particularly in 1943, Which is the year when this order originates. That ship not only had life-boats but automatically inflating floats.
May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER : A number of examples for the fact that captains were rescued under these orders are contained in the statements of the commanders, which can be found on pages 22, 25, and 26, under Exhibit No. Doenitz 13.
played a very imprtant part in Captain Moehle's statement. The Tribunal will no doubt remember that this case was the decisive reason for the interpretation which Moehle gave to the Laconia order. I submit Exhibit No. Doenitz 26, with reference to this case, which is the affidavit from Captain Witt. Ishould like to quote a few paragraphs from that.
THE PRESIDENT : What page ?
DR. KRANSBULHLER : On page 50, Mr. President.
" In November, 1943, in the course of my official duty in the staff of the Commander in Chief of the submarines, I had to interview Naval Lieutenant Albrecht, commander of the submarine U-386, concerning his experiences during his action just terminated. Albrecht reported that at the height of Cape Finisterre he had seen by day a rubber boat with shipwrecked British aviators in the Gulf of Biscay. He did not take rescue measures he was on the way to a convoy in process of being formed. He could only have reached his position by continuing without a stop. Besides he was afraid-- "
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Kranzbuehler, is it necessary to go into the details of each partcular case ? I mean, they all depend upon their own particular circumstances. You need not to read the documents very carefully. It is not necessary at this stage of the case.
DR. KRANSBUEHLER : Very well, Mr. President, I shall only report. The affidavit briefly states that the commander hat been enlightened regarding the fact that he should have brought the aviators back. That is, in fact, the contrary of what Moehle has Said in this courtroom.