The overall situation in May 1939 gave him a welcome opportunity to pursue all these ends. This is what I thought myself insofar as I believe I knew Hitler at the time.
Now I look at the record which I did not see before. There are several points which strike me. It is quite obvious that these few pages, there are altogether twelve pages, represent only a fraction of a conference, of a speech which lasted four hours and a half. Hitler did not speak slowly. If he got excited, which he always did when he spoke, then he spoke very, very quickly. It was extremely difficult to ask spectators to follow him; one, because he was so fast two, because he spoke in Austrian dialect which we north Germans cannot follow quite so quickly. This conference, I know very well he talked to us for one hour on the origins of his political mission. We called that "now he is talking about Adam and Eve." I know that all his other speeches, he addressed the nation over the wireless, crowds over the air, one hour was always "Adam and. Eve" before he went over to something else. He explained to the soldiers, he was convinced, he said, that a soldier did not know anything about foreign politics. He told them what the German situation was within the framework of the world.
In 1939 he had changed a little in comparison to the earlier years. He was much more convinced of his own virtues than he was earlier. I recalled his modesty was not so apparent any more. Then he patted himself on the back on his successes. He talked for a long time about his successes, Austria, Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia.
When the latter subject was mentioned,he spoke oh the collaboration of Poland in order to take over the Sudeten area. At that time he became extremely furious because the Poles asked for more than he had arranged with them. He abused the Poles and said on that occasion, "For the rest I have another account to settle with them; the question of the Corridor hasn't been cleared up yet," He said, "Originally my requests wore only concerned with preserving a corridor through the Corridor; that is to say, a German Corridor from the Reich to East Prussia across the Polish area, which reached the Baltic north of Warsaw."
Later on the Free City of Danzig is mentioned. I don't think he referred to Danzig at all because he confined himself particularly to that question. Then he spoke on Britain. He said that he wished to work with Britain, but he said also Britain did not wish that he would clear up the question of the Corridor with Poland. He then abused the British. He said the British wished to have the world to themselves and they wouldn't even let poor little Germany have the Corridor.
From that matter it became quite clear what his opinion was. He became more and more excited, and then he said, "We must think what will happen if, because of the Corridor question and that question I want to settle, if war breaks out because of that, what nations will oppose us; what can these nations do militarily; and what can Germany do against them." And he talked about that a long time. He had no notes with him. He spoke without any notes, and in my opinion he completely abandoned his original subject. I cannot recall that as in the document it says, "Without invading foreign states or attacking foreign territory, this is not possible." He said, "In fifteen or twenty years resettlement will become a matter of necessity to us. No German statesman can avoid that question any longer." He said before, as I recall it, that the German people consisted of eighty million people. He then spoke for a long time how many people there were to the square mile, what agriculture these people needed, and that now just enough material was available, but in twenty years, for instance, the German people would have increased so much more that then the figure of over one hundred million was mentioned.
Then our soil would no longer be sufficient; then we would have to have more soil. Then he spoke for a long time on the question of a nation without space, his favorite expression of the have not and the rich nations and so forth.
"Other successes can no longer be won without shedding blood"; it says here. That was an idea which he did not have at that time and altogether that idea and ether ideas contained herein; I can tell you the various details; all these ideas really come only in a later period. He had these ideas only in the war.
In many speeches he very often used the same phrases and words as everybody knows who has listened to his speeches to the nation. He did not change his style very often. Many of these expressions were only too familiar to us or look very familiar now, but in certain of these expressions here I am of the opinion that it can be proved that he would not use them in 1939.
He said in one case he is expecting to be given colonies. I know that in 1933 and 1934 Hitler said once before a number of people that Bismarck's policy had been wrong in acquiring colonies; that only forced Germany to have a fleet and the German Navy under Wilhelm II had been the reason why there had been war with Britain. And in practice a colony achieved really very little; which would have preserved him from ever acquiring colonies.
In '36 and '37 he had changed his point of view completely. From an economic point of view the necessity to have colonies became urgent; and he always stated that Germany has been deprived of her colonies by the Versailles Treaty and we must get them back. In the same sense I understood his intention to build big battleships; for in '33 and '34 he was not interested at all in a Navy. He frequently said that was only going to lead into trouble with England. "I don't want to have a Navy. I want to work with England." But in '39 he was an enthusiastic colonial politician and pro-Navy. I know that because in '36 and '37 I mentioned it three or four times, and I said that Germany was in no position to build a Navy of big battleships, and when he said, "I need it for colonies if we get them", I recalled his earlier speeches that he did not wish to have any colonies, and that in my opinion colonies were of no necessity.
As the time in which one can have colonies was a limited one, it was hardly worthwhile to acquire colonies now. So, therefore, in that conference he certainly did not refer to colonies.
He declared that by the Protectorate new food had been supplied to Germany, and above all, a fairly good industrial capacity was available there. He thought in particular of the Skoda Works, which, before the last war, were the true Austrian industry and which he knew very well. To him the Skoda Works meant the same thing as to a German would mean the word Krupp. He also said, "As the Czechs will not be called up as soldiers if there should be a war, there in these big Bohemian industrial works we shall have a first rate armament works which can work for German military requirements."
All his questions about the war were of a hypothetical nature. He took part in certain maneuvers arranged by the Army, and now, in my opinion he himself wished to put hypothetical cases in a military sense-if this happened something else must be done and so forth. Surely all countries do this on the general staff, that they assume a certain situation and then work on that situation accordingly.
"A decision to attack Poland on the first given opportunity," as it says here, I have no recollection at all, but surely I would remember that, because that would have been a considerable step to take. The question there must not be simultaneous war with the West or if, in the course of a German-Polish conflict, war would be excluded, war with the West would not be impossible, then the war would primarily be directed at Britain and France; that has not been said in that form.
Then there is a passage, "Japan is a very grave problem. If, for various reasons, they take a cool attitude towards working with us, it is all the same in Japan's own interest to work to take steps against Russia in good time." I can not recall that the term Japan has been mentioned in this conference at all, but apart from that, that idea contradicts in '39 when Japan did not see Russia as an enemy, but the United States.
The remarks on economic relations with Russia are incorrect in this form here. He said once the political relations are improved, then economic relations will be possible. At that moment there were no negotiations with Russia at all, but they started late in August only. He only abused Russia at that time on 23 May in his old manner which came from certain home political opinions. It is very typical because in August political relations improved, and on the basis of these political relations there was an economic agreement also which guaranteed Germany a fair amount of foodstuff, I believe it was one million tons per year, and also a considerable support for materials necessary for war purposes.
That remark could have been made only after the end of August. Then it says here, "If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia against Germany, Italy, and Japan -- here he still thinks Russia is on the enemy side, -- "I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows." I have to say this about that. A few annihilating blows were never mentioned before the war. The Wehrmacht and also Hitler were convinced that it would be a long and difficult struggle in order to gain a foot-hold in France in the military sense. The experiences of the First World War when those long battles took place on French soil without the possibility of strategic break-through did point out to the Wehrmacht not to take too lighthearted a view of a new war.
When France fell so quickly in 1940 everybody, including Hitler, was tremendously surprised. We couldn't understand it for a long time because otherwise it could not be understood why not immediately after Dunkirk an action against Britain would have been taken by the Wehrmacht, instead of which there were preparations for months, and the Luftwaffe and everybody else remained completely inactive without going into action. If one had counted on a few annihilating blows, then surely there would have been the ships ready to sail to England. That operation was started after Dunkirk; and it took several months until the first ships of the so-called Sea Lion were assembled on the Channel coast. At the time an operation against England was no longer possible. "The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England." He did not doubt it. He always emphasized that he wished to direct his policy in such a manner as to work with Britain; and he always said, "Even if Britain now condemns my action and threatens me, I shall know how to deal with it. There will never be war with Britain, even if I have to give in politically. But the British are very good at bluffing. So am I. We shall see who is better at this game."
I was convinced to the end and am so now that Hitler bluffed, just as in the affair when he occupied the Rhineland, in the case of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the Sudetenland. He did not wish to go to war at that time; and as he was successful in bluffing because of the first operations, he was backed by nothing, and he wanted to bluff again and believed himself to be able to attain the glory of having settled the Corridor of Poland, even if it were only the Corridor across the Corridor.
Because he was very ambitious, he was convinced that he would always be successful. He believed that he had been appointed by Providence, as he called it, and particularly favored by Providence.
Hitler was not a blasphemist. On the contrary, originally he was very pious. He said to me once, "A man who does not believe in God will never be faithful to his people. I do not wish to have anything to do with anybody who has not his God in his heart." He said so in 1934 or 1935. Therefore, all these words concerning Britain are wrong.
About Dutch and Belgian air bases to be occupied militarily, nothing was mentioned at the time. That was an idea which was completely remote at the time. "The opinion to buy one's way out cheaply is dangerous. There is no such possibility." These are ideas which it is true he expressed but always on the hypothetical assumption that there may be war and if there is a war, then it will be a life and death struggle, and then we must burn our boats. Either we win or we shall be dead. This was just a pep talk for his generals.
He was sufficiently well-informed not to say that "Britain in the last war could feed herself without importing, which is no longer possible today." Britain didn't feed herself in the First World War without imports, which Hitler knew very well. He says here that meager supplies may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise. It is quite clear that he meant the 11th of January 1940 when an aircraft which was to have received an order had to make a crash landing in Belgium; and secret orders regarding our aggressive intentions against Holland, Belgium and France were carried there. Hitler never counted on such things.
THE TRIBUNAL (JUDGE LUSMANNO): I'm confused as to the dates. These are notes of a conference or of a lecture on May 23, 1939; and I understand the witness refers to an episode of January 1940.
Perhaps I didn't catch that correctly.
DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Court, the situation is this; and the witness will explain it in advance that in his conviction this record in this form was written only in 1940. That was the reason why Neurath, Raeder, and Schmieling were interrogated by me; and that is why this case is current now.
THE TRIBUNAL (JUDGE MUSMANNO): When he said he was referring to the episode of January 1940, he meant Schmundt was referring to the episode of 1940 and not Hitler?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, that is so, Your Honor.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q Will you please continue?
A When this silly accident occurred on the 11th of January 1940, I know that Hitler always referred to this episode as a "Silly accident". I never heard him use that term before or otherwise. Then there's Point 4, why a surprise may not come off, Weather conditions. That point comes from the time after the Polish war. Hitler immediately after Poland wished to attack the West; but it demanded a period of six consecutive days of fine weather because at that time he was still convinced that he could attack only with the help of the Luftwaffe; and the Luftwaffe needed fine weather. There were so many weather conferences at that time as I had never seen them in my thirty-five years and more of flyers' life. Every single day and every day in Hitler's presence the weather exports would foregather. We said, "He'll talk to them until they will really provide fine weather." There was a man even engaged who was supposed to produce. it. He alleged that he could influence the weather. He had a funny name which I can't recall; but his name sounded suspiciously like "Deceiver". So we said, "We needn't give him a nickname because he's got one already."
In 1939, in May, Hitler didn't bother about the weather conditions, I am not sure even that he knew we had a weather service in the Luftwaffe, nor can I recall that in this context he spoke about the justice or the injustice of treaties.
It's also very illogical that he should say here that an annihilating blow could only be dealt if and when one did not slide into a war afterward or during the war with Poland. This is the correct statement. He does not wish to be involved in war with England. He would regard that as a great political blunder if he became involved. He does wish to settle the Corridor question of Poland but does not wish to risk war with Britain on that score. The idea that the army will have to hold positions and so forth is an idea which he also only conceived in the war with France.
Then there is the sentence about the army in cooperation with the navy and the Luftwaffe, and once the army has taken the most important positions, the industrial production no longer flows into the military matters but will be for the benefit of the Luftwaffe and the navy. To that I have to say that this is such a typical idea which was conceived only after the war with France. That Hitler should have spoken about the Danaides, which is an old mythological comparison, is quite impossible because such expressions are completely unknown to him. He didn't learn that in his school days.
To the question that the industrial production should be for the benefit of the Luftwaffe, I could provide evidence of that; that after the war in France, as late as the spring of 1941, I should say perhaps April or May, very short of the Russian campaign, there indeed Hitler calls together a conference and said, "Now I no longer need the armament for the army. Now a lot, or a large part of the factories that should work for the Army should be switched over for the Luftwaffe, and, also take part of it for the Navy." He stated that fact in that manner. He said then he could not sleep, that he had a new idea. Now he could give the Luftwaffe what it had always demanded. That was in 1941. I am convinced that this record was not written before 1941. He never said that the British Navy had a defense installation against the Luftwaffe at that time; that may have been the case in 1940 or 1941. It is not true, because the defensive installation of the British Navy was in existence in 1939. I got this as one of the reasons why he actually had this war in 1939, but that is the reason given about the events afterwards.
Then there are the other two very clear points which enlarged only after the war had commenced; The correct estimate of the effectiveness, for instance, of the aircraft, the battleships, and the aircraft carriers, and, which is the more effective on little occasions, and it was considered as a whole the aircraft carrier is a better protection for a convoy, and, (b), is an air attack on a factory more important than on a battleship, where the battleship protection is any protection for a convoy. The question of aircraft carriers, battleships and convoys arose only in 1940, then the new ones were built for convoys.
The question of aircraft attack on factories, or on battleships, was discussed by Hitler for the first time after the campaign in France, roughly, in August 1940. He maintained that you could sink a battleship by bombs, but he was speaking only of cruisers and smaller battleships for sometime thereafter.
Then the attack an the British was stressed, and he concentrated on the question which of the other, British Navy or the British Industry -- the British war industry should be attacked, and should be number one, but that before the battleships even the aircraft carriers should be attacked. These questions arose, in other words, in the fall of 1940. I myself have had no idea on that but just the same started to study various things which had been brought together, and, he said at that time, that I know that the questions connected with the war must be studied so that for every emergency a solution should be held ready in every regard, and he himself included as in the "C in C" not to be made part of this. I do not know whether this sort of planning so started was brought together with the aircraft. I never heard anything about it at all. Then finally the question of secrecy arose. He certainly did not care that secrecy must be maintained so far as Japan and Italy were concerned. The first question of secrecy towards Italy arose when Italy attacked and invaded Greece from Albania. Hitler was highly indignant because he had not been informed previously, that the Italian government had not taken him into its confidence; although after the Italian Army had marched into Greece, after this occurrence I think he would have never had the idea to go into Greece. The relations between Germany and Greece were always friendly, even in the First World War. Even when it said that everything which goes through the Maginot Line must be made by Italy, but I know positively in that sense that the Maginot Line was not mentioned at all. Then finally there are the working members, of course, that is, as to the frequently mentioned secrecy orders. These secrecy orders were the so called Fuehrer Order No. 1, and was ordered for the first time as of 11 January 1940, dictated and ordered by Hitler himself, and it said that nobody must tell anybody anything else, and so forth. At that time nobody thought of the order, and the order was not even mentioned at that time. As to what I said at the beginning, Hitler said, "in all my conferences I want to say that all those questions must not be discussed at all amongst each other", which is the reason I conferred with Goering on that subject.
Q. Witness, you talked also on the question of where Goering is alleged to have asked the question at that meeting you talked about this morning.
A. Yes, I remember.
Q. I want to ask one more question in this regard. On one point was the population of non-German territory, makes no military service and is available for labor, and this question arose at that time in which the slave labor was talked about?
A. I think that is entirely out of the question of slave labor available, as I recall that in the connection of the Skoda works it was mentioned and particularly it was said that every good worker is in the priority, and protection to be assured every good skilled worker, he said. I know that as late as 1940 there was a meeting called where it was discussed within this four year plan at the time the assurance on the question of making prisoners of war available for work. This was maintained, and, that is, I know there was an agreement with France on the use of the prisoners of war. That was a new idea at the time, and the recruiting of foreign workers came from the time when the labor plenipotentiary decreed that work.
Q. In other words, you mean to say that from this meeting you did not try to conclude that Hitler was planning to use slave workers, or workers of foreign nations?
A. In no sense of the word. May I repeat, I don't think that Hitler he did not actually plan the war at the time, but that I say with regard to slave workers in the sense discussing it, he could have discussed that with Sauckel, and reported to Sauckel about it, and this idea of war in a practical sense was not in his mind at all, therefore, not the question of slave labor.
Q. Witness, you have had a talk with him before that in which he assured you that there would be no war?
A. Yes.
Q. In this conference, did you get the impression that Hitler had changed--basically changed his viewpoint?
A. No. In a conversation, or in a conference like this one, or from any conversation in the past, not only before he succeeded Blomberg as "C in C", but also when he was Supreme Commander after Hindenburg's death, and he was very fond of planning and of solving different kinds of strategical problems.
Q. Witness, you have said that Hitler had told all of his listeners that they should not talk to each other about these things. If at that time there had been talk of preparation of war, would not they have been necessary to speak to each other with regard to these preparations?
A. Quite obviously. For instance, in my capacity as Inspectorate General, at the time also I was responsible for the training of the people on the feeding, and on the clothing of the troops and other equipment of which I had to know, so that I could have then taken preparations. I had no orders in the sense to make any preparations, and already I said this morning about the promise which we did not have. I always urged the bombing part of the question that he mentioned in the conference, because I say the invasion of Czechoslovakia could not have been effective without war.
Q Witness, as a result of this conference, had you made any preparations for this alleged or claimed coming war?
A In no sense. I would have had to have an order from Goering via the General Staff. The General Staff would have had to make the proper decisions; Goering would have signed them, and I would have been given them and carried them out. Not one of those orders ever reached me.
Q Witness, did I understand you correctly? You mean to say that the protocol, or the minutes here, do not correspond to the real contents of the conference?
A That is what I wish to say. I am firmly convinced, having seen real record here for the first time - formerly I saw brief extracts in English, which did not give all these details - I am perfectly convinced that here history has been falsified, because it was intended to force history in order to prove how wise Hitler was to foresee events as early as 1939 after he had been successful in Poland and the West, and when he thought the war had been won for him. May I also add that in the course of the war a department war history was founded in Hitler's staff, and history was written in that same way.
Q In other words, you speak of a falsification of war history?
A Hitler himself was not responsible for these falsifications, but the various people who were in this department.
Q Witness, in connection with this conference of the 23rd of May 1939, you have been reproached with having been called to this conference of the 23rd of May 1939, and that this fact proved that you were a member of the intimate circle around Adolf Hitler. May I ask you to explain your position with regard to that?
A First of all, nobody of the inner circle was present at the time for Keitel and Jodl were not at that time members of Hitler's inner circle, they may have become members of the inner circle, if at all, during the war.
There were only present the Supreme Commanders in Chief, their Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of the OKW with his representative, nobody else. As Goering was no 1776 a present and I was the next senior officer, I was automatically invited by Hitler's A de C, as it seems that Goering, at the very last moment, was prevented from turning up at a very late moment.
I saw that Admiral Raeder says he had turned up in civilian clothes. I think by that he means naval civilian uniform, he means the jacket with the gold braid. The Navy didn't wear their arms equipment, the Navy merely carried a dagger.
Q Witness, when, after that, did you clearly get information that war was intended? From whom did you get the information, and what details do you know about?
A On 15 August I was ordered to go to Berchtesgaden where Goering was. I wrote in my diary, "informs me of his intentions. He is very nervous." The intention which he expressed there was that there was a possibility, or possibility existed, of war breaking out and all preparations had to be taken.
On the 21st of August I was ordered once again to go to Berchtesgaden and on that occasion the four chiefs of the air fleet were present. In the evening Goering told us that there would be a conference at Hitler's office of all military loaders. In that preparatory conference, so to speak, which was concerned with the air fleet chiefs not with myself - the report came in that there had been a telegram from Stalin, as I regarded it, that "Russia goes together with us." Later on I heard that this telegram had not been quite so far-reaching, but we were all under the impression that Germany had come to an agreement with Russia, an agreement which was a very important one for German military questions. German soldiers had always advocated collaboration with Russia as long ago as at the time of Bismarck and Moltke; and the small German Wehrmacht after 1918 became very greatly in good and intimate relations with the Russians' military machine.
On that day, on the 22nd of August, at 4 o'clock, all commanders-in-chief, all leaders of the armed group, all army leaders, all chiefs of air fleets, Mere present. There was a large number of people present, about 40 I should say. Hitler again gave a speech. There was no debate, apart from the fact that Goering once again reassured the Fuehrer of the loyalty of the 1777 a Wehrmacht.
During the conference it was said that relations with Poland had now reached a highly critical point, one war seemed inevitable; "in the next few days orders will be given as to whether you have to report or not; everybody has to be ready; you have to mobilize and you have to take up from this starting point. However, everybody has to wait, as diplomatic negotiations are still going on."
Then in between, I believe there was a brief order for the 27th of August, "Be ready tomorrow and report tomorrow." This order was rescinded a few hours later.
I do not wish to commit myself 100 percent for that date of 27 August, but I believe it was that day. Just a moment.
No, I am sorry, it was on the 25th, the 25th of August. The order was given to "report tomorrow", and rescinded very shortly afterwards. We hoped at that moment that the diplomats would settle the matter and war could be avoided.
That is how matters stood until August 31, when, at 1700, the order to attack was given for the next morning at 4:30 or some such hour.
Q Thank you. Witness, now when, on the 22nd of August, 1939, you heard that the war was rather probable, what did you think at that time? Did you still retain your opinion that the war was to be avoided, or did you change it, or what steps did you take in order to avoid the war?
AAt the first opportunity I had I talked to Goering, and Goering said to me that through a Swedish gentleman, Count Dahlehus, he was still negotiating with Britain, hoping to avoid war. I am still convinced today that Goering did not wish the war to break out.
Then, when it was clear that war with Poland would break out, I advised Goering to go to England personally, of course with Hitler's permission in order to try and save what could be saved.
My impression from my visit in 1937 was that Goering had sympathies in England - that was what everybody explained to me at the time, and I assumed that it was correct - while Hitler and other Party members, above all Ribbentrop, were taken a negative view of 1778 a there.
I reported this to Hitler also, after my visit to England, that Ribbentrop was hardly the suitable man to represent Hitler's policy in Britain. I felt obliged to say so. Now I believed, perhaps, that a man like Goering, who was diplomatically very skillful and who certainly was very determined to have peace - perhaps he was the only man to avoid war.
Goering was prepared and went also to Hitler, but I didn't see him afterwards, because shortly afterwards Britain joined in the war, on the third of the tenth month. Britain and France declared war on that day. I had no more possibility of doing anything at all, because though I knew the command of the Luftwaffe Department, they had as little political influence as I had myself.