Then the attack an the British was stressed, and he concentrated on the question which of the other, British Navy or the British Industry -- the British war industry should be attacked, and should be number one, but that before the battleships even the aircraft carriers should be attacked. These questions arose, in other words, in the fall of 1940. I myself have had no idea on that but just the same started to study various things which had been brought together, and, he said at that time, that I know that the questions connected with the war must be studied so that for every emergency a solution should be held ready in every regard, and he himself included as in the "C in C" not to be made part of this. I do not know whether this sort of planning so started was brought together with the aircraft. I never heard anything about it at all. Then finally the question of secrecy arose. He certainly did not care that secrecy must be maintained so far as Japan and Italy were concerned. The first question of secrecy towards Italy arose when Italy attacked and invaded Greece from Albania. Hitler was highly indignant because he had not been informed previously, that the Italian government had not taken him into its confidence; although after the Italian Army had marched into Greece, after this occurrence I think he would have never had the idea to go into Greece. The relations between Germany and Greece were always friendly, even in the First World War. Even when it said that everything which goes through the Maginot Line must be made by Italy, but I know positively in that sense that the Maginot Line was not mentioned at all. Then finally there are the working members, of course, that is, as to the frequently mentioned secrecy orders. These secrecy orders were the so called Fuehrer Order No. 1, and was ordered for the first time as of 11 January 1940, dictated and ordered by Hitler himself, and it said that nobody must tell anybody anything else, and so forth. At that time nobody thought of the order, and the order was not even mentioned at that time. As to what I said at the beginning, Hitler said, "in all my conferences I want to say that all those questions must not be discussed at all amongst each other", which is the reason I conferred with Goering on that subject.
Q. Witness, you talked also on the question of where Goering is alleged to have asked the question at that meeting you talked about this morning.
A. Yes, I remember.
Q. I want to ask one more question in this regard. On one point was the population of non-German territory, makes no military service and is available for labor, and this question arose at that time in which the slave labor was talked about?
A. I think that is entirely out of the question of slave labor available, as I recall that in the connection of the Skoda works it was mentioned and particularly it was said that every good worker is in the priority, and protection to be assured every good skilled worker, he said. I know that as late as 1940 there was a meeting called where it was discussed within this four year plan at the time the assurance on the question of making prisoners of war available for work. This was maintained, and, that is, I know there was an agreement with France on the use of the prisoners of war. That was a new idea at the time, and the recruiting of foreign workers came from the time when the labor plenipotentiary decreed that work.
Q. In other words, you mean to say that from this meeting you did not try to conclude that Hitler was planning to use slave workers, or workers of foreign nations?
A. In no sense of the word. May I repeat, I don't think that Hitler he did not actually plan the war at the time, but that I say with regard to slave workers in the sense discussing it, he could have discussed that with Sauckel, and reported to Sauckel about it, and this idea of war in a practical sense was not in his mind at all, therefore, not the question of slave labor.
Q. Witness, you have had a talk with him before that in which he assured you that there would be no war?
A. Yes.
Q. In this conference, did you get the impression that Hitler had changed--basically changed his viewpoint?
A. No. In a conversation, or in a conference like this one, or from any conversation in the past, not only before he succeeded Blomberg as "C in C", but also when he was Supreme Commander after Hindenburg's death, and he was very fond of planning and of solving different kinds of strategical problems.
Q. Witness, you have said that Hitler had told all of his listeners that they should not talk to each other about these things. If at that time there had been talk of preparation of war, would not they have been necessary to speak to each other with regard to these preparations?
A. Quite obviously. For instance, in my capacity as Inspectorate General, at the time also I was responsible for the training of the people on the feeding, and on the clothing of the troops and other equipment of which I had to know, so that I could have then taken preparations. I had no orders in the sense to make any preparations, and already I said this morning about the promise which we did not have. I always urged the bombing part of the question that he mentioned in the conference, because I say the invasion of Czechoslovakia could not have been effective without war.
Q Witness, as a result of this conference, had you made any preparations for this alleged or claimed coming war?
A In no sense. I would have had to have an order from Goering via the General Staff. The General Staff would have had to make the proper decisions; Goering would have signed them, and I would have been given them and carried them out. Not one of those orders ever reached me.
Q Witness, did I understand you correctly? You mean to say that the protocol, or the minutes here, do not correspond to the real contents of the conference?
A That is what I wish to say. I am firmly convinced, having seen real record here for the first time - formerly I saw brief extracts in English, which did not give all these details - I am perfectly convinced that here history has been falsified, because it was intended to force history in order to prove how wise Hitler was to foresee events as early as 1939 after he had been successful in Poland and the West, and when he thought the war had been won for him. May I also add that in the course of the war a department war history was founded in Hitler's staff, and history was written in that same way.
Q In other words, you speak of a falsification of war history?
A Hitler himself was not responsible for these falsifications, but the various people who were in this department.
Q Witness, in connection with this conference of the 23rd of May 1939, you have been reproached with having been called to this conference of the 23rd of May 1939, and that this fact proved that you were a member of the intimate circle around Adolf Hitler. May I ask you to explain your position with regard to that?
A First of all, nobody of the inner circle was present at the time for Keitel and Jodl were not at that time members of Hitler's inner circle, they may have become members of the inner circle, if at all, during the war.
There were only present the Supreme Commanders in Chief, their Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of the OKW with his representative, nobody else. As Goering was no 1776 a present and I was the next senior officer, I was automatically invited by Hitler's A de C, as it seems that Goering, at the very last moment, was prevented from turning up at a very late moment.
I saw that Admiral Raeder says he had turned up in civilian clothes. I think by that he means naval civilian uniform, he means the jacket with the gold braid. The Navy didn't wear their arms equipment, the Navy merely carried a dagger.
Q Witness, when, after that, did you clearly get information that war was intended? From whom did you get the information, and what details do you know about?
A On 15 August I was ordered to go to Berchtesgaden where Goering was. I wrote in my diary, "informs me of his intentions. He is very nervous." The intention which he expressed there was that there was a possibility, or possibility existed, of war breaking out and all preparations had to be taken.
On the 21st of August I was ordered once again to go to Berchtesgaden and on that occasion the four chiefs of the air fleet were present. In the evening Goering told us that there would be a conference at Hitler's office of all military loaders. In that preparatory conference, so to speak, which was concerned with the air fleet chiefs not with myself - the report came in that there had been a telegram from Stalin, as I regarded it, that "Russia goes together with us." Later on I heard that this telegram had not been quite so far-reaching, but we were all under the impression that Germany had come to an agreement with Russia, an agreement which was a very important one for German military questions. German soldiers had always advocated collaboration with Russia as long ago as at the time of Bismarck and Moltke; and the small German Wehrmacht after 1918 became very greatly in good and intimate relations with the Russians' military machine.
On that day, on the 22nd of August, at 4 o'clock, all commanders-in-chief, all leaders of the armed group, all army leaders, all chiefs of air fleets, Mere present. There was a large number of people present, about 40 I should say. Hitler again gave a speech. There was no debate, apart from the fact that Goering once again reassured the Fuehrer of the loyalty of the 1777 a Wehrmacht.
During the conference it was said that relations with Poland had now reached a highly critical point, one war seemed inevitable; "in the next few days orders will be given as to whether you have to report or not; everybody has to be ready; you have to mobilize and you have to take up from this starting point. However, everybody has to wait, as diplomatic negotiations are still going on."
Then in between, I believe there was a brief order for the 27th of August, "Be ready tomorrow and report tomorrow." This order was rescinded a few hours later.
I do not wish to commit myself 100 percent for that date of 27 August, but I believe it was that day. Just a moment.
No, I am sorry, it was on the 25th, the 25th of August. The order was given to "report tomorrow", and rescinded very shortly afterwards. We hoped at that moment that the diplomats would settle the matter and war could be avoided.
That is how matters stood until August 31, when, at 1700, the order to attack was given for the next morning at 4:30 or some such hour.
Q Thank you. Witness, now when, on the 22nd of August, 1939, you heard that the war was rather probable, what did you think at that time? Did you still retain your opinion that the war was to be avoided, or did you change it, or what steps did you take in order to avoid the war?
AAt the first opportunity I had I talked to Goering, and Goering said to me that through a Swedish gentleman, Count Dahlehus, he was still negotiating with Britain, hoping to avoid war. I am still convinced today that Goering did not wish the war to break out.
Then, when it was clear that war with Poland would break out, I advised Goering to go to England personally, of course with Hitler's permission in order to try and save what could be saved.
My impression from my visit in 1937 was that Goering had sympathies in England - that was what everybody explained to me at the time, and I assumed that it was correct - while Hitler and other Party members, above all Ribbentrop, were taken a negative view of 1778 a there.
I reported this to Hitler also, after my visit to England, that Ribbentrop was hardly the suitable man to represent Hitler's policy in Britain. I felt obliged to say so. Now I believed, perhaps, that a man like Goering, who was diplomatically very skillful and who certainly was very determined to have peace - perhaps he was the only man to avoid war.
Goering was prepared and went also to Hitler, but I didn't see him afterwards, because shortly afterwards Britain joined in the war, on the third of the tenth month. Britain and France declared war on that day. I had no more possibility of doing anything at all, because though I knew the command of the Luftwaffe Department, they had as little political influence as I had myself.
Q. Witness, but you personally, would you have had a possibility to get out of your order to do military service - to avoid that?
A. That, of course, is quite impossible. After all I was not a fair weather soldier. I had become a soldier to fight in a war should war break out. That was demanded by loyalty to one's own people.
Q. Witness, what was your first war time order in 1939?
A. My orders were shortly before the attack on Poland to go to Goering's headquarters and to be among his military staff. That finished my task in the ministry. The organization had been created before in such a way as to have a chief of air defense under me. This chief of air defense had nothing to do with actual defense; it was merely a highsounding title. In a civilian ministry you would have said deputy state secretary. He, in other words, was my deputy ministerial secretary. This was an officer of high rank who looked after all the ministerial tasks in the ministry independently. That didn't mean I lost my position in the air ministry; I was merely relieved, but I remained inspector general. Throughout the Polish campaign and later on in the campaign of the west I followed Goering's headquarters. I made daily flights with the troops, to the troops, and I was only active as an inspector general for there was no point in just sitting around in the headquarters; I had nothing to do.
Q. Thank you. After the campaign in Poland did you receive a special task?
A. Yes, I did. I said once before that we had no bombs. On 12 October, that was after the Reichstag meeting, and when Hitler failed to come to peace terms; that offer was never answered; Hitler ordered the war goes on; now you must produce bombs. That really should have been the task of the Army Arms Department. I contacted that department, as I did our own departments, and as the man responsible for the whole complex, it was not until the spring of 1940 when it came to an end, and I saw to it that the Luftwaffe received a sufficient number of bombs. I was deeply worried that the war would start in the autumn as Hitler wished it, and it was not possible to produce bombs between the 12th of October and whatever date Hitler had in mind, because after all if all went well, you would have to have a period of four to five months to start.
I began to produce concrete bombs to the tune of one million, which contained sufficient high explosives. The high explosives for these concrete bombs could be produced within a few days. By accident I had seen that type of manufacture in Switzerland, and I thought it a very good idea of producing bombs when I saw the explosive effect, that is to say, on buildings and solid objects which was as good as that of metal, or almost as good as that of metal bombs. We succeeded in a very few weeks to produce a sufficient number of concrete bombs, and in the spring, before we attacked France, we had a sufficient number of bombs.
Q. Witness, did you know anything about the preparations of the Norwegian campaign?
A. No.
Q. When did you hear, for the first time, of the carrying out of the Norwegian campaign and its preparations?
A. On 8 April, from Goering. The occupation took place on the ninth; a few hours so to speak before.
Q. Witness, did you have any part in the preparation of the campaign against Holland and Belgium?
A. On 12th of April I had been promoted Commander of Air Fleet V in Norway. The Luftwaffe there had been under the order of somebody else before. On account of difficulties of service there, moreover, there was only one telephone line which went via Sweden an independent command was to be established there. From the beginning of the war communications had been asked for and we received them to be used at the front. This had been given to me for the time being there. I commanded the Fleet from 12 April until 5 May; then the first operations in Norway had been concluded and connections had been established at the front and Goering insisted that I should return for the campaign in the west. On the 7th of May in the evening I arrived in Berlin, and on 8 May I reported back. That is, I had to report for the first time to the offensive in the the West and it began on the 10th of May.
DR. BERGOLD: Before I ask any more questions, may it please the Tribunal, I think that this is the time when the Tribunal would like to take a recess.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Tribunal 2 is again in session.
DR. BERGOLD: Mr. Denney is missing. May I begin?
THE PRESIDENT: Wait just a minute.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q Witness, I have to put another question. According to the campaign in the west, you told us that only immediately you knew about that. Did you take part in the preparation for this?
A No, I did not.
Q Witness, after the campaign in the west you received the Iron Cross. What were the reasons for it?
A I received it after the Norway campaign, for my work in the Norway campaign.
Q When did you become Field Marshal?
A 19 July 1940.
Q Can you give us the reasons for that, as far as you know?
A There was the question of how many vacancies of Field Marshals should be allotted to the Air Force. First of all there was talk of just two. In that case I wouldn't have become a Field Marshal.
THE PRESIDENT: Let me announce that any spectators who wish, inside the rail, may sit at this table here.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q Please continue.
A In that case there would only have been the two chiefs of fleet who would become Field Marshals, those who had been in active service in the French campaign. Since, however, I was senior in rank, being the only Colonel General in the air force, one did not wish to pass by me, and Hitler decided that I, too, should be promoted to Field Marshal. In that connection he gave credit for the fact that according to my flying logbook I had made about 40 sorties, and also he wanted to recognize my service in Norway, which actually probably wouldn't have been quite enough.
Q. Witness, did you have anything to do with the air attacks on England, the so-called Blitzkrieg?
A. No.
Q. When did you know about it the first time of the attack on Yugoslavia and Greece, and did you take part in the preparation?
A. No, I did not take part in the preparations. The attack took place on the sixth of April. That is, the attack against Yugoslavia and Greece. Both came to the General Government as a surprise, since previously there had been a mutual agreement between us and the Yugoslavs. When the government was removed - I think the prime minister was called Stojadinowicz, and, likewise, the regent, the Prince -- and from that moment onwards the Yugoslavs were at war with us. Greece too, through Italy's defeat, became a prerequisite since it was impossible for us to let down the Italians who were our allies. I myself only heard about the whole affair immediately before the attack, or rather, after it had already taken place. May I just confirm that briefly. It was on the previous day - that is, the 5th of April - in the afternoon, that I landed in Vienna and then I drove out to visit Goering at Semmering in the evening of the fifth day that I learned that the following morning something was afoot. Previously I had been on anti-aircraft precaution inspections through Germany which was under my jurisdiction, and I was responsible for protection of German cities in the West and North, and I had taken care of the necessary shelters there. It was about as I had material and labor for that purpose at the time.
Q. Witness, when did you know that an attack on Russia was imminent? From whom?
A. It was on the fourteenth of June, 1941, when I was with Hitler. The orders were given out to the Navy, Air Force, and the Army. On the other hand, previously I had already heard that Hitler was afraid of an attack by the Russians.
For instance, Goering told me so on the 13th of January. I was surprised and I just couldn't believe it. In fact I told Goering, "I think that is out of the question. We have considerable 1784 (a) supply contracts - mutual supply contracts - with the Russians.
There was development work of the German Air Force which was planned, and which had been sold by order of Hitler. For instance, we sold them our latest fighter plane; likewise the most modern and newest instruments, such as ... All these things where we had opposition in connection with these sales because I said these are all things we haven't got ourselves. They have only just been developed. But it was said the Russians wanted these things and we have got to supply them with something in exchange for the large-scale supplies which we got from them. Thus, I did not believe in an attack.
But then, at some future time - and I think it was towards end of April - the chief of the anti-aircraft system came and visited me - whom I have already mentioned - who came together with the chief of the Administers' Department, who was in charge of clothing, and he told me that he wanted to have my opinion; whether I believed that, in a Russian campaign, there would not be any necessity for winter clothing. I jumped up from my chair and put my hand down, "Surely I didn't understand you correctly. What did you say?" And he said, "In the Russian campaign, you know." I said, "What Russian campaign?" And he looked up and said, "I beg your pardon, Field Marshal. Don't you know anything about it?" And I said, "About what?" And he said, "I beg your pardon. According to Fuehrer Order Number One you, too, must be told." And I said, "Look here.
Now the world is coming to an end. You know something, and I - your immediate superior - know nothing about it". And he said, "I am terribly sorry, but I can't say another thing."
Now, of course, I was hit by the idea, although it wasn't a clear one, and I said to him; "I am now giving you the formal order for the Air Force; that winter clothing should be obtained to the greatest possible degree." And, I, myself, ordered that every man should at least have four woolen shirts and four woolen drawers, and that everybody should have high fur boots and a fur coat.
And he followed up by saying, "These instructions of yours are in direct contradiction of an order of Hitler's." I said, "Well, now, will you please at least tell me what is going on?" And he said, "Well, what is really going on - that is something I don't know. We have only got an order to the effect that troops should be equipped with clothing for a Russian campaign. Now, whether that is going to be originated by the Russians or us - that is something I don't know. But it has been said that this campaign would not last through the winter." So I went on to say, "Well, you know, these people have gone crazy. We have already had one war with Russia and we needed three winters for that. And this time we are going to need clothing for three winters, at least, also." And he said to me that he was of the same opinion that if I signed the thing, then he would immediately proceed with the matter; that he, himself, couldn't infringe Hitler's order.
So I gave him this written order he wanted to the effect that he should obtain this winter clothing. It was obtained and the Air Force could give some of it to the Army afterwards. This was the second point when I had heard it, but it wasn't clear.
Q. Just a moment, witness. Is it correct that at this occasion that this man said the clothing was not necessary for the reason because the campaign against Russia would be finished before the winter?
A. Hitler had given the order that no winter clothing should be obtained since the war in the East would be completed before the winter. But, of course, considering that I went on to think during the night, it was quite clear what we were concerned with. It was my fear that we would now come to a war. I can't tell you the day when it actually happened. It may have been 1786 (a) the beginning of May.